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This thesis discusses the long-run effects of exposure to shocks in developing
economies in Latin America. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the effects of expo-
sure to violence in the context of the Peruvian armed conflict occurred from
1980 to 2000, while chapter 3 studies the impacts of family size on female
labor supply of Latin American women with two or more children. The first
chapter estimates the effects of exposure to violence associated with the Peru-
vian civil conflict on trust in government institutions and on participation in
social organizations finding that violence exposure reduces the levels of trust
in government institutions, especially when the exposed population identifies
the government as the responsible of the acts of violence. The second paper
aims to shed light on how alternative measures of conflict exposure can affect
the estimated impacts of conflict. The results suggest that the definition of
conflict exposure influence not only the magnitude of the estimated effects,
but also their statistical significance. The third chapter relies on an instru-
mental variable strategy to estimate the causal relationship between family
size and female labor supply using data from 15 countries in Latin America
in 2010. The results of this paper suggest a positive relationship between
family size and some labor market outcomes such as number of hours worked
per week and formality.
Chapter 1: Does conflict undermine social capital? Long-run evidence from
Peru
Could conflict have a lasting impact on a society’s social capital even long
after it ends? If so, how does conflict exposure affect individuals’ trust in
government and institutions and their participation in social organizations?
This paper exploits the progression of the 1980-2000 conflict in Peru over
time and space to show that exposure to conflict reduces trust in govern-
ment institutions and participation in local social organizations associated
with the provision of public services. Overall the results suggest that expo-
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sure to conflict has negative effects on trust in institutions such as district and
province governments and institutions of the electoral system and the media,
although these effects do not translate to other types of civil organizations
like the Church, the Ombudsman’s office or to the police. The estimated
results suggest that the age period from 7 to 18 years old is key for the de-
velopment of trust in government authorities, while the period immediately
after the minimum legal age for voting (18 years old in Peru) is relevant to
establishing trust in the institutions of the electoral system. These negative
impacts seem to be driven by exposure to violence perpetrated by govern-
ment forces. Finally, results showing the effects of civil conflict violence on
participation reveal a negative relation between conflict exposure and par-
ticipation in groups associated with the public provision of services such as
education and food security, while the effects of violence on participation in
cultural, political and social organizations are negligible.
Chapter 2: Measurement matters: evidence from alternative definitions of
conflict exposure on the estimated effects of the Peruvian conflict
This paper discusses the estimated effects of alternative measures of conflict
exposure on human capital accumulation and labor market outcomes focusing
on exposure during the early stages in life. The measures analyzed include a
binary indicator variable of exposure and continuous measures based on the
number of events and length of exposure. The paper exploits the progres-
sion of conflict violence across space and time, along with unique individual
level information from the Peruvian national household survey to construct
alternative measures of conflict exposure and estimate their effects. The re-
sults reveal that the estimated effects of conflict exposure are sensitive to
the measure of exposure to violence used. Moreover, relying on a consistent
database to compare alternative measures of conflict violence, this paper finds
that there is no obvious definition of exposure to the Peruvian conflict that
produces consistent results across multiple outcomes of interest. One rec-
ommendation derived from these results is that future studies on the effects
of conflict exposure should include a sensitivity analysis of the robustness of
the estimates to alternative measures of conflict as well as a discussion on
the potential transmission mechanisms of the violence shock and the criteria
used to select a specific measure of exposure.
Chapter 3: Does Family Size Affect Female Labor Supply? Evidence from
Latin America
iii
What is the relationship between childbearing and female labor supply in
Latin America? This paper tries to answer this question using an instrumen-
tal variable (IV) approach based on the gender mix of the first two siblings in
families with two or more children in Latin America. The paper uses house-
hold survey data from fifteen Latin American countries in 2010 to estimate
the effect of childbearing on the labor supply of women living in urban ar-
eas. The results suggest a positive relationship between family size and the
number of hours worked per week for married women (about 24 additional
hours), and a negative effect of family size on the probability of married
women working on the informal sector (a 57 percent reduction). However,
family size does not have a causal impact on female participation in the la-
bor market. This paper also finds that the estimates are not homogeneous
across all groups of women. The effects on informality are driven by married
women with at least some secondary education, while younger women (18 to
28 years old) tend to reduce the number of hours they work with family size,
in contrast with the average effect for all married women.
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Chapter 1
DOES CONFLICT UNDERMINE SOCIAL
CAPITAL? LONG-RUN EVIDENCE FROM
PERU
1.1 Introduction
The immediate effects of violence from conflicts are obvious to the observers,
but besides the negative impacts on physical infrastructure and human cap-
ital,1 conflicts could also affect the development of institutions and social
norms. These effects on social capital2 could be either positive by promot-
ing state formation and nation building (Bauer et al., 2016), or negative by
switching behavior from an equilibrium where honesty is expected to one
where corruption is the norm (Collier et al., 2003). In addition, these im-
pacts are not always immediately felt, but rather tend to manifest in the
long-run. The empirical evidence that has emerged in the last decade about
the long-run effects of conflict on social capital is ambiguous,3 even though
social capital plays an essential role in the economic and social health of
countries (Putnam et al., 2003). For instance, the impacts of conflict on
cooperative behavior could influence the public provision of certain goods
and services and the strength of social networks (Bellows and Miguel, 2009;
1In addition to the economic costs, individuals exposed to conflicts are often maimed,
displaced and at risk of losing their properties and even their lives (Blattman and Miguel,
2010; Brück and Wickstrom, 2004), with civilians suffering the consequences and many of
the negative effects that accrue when the conflict is over (Collier et al., 2003).
2According to Fukuyama (2000, pg. 3) “social capital is an instantiated informal norm
that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals”. While for Putnam et al.
(2003, pg. 2) “social capital refers to social networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assis-
tance, and trustworthiness.”
3In the last decade, Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009); Blattman (2009); De Luca and
Verpoorten (2011); Cassar et al. (2013); Voors and Bulte (2014) studied the effects of
exposure to conflict on multiple forms of social capital such as institutions and coopera-
tive behavior. These papers find evidence suggesting that conflict increases participation
in community organizations and political engagement (Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009;
Blattman, 2009), but also indicating that conflict erodes trust within localities and the
appreciation for state institutions (De Luca and Verpoorten, 2011; Cassar et al., 2013;
Voors and Bulte, 2014).
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Gilligan et al., 2014). In addition, the effect of conflict on trust in state in-
stitutions could shape the allocation of power, future political stability and
the capacity of the government to implement reforms (Gafaro et al., 2014;
De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016).
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of exposure to conflict
violence on social capital, measured as trust in institutions and cooperative
behavior. To do so it exploits the substantial spatial variation in the timing
and intensity of violence from the Peruvian conflict (1980-2000) and the dif-
ferences that intensity of exposure made on distinct cohorts of individuals.
These measures of conflict exposure rely on information about the progres-
sion of violence in time and space gathered by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, and on the characteristics of individuals as reported in several
rounds of the Peruvian national household survey (2004-2014). The paper
estimates the effects of conflict on institutions by analyzing the impact of vi-
olence on the reported level of trust in the government (municipal, province
and regional government as well as the Congress) and in civil social orga-
nizations such as the Catholic Church and political parties. To assess the
impacts of conflict on pro-social behavior, the paper analyzes the effects of
violence exposure on participation in organizations associated with the provi-
sion of public services like education and food security, as well as on cultural,
political and sport organizations.
Studies on the legacies of conflicts typically emphasize their adverse effects
on later economic performance (Collier et al., 2003; Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and human capital accumulation (Bun-
dervoet et al., 2009; Akresh et al., 2011; Shemyakina, 2011; Akresh et al.,
2012a,b) even though the effects of conflict on social capital could be substan-
tial and longer lasting than those on physical capital (Bellows and Miguel,
2009). In the last decade, empirical evidence has emerged suggesting that
the causal impacts of conflict on social engagement and institutions might
be ambiguous (Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Cassar
et al., 2013; Bauer et al., 2016). Early studies on the effects of the civil war
in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) show that households that experienced violence
showed higher rates of voter registration, community meeting attendance
and community group participation, while individuals who experienced di-
rect violence displayed higher levels of political mobilization and engagement
along with greater contributions to public goods (Bellows and Miguel, 2006,
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2009). Moreover, evidence from ex-combatants during the twenty-year war
in Uganda (where abductions of recruits generated a quasi-exogenous shock)
reveals that forced recruitment leads to a higher probability of voting, be-
coming a community leader and holding a political job (Blattman, 2009).
More recently, field experiments (behavioral games) in rural communities in
Burundi show how people exposed to wartime violence display more altruistic
behavior toward their neighbors (Voors et al., 2012). Similarly, lab-in-the-
field techniques and matching methods in postwar Nepal find that members
of communities that suffered greater exposure to fatal violence were signif-
icantly more pro-social in their relations with each other (Gilligan et al.,
2014).
In contrast, evidence of the effects of the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997)
on trust and cooperation suggests that exposure to violence undermines trust
within localities and decreases victim’s willingness to engage in interpersonal
exchange (Cassar et al., 2013). In addition, De Luca and Verpoorten (2011)
provide suggestive evidence that the level of trust and participation in reli-
gious and community associations decreases in Uganda when transiting from
peace to violent periods. Moreover, evidence from the civil war in Burundi
finds that the people’s appreciation for state institutions is negatively af-
fected by exposure to violence (Voors and Bulte, 2014). Similarly, recent
evidence from the civil war in Nepal (1997-2002) shows that exposure to vi-
olence decreases trust in the national government (De Juan and Pierskalla,
2016).4
Thus, it is not clear if conflict breeds disengagement and distrust in institu-
tions or if, on the contrary, conflict fosters pro-social behavior and strength-
ens institutions. As a consequence, the social and institutional legacies of
conflict continue to be among the most important but least understood of
all war impacts (Blattman and Miguel, 2010, pg.42). In the Peruvian case,
different authors have explored the legacies of the conflict in recent years, but
they have focused on migration (Laszlo and Santor, 2009), education (Leon,
2012), health (Grimard and Laszlo, 2014), labor markets (Galdo, 2013) and
intra-family violence (Morales and Singh, 2014). To the best knowledge of
this author, this is the first paper to analyze the long-run effects of the Pe-
4These results contrast with evidence on the effects of political repression on trust in
the state, where individuals are more likely to report trust in the head of the state and
the ruling party (Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale, 2013, 2015).
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ruvian conflict on social capital.
This paper takes advantage of the spatial variation in the timing of the
conflict to identify differential impacts of violence (a decade after the conflict
ended) on trust in state institutions as well as in organizations related to
the public provision of services in a mid-level income country. This study
contributes to the literature on the legacies of conflict in three main ways.
First, it reveals the negative effects of exposure to conflict during teenage
and young adults years on trust in state institutions and on participation in
organizations for the public provision of services. Second, this paper exploits
the characteristics of the Peruvian conflict, where government forces were
allegedly responsible for about half of the reported acts of violence (Truth
and Commission, 2014), to provide evidence of the heterogeneous effects of
exposure to violence from the government and from terrorist organizations.
Third, the Peruvian conflict offers a unique opportunity to assess the long-run
effects and reveal potential hidden legacies of conflict on both participation in
social organizations and trust in institutions in the context of a mid-income
country that grew continuously for fifteen years after the end of the conflict.
Overall the results suggest that exposure to conflict has negative effects
on trust in institutions such as political elected authorities, institutions of
the electoral system and the media, although these effects do not translate
to other types of civil organizations like the Church, the Ombudsman’s of-
fice or the police. Results suggest that the negative effects of exposure to
violence on trust during the age period from 7 to 18 years old are key for
the development of trust in government authorities, while the period imme-
diately after the minimum legal age for voting (18 years in Peru) is relevant
to establishing trust in the institutions of the electoral system. These results
are consistent with studies finding that the school age range is a formative
period for political views and trust (Bauer et al., 2014; Sears and Valentino,
1997). Similarly, these results echo the negative effects of exposure to armed
conflicts on trust in public institutions in Colombia (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013)
and from exposure to civil war violence on trust in the national govern-
ment in Nepal (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016). In addition, this paper also
analyzes the effects of exposure to violence from different perpetrators (i.e.,
government versus rebel forces) on trust in government organizations and the
media. The estimates suggest that government violence has negative impacts
on trust (in some cases the magnitude of the estimates is twice as large as in
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Table (3.10)), while the effects of violence from terrorist groups are typically
smaller and, in several cases, negligible. These results are important since
they indicate that conflict exposure might have multiple dimensions and that
the expected effects of civil conflict violence on trust would depend not only
on the intensity or period of exposure to violence, but also on the perception
of those responsible for inflicting the violence.
The estimates of the effects of civil conflict violence on public participa-
tion reveal a negative relation between conflict exposure and participation in
groups associated with the public provision of services such as education and
food security. These results contrast with previous findings in the literature
such as Bellows and Miguel (2009); Blattman (2009) and Bauer et al. (2016)
who find that conflict exposure is associated with higher rates of community
group participation, political engagement and political leadership. Addi-
tional results suggests that the effects of violence on participation in cultural,
political and social organizations are negligible. Moreover, the analysis of the
differential effects of violence practiced by different agents (i.e., government
versus rebel forces) finds no clear pattern associating violence from a particu-
lar actor to positive or negative effects in participation in organizations that
provide public services. Nevertheless, exposure to government violence seems
to have a negative impact on participation in social organizations, while vio-
lence from rebel groups appear to have positive effects. The negative effects
of conflict in participation have broad impacts, from the weakening of the
social insurance provided by strong social capital (Bauer et al., 2016), to the
loss of political accountability in the functioning of institutions (Nannicini
et al., 2013).
This paper presents the origins and history of the civil conflict in Peru in
section 2.2, outlining the main elements behind the progression of violence
in time and space. Then, section 1.3 discusses the theoretical framework for
interpreting the effects of conflict on institutions and social capital forma-
tion. Next, section 2.4 presents the methodology and identification strategy
proposed to assess the effects of exposure to violence. Section 2.3, describes
the main sources of information, the Final Report of the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission and multiple waves of the Peruvian national household
survey. Finally, section 2.5 presents the main estimation and empirical re-
sults, while section 2.6 is reserved for the conclusions.
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1.2 The Evolution of Civil Conflict in Peru
In May of 1980, in the middle of a transition towards democracy after more
than a decade of military rule and within a context of fragile democratic
institutions,5 the Shining Path6 began their self-denominated “people’s war”
aimed at tearing down the Peruvian state and imposing a communist regime
on the country (Truth and Commission, 2014). The Shining Path initially
focused on symbolic political actions like the theft and destruction of vot-
ing ballots from the 1980 Peruvian Presidential election,7 but their actions
promptly escalated into violence against the state and civil population. Even
though the violence began in Ayacucho and the central highlands of Peru,8
it rapidly expanded to other areas of the country, as depicted by Figure
1.1. The main strategy of the Shining Path was to expand from the highland
countryside to the cities9 using violence and intimidation as part of their tac-
tics (McCormick, 1992). In particular, although the presence of the Shining
5In October of 1968, a military coup led by Gen. Juan Velazco Alvarado seized power
from democratically elected President Fernando Belaunde, starting a left wing-oriented
military dictatorship. However, economic and social unrest followed the reforms imple-
mented by the military government, and in 1975 Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez took
control of the military forces and the government. Nevertheless, due to the lack of popu-
lar support, the new military government committed to leading a transition towards full
democracy. This commitment was fulfilled in 1978 when the military government called a
general election for a special Assembly responsible for writing a new Constitution and then
for the Presidential election of 1980. The former President of Peru, Fernando Belaunde
(who had returned from living in exile in 1978), triumphed in the general election and was
anointed as President for the 1980-1985 period (Gorriti, 2014, pg.81)
6Note that the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or “MRTA” for its acronym in
Spanish, was also involved in acts of terror during the 1980s and 1990s.
7Although Crost et al. (2013) argue that electoral fraud can be a catalyst for conflict,
it is accepted that this was not the case in the Peruvian elections in 1980 (Degregori,
2013; Truth and Commission, 2014). On the contrary, this electoral process was generally
perceived as transparent, with wide participation of groups from across the whole political
spectrum, including most of the left wing political parties, although the Shining Path
denounced the leftist organizations participating in the elections as being reactionary.
However, the transition towards new democratic institutions in countries with low levels
of per capita income tends to be relatively unstable (Collier et al., 2003, pgs.64-65).
8The leader of the Shining Path was Abimael Guzman, a former university philosophy
professor who spent most of the 1960s and 1970s on the faculty at the Universidad Nacional
San Cristbal of Huamanga in Ayacucho. The initial core of leaders of the Shining Path
comprises colleagues, family members and former students of Abimael Guzman.
9In contrast with recent literature that tries to relate conflict occurrence with natural
phenomenon like rainfall (Crost et al., 2015) or exogenous interventions like international
aid (Crost et al., 2014), the general consensus is that the Peruvian conflict originated from
the political ambitions and quest for power by the Shining Path’s leader (Gorriti, 2014;
Truth and Commission, 2014). See Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion (2004b, Ch.
1) on the motivations of the Peruvian conflict.
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Path in Lima (Peru’s capital) dates back to the beginnings of the conflict,
the initial actions of the Shining Path in the highlands were both a short
prelude to and a precondition of a larger plan to take the country’s capital
city.
In just a few years, the rebel organizations proved to be a threat to the
Peruvian government, gaining influence in large areas of the country and rel-
egating the presence of the government to the capital and a handful of larger
towns (McCormick, 1992) such that by 1991 half of the Peruvian population
lived under a “state of emergency” (Comision de la Verdad y la Reconcil-
iacion, 2004a),10 and by 1992 large tracts of the highlands were effectively
ceded to the rebel group while “predictions of Lima’s impending collapse
dominated national conversations.”11 The Peruvian Senate estimated that
as early as 1988 the economic cost of the armed conflict was equivalent to 66
percent of the external debt of the country or 45 percent of its gross domestic
product (Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion, 2004b). In terms of hu-
man cost, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission received reports of more
than 23,000 civilian deaths or disappearances during the 1980-2000 period,
although statistical estimations put this number closer to 69,000 (Comision
de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion, 2004a).
Despite the initial success of the Shining Path in expanding its influence
across the whole territory, the episodes of violence declined abruptly after
1992 when the leader of the Shining Path was captured in Lima and subse-
quently requested a peace agreement with the Peruvian government in 1993
from prison (Burt, Jo-Marie, 2008). In contrast with the prediction that
once a rebellion occurs in a society it is at risk of being caught in a conflict
trap (Collier et al., 2003; Bank, 2011), after the capture of the leader of the
Shining Path not only did the violence decrease rapidly, but the rebel groups
were effectively defeated (Stern, 1998).
Two reasons help to explain why the intelligence services of Peru were ini-
tially unable to understand the insurgent phenomenon, thus facilitating the
expansion of the violence during most of the 1980s. First, the intelligence
system was in a poor condition due to a fragile institutional framework in
10A state of emergency is supposed to be an exceptional situation where certain civil
liberties are suspended to maintain peace and order.
11Stern (1998, pgs. ix-x)
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the context of the transition towards democracy.12 Second, the intelligence
forces had never been confronted with a group with the characteristics of the
Shining Path. Thus, the Peruvian intelligence agencies dedicated themselves
to looking for local equivalents of leftist groups that had appeared in the re-
gion during the 1960s and 1970s (such as the Tupamaros and the Montoneros
from Uruguay and Argentina) and focusing on the symptoms of social unrest
that typically precede their appearance (Gorriti, 2014).
Faced with the threat of increasing violence from the Shining Path, the
initial response of the Peruvian government was slow and ineffective (Mc-
Cormick, 1992). This occurred even though at its peak during the late 1980s,
the Shining Path had only approximately 5,500 members and fewer than one
thousand combatants (Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion, 2004a).13
Neither the intelligence agencies, nor the police, nor the armed forces no-
ticed the substantial differences between the processes developing in Peru
and those occurring in other parts of the Southern Cone of Latin Amer-
ica (Gorriti, 2014). Unable to perceive nuances, some groups within the
police and military forces used indiscriminate violence against civilians. As
a consequence, in occasions the civil population felt trapped in the crossfire
between government forces (army, police and paramilitaries) and the Shining
Path, as suggested by Figure 1.4. In particular, the rural civil population was
the most severely affected by the violence. As highlighted by the Truth and
Commission (2014), on one hand, the police and military forces often forgot
that human beings were the supreme end of order and adopted a strategy of
massive violation of rights. On the other, the Shining Path and other sub-
versive organizations showed contempt for their victims, who counted only
as a blood toll to be paid to carry out their revolution and achieve social
change.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
This section discusses alternative theoretical frameworks for interpreting the
effects of armed conflicts on social capital, and how this paper fits and con-
12See Gorriti (2014, Ch.V “The Missing Files”) for an account of the loss of intelligence
files of the Ministerio del Interior (i.e., Department of State) in 1980 during the transition
to democracy from a military dictatorship.
13The population of Peru was estimated at more than 20 million by 1990.
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tributes to the overall literature on the legacies of conflict.
The theories proposed to interpret the impacts of conflict on institutions
and social capital can be organized under three main categories (Bauer et al.,
2016). The first category comprises theories rooted in the logic of an economic
maximizing agent and argues that conflict changes constraints, economic
payoffs and beliefs, thus generating greater cooperation due to the higher
value of social capital as social insurance. For instance, individuals foster
cooperation through collective coping arrangements to defend themselves and
manage the negative consequences of conflicts (Gilligan et al., 2014, pgs.605-
606). A second group of theories argues that armed conflicts either generate
changes in local norms and preferences that lead to favoring one’s own group
over social and political action in general, thus strengthening bonding social
capital at the expense of bridging social capital (Putnam et al., 2003).14 For
instance, using behavioral games, Voors et al. (2012) show that communities
in Burundi exposed to greater levels of violence during the civil war displayed
more altruistic behavior towards their neighbors. Similarly, Bauer et al.
(2014) find that greater exposure to the war in Sierra Leone and the Republic
of Georgia created a lasting increase in peoples egalitarian motivations toward
their in-group, but not to out-groups. A third group of theories propose that
preferences for political participation and “pro-sociality” shift more generally,
rather than for or against a particular group. This is the kind of psychological
damage that people have in mind when referring to the negative effects of war
on social and political activity (Blattman, 2009). A hypothesis derived from
this theory is that changes in preferences or behavior caused by exposure
to conflict would have a general impact, and would not affect any group in
particular.
This paper estimates the long-run effects of exposure to conflict on insti-
tutions and participation in social organizations15 in the aftermath of the
Peruvian armed conflict. During this episode of violence, civilians often
suffered victimization inflicted by state forces dispatched from bases out-
14According to Putnam et al. (2003, pp. 2) “bonding” social capital refers to networks
that link people who are similar in crucial respects and tend to be inward looking. The
“bridging” social capital involves networks that encompasses different types of people and
tend to be outward-looking.
15Note that, according to Fukuyama (2000) variables typically associated with social
capital such as trust, networks or civil society arise because of social capital but do not
necessarily constitute social capital itself (Fukuyama, 2000, pg. 3).
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side their communities (Gorriti, 2014; Truth and Commission, 2014), and
there is suggesting evidence that the Shining Path combatants were per-
ceived as outsiders (Degregori, 2013; Comision de la Verdad y la Reconcil-
iacion, 2004b). This paper exploits the characteristics of the information
gathered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to distinguish the ef-
fects of violence perceived to be practiced by the government from violence
from non-government forces such as terrorist groups. Thus, the findings of
this paper could be linked to the question of how externally inflicted vio-
lence (from outside the community) affects institutions and social capital.
However, given data limitations, this paper is unable to causally determine
whether the effects of conflict affect perceptions and behavior towards one’s
own group or whether they generate more general changes.
The main outcome variables studied by the literature on the effects of con-
flicts on social capital and institutions can be organized into six categories
roughly following the grouping suggested by Bauer et al. (2016): (i) Trust.
This group includes variables capturing political and social perceptions, es-
pecially with respect to state institutions (Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale, 2013,
2015; De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016). (ii) Participation in social groups. In-
cludes variables that measure the participation in community organizations,
local social clubs and sports teams (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Schaub, 2014).
(iii) Knowledge and perception of politics and democracy. Typically includes
variables that combine binary indicators of familiarity with political figures or
events, attitudes towards democracy and more general interest in a country’s
politics (Adhvaryu and Fenske, 2014; Voors and Bulte, 2014). (iv) Commu-
nity leadership and political participation. This category considers multiple
proxy measures of community leadership and political engagement (Bellows
and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009). (v) Pro-social behavior in experimental
games. This group comprises measures of pro-social behavior in the context
of experiments or “games,” ranging from altruistic and inequality-averse be-
havior, to contributions in a public goods game (Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan
et al., 2014). (vi) Voting behavior. The last category includes variables
measuring either registration to vote or effective voting at different levels
(local, regional or national) of political elections (Bellows and Miguel, 2006;
Blattman, 2009).
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Given the availability of information for this study,16 it provides insights
into the relationship between exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed
conflict and trust in state institutions (such as local and national authorities)
as well as between participation in groups for the public provision of services
(education and food security) and civil organizations (social clubs, cultural
organizations, and political parties).
1.4 Methodology
This section discusses the main characteristics and assumptions underlying
the proposed identification strategy and the main equations used to estimate
the causal effects of conflict exposure on social capital. Identification relies on
the substantial spatial variation in the timing and intensity of the Peruvian
conflict (1980-2000) and the differences in exposure it had on different cohorts
of individuals.
1.4.1 Identification strategy
The identification strategy for this study exploits the progression of the Pe-
ruvian conflict (1980-2000) in time and space as outlined in the Final Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The strategy of the Shining
Path explicitly included generating terror as an instrument to destroy the
existing political and institutional structures in the country and to replace
them with their own institutions. In practice, this implied taking actions
across the whole country to increase the sense of insecurity among the en-
tire population (Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion, 2004a). The
actions of the Shining Path also aimed at triggering a disproportionate re-
sponse from the government armed forces as part of their strategy to create
chaos and terror (Truth and Commission, 2014; McCormick, 1992). Since
the Shining Path’s strategy explicitly aimed to provoke a generalized state
of terror among the population, and given the unpredictability of individual
events of violence, this paper argues that it is unlikely that the correlation
between the incidence of violence and citizens’ trust in institutions and par-
ticipation in groups was driven by some omitted variable that generates a
16For details on the availability of information, please refer to Section 2.3
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confounding effect.17 Nevertheless, this paper acknowledges that typically
no empirical strategy can fully address all concerns about bias (either from
selection, reverse causality or omitted variables) when analyzing exposure to
violence from conflict (Bauer et al., 2016).
This paper takes advantage of the exogenous variation provided by the
moment (month) and spatial location (district) of acts of violence associated
with the armed conflict to construct measures of exposure to violence for
different birth cohorts. The identification also relies on a large set of ge-
ographical and time-fixed effects, along with province-specific time trends.
After controlling for district and cohort-specific variation as well as province
time trends, this paper argues that the incidence of violence is not correlated
with any determinant of the outcome variables.18
The main independent variable in this study measures the years of con-
flict exposure at different age ranges. The main specification in this paper
considers two age ranges (or life stages) comprising the first 60 years of life
of individuals. The first age range includes ages 0 to 18 years old (early
childhood and school years). The second age period represents the adult-
hood period from ages 19 to 60 years old. A first alternative specification
distinguishes between the effect of exposure to violence from the government
forces and the impact of exposure to violence from rebel groups during the
two age periods. This is the first paper that distinguishes between the poten-
tial heterogeneous effects of conflict exposure based on the perceived source
of the violence. A second alternative specification estimates the effects of
exposure to conflict using a more granular age classification (i.e., using in
four categories instead of two): from 0 to 6 (early childhood and preschool
periods), 6 to 17 (school period), 18 to 30 (young adulthood), and 31 to 60
(adulthood). This allows to contrast the estimated results with some theories
on the key periods for the development of social and political awareness.19
17This assumption is generally aligned with the approaches and identification strategies
posited by Morales and Singh (2014), Grimard and Laszlo (2014, pg.147) and Leon (2012,
pg. 993).
18Since the Peruvian conflict spanned a 20-year period, individuals faced incentives to
try to migrate from areas perceived as more likely to be affected by the violence. Thus,
the main specification of the model includes controls for migration (measured as living in
a different province from that of birth at the moment of the survey) to mitigate this effect,
but full migration histories were not available so the results should be interpreted in light
of these limitations.
19The period from 6 to 17 years old has been identified as key in the development of
social and political awareness. According to Adhvaryu and Fenske (2014) the child’s po-
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1.4.2 Equation structure
The interaction between date and location of birth and the progression of
violence in time and space serve to jointly determine the exposure of an
individual to the armed conflict. Equation 2.4 presents the general specifica-
tion for a dependent variable “Yijkt” representing an individual “i”, living in
district “j”, interviewed during wave “k” of the household survey and from
cohort of birth “t”:20
Yijkt = αj + δt + γk + Province Trendp +
t+60∑
τ=t
βτ · Exposureijτ + εijkt (1.1)
where αj represents the district fixed effects, δt are cohort of birth (year-
month) fixed effects, γk are the fixed effects for the waves of the household
survey, ProvinceTrendp is a location-specific time trend that captures poten-
tial differences in time patterns at province “p” where district “j” is located.
εijkt is the random, idiosyncratic error term. Importantly, the coefficient βτ
measures the impact of an additional year of exposure to violence from the
armed conflict between ages 0 to 60.21 The term Exposureijτ indicates con-
flict violence exposure during year τ = t − 1, ..., t + 60, based on the period
litical view of the world starts to take shape by age 5, restricting the political reality
she later perceives (Adhvaryu and Fenske, 2014, pp.18). Similarly, Bauer et al. (2014)
find that war exposure during the age period from 7 to 20 years affects egalitarian mo-
tivations later in life. Bauer et al. (2014) study children and adults affected by wars in
the Republic of Georgia and Sierra Leone finding that greater exposure to war created
a lasting increase in peoples egalitarian motivations–the way individuals play in different
behavioral experiments–toward their in-group, but not toward their out-groups, during a
developmental window starting in middle childhood (around 7 years of age) and ending
in early adulthood (around 20 years of age). In addition, Sears and Valentino (1997)
also find that exposure to political events such as presidential campaigns between ages 10
and 17 affect party identification and later political predisposition. Sears and Valentino
(1997) interview adolescents (10 to 17 years old) and their parents to study the effects of
socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign in the Unites States finding
that exposure to the campaign reduced the gap between pre-adults and adults in party
identification and can also affect socialization generating predispositions that persist later
in life. The third age period begins at the legal voting age in Peru and corresponds to
young adults from 18 to 30 years old. The last period includes all adults between the ages
of 30 and 60 years.
20Economic literature on the effects of violence on exposed populations (see Akresh et al.
2011, Akresh et al. 2012a, and Bundervoet et al. 2009 for Africa, and Grimard and Laszlo
2014 for the Peruvian case) rely on similar approaches to assess the effects of exposure to
conflict violence.
21Note that although this paper can measure number of months of exposure, the mea-
sures of exposure are scaled in terms of years. For example, 6 months of exposure is
expressed as 0.5 years, while 36 months as 3 years.
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of birth “t” of individual “i” born at a district “j”.
Since this paper is interested in the effect of exposure at different periods
of life, it aggregates the exposure into variables that capture the number of
years of exposure during each relevant age period: 0 to 18 years and ages
19 to 60.22 Then, Equation 2.4 represents the preferred specification used
for estimating the main results of this study. In particular, the coefficient
βτ from Equation 2.4 measures the impact of an additional year of exposure
to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range.
The preferred specification of the model includes district and cohort of birth
fixed effects. Notice that using shock exposure variables at the district level
leads to the possibility that location-specific time trends are driving the re-
sults. Thus, trends at the province level are included to control for changes
over time in the average values of the dependent variable that would not
have been similar across regions in the absence of civil conflict. Including
a province-specific time trend buttresses the argument that changes in the
dependent variable would have been similar in the absence of armed conflict
violence (Akresh et al., 2011; Bundervoet et al., 2009; Leon, 2012). In ad-
dition, the main results discussed in this paper include a set of observable
control variables Xi such as gender, marital status, family size, migration
status, residence indicator (urban or rural) and native language.
In addition, since the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission includes information on the perception of responsibility for the vi-
olence, either from government or rebel (i.e., the Shining Path) forces, this
paper tries to assess whether the effects from government violence, captured
by βτ in equation 1.2, differ from the impacts of violence by the rebels or
terrorist groups, θτ , on trust and participation. This paper uses the follow-
ing alternative specification to assess the effects of conflict exposure from
22A similar strategy was followed by Leon (2012); Galdo (2013) and other authors to
assess the effect of conflict exposure.
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different sources of violence:








θτ · Exposure Rebels Violence ages 0 to 60ijτ
+ εijkt (1.2)
The main identifying assumption needed to consistently estimate the causal
effect of exposure to violence is that the error term is uncorrelated with the
incidence of violence after controlling for a broad set of district and time fixed
effects as well as province-specific time trends. However, the inclusion of a
large set of fixed effects affects the interpretation of the results. Therefore, the
estimates do not represent the impact of violence on the interest variable at
a national level, but rather the average effect with respect to local (district)
averages and cohort averages, purged of province-specific trends. In this
sense, the estimates could be interpreted as conservative, since the district
fixed effects eliminate some valuable cross-sectional variation in the violence
data.
1.5 Sources of Information
This section describes the main sources of information used to construct the
measures of exposure to conflict, as well as the set of outcome variables of
interest affected by the conflict. The first part describes the report on violent
acts prepared by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The level of de-
tail of the report allows me to outline the progression of violence across time
and space (at the month-district level) and to identify those perceived as re-
sponsible for the violence. The second part describes the Peruvian household
survey, which is the main source of individual level characteristics such as
district and month of birth. Finally, the third part discusses in detail the
outcome variables associated with trust in institutions and participation in
social organizations.
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1.5.1 Evolution of violence: The Final Report of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission
The information on individual acts of violence associated with the civil con-
flict comes from the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. The measures of exposure to violence rely on district level
records collected by the Commission regarding violent events that occurred
from 1980 to 2000, and on individual level information from repeated cross-
sections of the Peruvian national household survey.
The database produced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission presents
two main advantages. First, it provides a detailed account of the monthly
progress of the civil conflict at the district level (i.e., how many acts of vi-
olence occurred in a certain district during a particular month), including
information on the type of violent act and alleged or perceived perpetrators.
Second, the information in the Final Report can be matched to birthplace
information from the Peruvian national household survey. This paper com-
bines district level records collected by the Commission with individual level
information from the national household survey to construct measures of
exposure to violence during the period 1980-2000.
The details of the acts of violence provided by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission allows me to outline the progression of the conflict in time and
across the Peruvian territory (Degregori, 2013) at the district and month
level. The Commission investigated and reported data on violence over a 20-
year period (1980-2000), recording every single instance of conflict violence
(about 36,000 acts) as an independent event at a given location (district) and
time (month). Figure (2.3) depicts the evolution of the civil war violence in
Peru from 1980 to 2000. The violence reached its peak between 1983 and
1992 when the leader of the Shining Path was finally captured. After the
apprehension of Abimael Guzman the violence decreased rapidly.
The acts of violence from the Peruvian armed conflict23 registered by the
Commission began in May of 1980. Two clear peaks of violence occurred
during the 1980-2000 period, as 25 percent of the acts of violence took place
between 1983-1984, and 23 percent occurred during 1989-1990. In total,
23While Blattman and Miguel (2010, pgs. 3-4) define as civil conflicts those internal
conflicts that count at least 25 battle deaths per year, and as civil wars those conflicts that
count more than 1,000 battle deaths during a single year, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission refers to the 20-year violence period as an “internal armed conflict”.
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almost half of the acts of violence recorded by the Commission occurred
during these four years (1983-1984 and 1989-1990). Moreover, Figures (2.3)
and (1.4) reveal that up to 95 percent of the acts of violence registered by
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission occurred between 1983 and 1995.
In order to gather information on the acts of violence related to the civil
conflict, the members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission traveled
across Peru holding public hearings to obtain testimonies from victims, rel-
atives, witnesses, and survivors of the acts of violence. All the testimonies
were individually coded to identify the characteristics of the events such as
type (illegal detentions, kidnapping, murder, extra judicial execution, tor-
ture, or rape), location (at the district level), identity of the victim, date of
the event and those alleged or perceived responsible (the Shining Path, the
MRTA, the government armed forces, the police forces, auto-defense groups
or unidentified). To bolster the validity of the information, the data gathered
by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was cross-tabulated with infor-
mation from six other data sets that had been collected at different points
in time by human rights organizations, the Red Cross, the judiciary, NGOs,
and the ombudsman’s office (for more details on the composition of the Final
Report see Leon (2012)).
Given the self-reported nature of the information gathered by the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, the database could suffer from self-selection
bias and underreporting, as discussed by Leon (2012), Galdo (2013) and
Grimard and Laszlo (2014). This paper follows a strategy similar to Leon
(2012) and Grimard and Laszlo (2014) who use the presence of violence in the
district, rather than the number of acts of violence, as a proxy for exposure
to the conflict. More precisely, the preferred measure of conflict exposure
focuses on the “duration” of exposure using the number of months that
registered at least one act of violence during a certain age range (although
the main results section present the effect of duration of exposure expressed
in number of years).24 The presence of violence is defined as the occurrence
of at least one violent act in the district.
Finally, the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission only in-
cludes information on human rights violations, not on attacks on public in-
24In contrast, Galdo (2013) instruments violence intensity using the occurrence of vio-
lence in neighboring districts, while Morales and Singh (2014) rely directly on the number
of acts of violence.
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frastructure (see Collier et al. (2003, Ch. 1) for a discussion on the distinction
between the economic and the social costs of conflict). Hence, this paper is
only able to identify the effects of exposure to civil conflict violence against
individuals, not the consequences or impacts of the destruction of public
infrastructure.
1.5.2 Individual characteristics: The Peruvian national
household survey
The Peruvian national household survey, conducted by the Peruvian national
statistics office, is a continuous annual survey containing rich information on
household consumption and spending patterns, household assets, education
and health, among other observable characteristics. The main objective of
the survey is to serve as a reliable source of information for public and private
institutions and researchers interested in evaluating the evolution of the living
conditions of Peruvian households.
This paper uses data from the Peruvian national household surveys from
2004 to 2014. Some key variables of the national household survey for this
study are the district, year and month of birth of each individual. Note
that the data base contains information both at the individual and at the
household level. The detailed information available in the survey allows me
to analyze a wide set of outcomes regarding individuals’ trust in institutions,
social engagement and attitudes towards democracy25 among the exposed
population. The Peruvian national household survey is the main source of
information for the individual-level control variables and the household-level
characteristics presented in Table (1.1).
1.5.3 Variables in trust in institutions and participation in
social organizations
Following the discussion in Section 1.3, this paper focuses on two categories
of outcome variables. Table 1.2 shows the main statistics of the outcome
variables for the full sample in its first column and the statistics for two
25For instance, Galdo (2013) uses the Peruvian household survey to estimate the effects
of the armed conflict on labor market participation and formality, among other labor
market outcomes.
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sub-samples based on exposure to conflict in the remaining columns. Thus
I am able to analyze the effect of exposure to armed conflicts on trust in
institutions and the media, and on participation in social organizations to
provide insights into the link between these outcomes and armed conflict.
Importantly, since I am also able to identify the alleged responsible for the
violence, this paper also distinguishes the impacts of conflict violence on
these variables according to the perceived source.
In the Peruvian household survey the reported trust in each organization
or institution is coded using four categories: trust nothing, very little, enough
or a lot, taking the numerical values of 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. However,
in this paper I am representing the levels of trust as binary variables taking
the value of zero if individual trust in the institution is null or very little, and
one if the individual reports trusting enough or a lot (robustness checks using
the original coding of the trust variables are also presented in Tables (3.28)
and (3.29) in the annex). For variables describing social participation, the
Peruvian national household survey reports participation in organizations as
a binary variable taking the value of one if the person participates in an
organization and zero otherwise.
The outcome variables associated with trust in institutions are divided into
two categories: trust in government and trust in mass media. First, section
A.1. of Table (1.2) shows the statistics for trust at four levels of government
going from local to national: district government, provincial government,
regional government and national Congress. The district governments are
the third and smallest level of administrative subdivision in Peru and are
governed by a district mayor elected for a 4-year term.26 Importantly, the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission reports information on the location
of episodes of violence at the district level. The second level of adminis-
trative subdivision in Peru corresponds to the provincial governments that
usually group several districts (from 1 to 20 districts per province and seven
on average). Currently, Peru has 196 provinces organized into 26 regions,
the first-level of administrative subdivision in the country. These regional
governments are a fairly recent legal figure, just created in 2002.27 The last
26There are currently 1,828 districts in the country with the smallest counting as few
as 3,500 inhabitants and the most populated with as many as 800,000.
27The regions were created following almost the same circumscriptions of the “depart-
ments” (until then, the country had been organized into 24 departments), plus two special
regions (El Callao and Lima Metropolitana). The original individual regions were expected
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government institution represented in section A.1. of Table (1.2) is the Na-
tional Congress, the basic legislative body of Peru consisting of 130 members
(Congressmen) elected for a five-year term based on a proportional represen-
tation system determined at the regional level.
This paper also discusses the effect of exposure to conflict on two insti-
tutions associated with the electoral process. Section A.2. of Table (1.2)
shows the level of trust in the Peruvian national jury of elections and in the
office of electoral processes. The Peruvian national jury of elections is the
state agency responsible for overseeing the legality of all electoral processes,
proclaiming the official election results and awarding the recognition and
credentials to elected authorities. Moreover, the national jury of elections
is the final authority over controversies regarding electoral matters such as
vacancies in elected offices. Overseeing the logistics of elections, the national
office of electoral processes is the agency responsible for organizing all elec-
toral processes, referenda and other popular consultations. In practice, the
national office of electoral processes designs the voting ballots, electoral acts
and any other relevant material required for elections.
Section A.3. of Table (1.2) presents two types of institutions grouped
under the label of mass media. The first is the written press, including
both local and national newspapers and magazines, although the Peruvian
household survey does not allow differentiation between local and nationwide
newspapers and magazines. The second type of institution includes radio
and television stations. Similarly, the household survey does not distinguish
between nationwide and local radio and television stations. Also note that
the Peruvian government edits an official newspaper, and that there are both
official television and radio stations.
In addition, four institutions are grouped under the label of “Others” in
section A.4. of Table (1.2). First, the table shows the level of trust in the
Catholic Church, the most trusted institution among those considered in
Table (1.2). Peru is a mostly Catholic country, and the Catholic Church has
had a widespread presence across the whole territory since colonial times,
constituting one of the oldest and largest institutions in the country. As
another part of the category “Others,” Table (1.2) shows the level of trust in
political parties. However, from the information available it is not possible
to merge into larger regions; however, when a referendum for the merger of several regions
took place in 2005, every proposed merger of regions was rejected by the population.
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to distinguish among local movements and national level parties, or between
left-wing and right-wing leaning parties.
Section B.1. of Table (1.2) shows the participation in organizations as-
sociated with the public provision of services such as mothers’ club, school
parents association, the glass-of-milk program and the soup-kitchen program.
The mother’s clubs are social organizations typically formed by mothers with
the mission of serving as links between the population and the authorities to
manage and organize the provision of some key social programs. Note that
the statistics for mothers clubs are estimated based only for women. The
school parents associations are committees of parents that serve as mech-
anisms to organize school parents to influence school decisions and play a
key role in school governance. The glass-of-milk program is the largest so-
cial assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes, cereals
and other commodities among households with children under the age of 12,
pregnant women, mothers in their lactation period, elderly individuals and
persons suffering from tuberculosis. The soup-kitchen or social dining hall is
a social program relying on government and public charity support to feed
low-income households for free or for a small contribution. Soup kitchens are
typically run at the local level.
The bottom part of Table (1.2) shows participation in four types of so-
cial organizations ranging from purely social organizations (social clubs and
cultural associations), to political associations (political parties) and self-
defense groups. Social clubs are organized groups that are not associated
with the provision of a particular good or service. Cultural associations are
groups for the practice of sports, dance, theater or other cultural manifesta-
tions. The political parties represent both local and national level political
organizations, although the information in the household survey does not al-
low differentiation among them or their political affiliation (left, right, green
parties, etc). Finally, the self-defense groups are a type of social organiza-
tion related to the provision of security and safety at the local level. These
groups were created during the 1980s as a way to organize local communities
to fight the terrorist groups and are partially credited for helping defeat the




This section presents the main estimates of the effects of exposure to violence
from the Peruvian armed conflict on citizens’ trust in institutions28 and par-
ticipation in social groups (a proxy measure of cooperative behavior). The
results are organized in two subsections, each associated with one category
of outcome variables.
Overall the results suggest that exposure to conflict has negative effects
on trust in government institutions and in some forms of media, as shown
by Table (1.3), although these effects do not translate to other types of
organizations from the civil society such as those included in Table (1.4).29
In addition, Table (1.3) suggests that the age period from 0 to 18 years is the
most important for the development of trust in government authorities, while
the period after the minimum legal age for voting (set in 18 years old in Peru)
is relevant to establish trust in the institutions of the electoral system. These
results echo the negative effects of exposure to armed conflicts on trust in
public institutions in Colombia (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013) and from exposure
to civil war violence on trust in the national government in Nepal (De Juan
and Pierskalla, 2016). Moreover, exposure to conflict violence at any period
between 0 to 60 years old has a negative impact in the level of trust in radio
and television, although no precisely estimated effects on trust in the written
press.
This paper also analyzes the effects of exposure to violence from different
perpetrators on trust in government organizations and the media. The results
in Table (1.5) suggest that government violence has negative impacts on trust
(in some cases the magnitude of the estimates is twice as large as in Table
(1.3)), while the effects of violence from terrorist groups are typically smaller
and, in several cases, negligible. These results are important since they
indicate that conflict exposure might have multiple dimensions and that the
expected effects of civil conflict violence on trust would depend not only on
the intensity or period of exposure to violence, but also on the perception of
28Weak institutions is commonly cited as one of the factors limiting economic growth in
developing countries (Acemoglu et al., 2003). The role of institutions in influencing how
an economy works and the incentives they generate for the behavior of individuals and
the society have been widely discussed, e.g. by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
29The results are consistent to the use of the original scale on trust as shown by Ta-
ble (3.28).
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the party or group responsible for inflicting the violence.
An alternative specification analyzes the effects of exposure to conflict
dividing the exposure in four age periods. Tables (3.10) to (3.13) show the
effects of exposure during the period 0 to 6, 7 to 18, 19 to 30 and 31 to 60
years old. The results provide suggestive but not conclusive evidence that
the school age range (7 to 18 years old) is a formative period for political
views and trust, consistent with previous studies such as Bauer et al. (2014);
Sears and Valentino (1997).
A second group of results shows the estimated effects of conflict exposure
on participation in several organizations. The results in Table (1.7) on the
effects of civil conflict violence in participation reveal a negative relation
between conflict exposure and participation in groups associated with the
public provision of services such as education and food security, although
Table (1.8) suggests that the effects of violence on participation in cultural,
political and social organizations are negligible. These results contrast with
previous findings by Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Blattman (2009) who
find that conflict exposure is associated with higher community group partic-
ipation and political engagement. Similarly, in a recent review of the effects
of war on cooperative behavior, Bauer et al. (2016) find that people exposed
to violence from war tend to increase their social participation by joining
more local social and civic groups.30 In addition, the estimates of the effects
of violence practiced by different agents (i.e., government versus rebel forces)
in Tables (1.9) and (1.10) suggest that there is no clear pattern associating
exposure to violence from a particular actor to higher or lower participation.
These results contrast with the estimates in Table (1.5), where the negative
effects of violence seem to be driven by government inflicted violence, in this
case the impacts of government and rebel violence do not produce consistent
effects in participation across different types of organizations.
The average length of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed con-
flict among the exposed population from ages 0 to 60 is 1.51 years (see first
row of column (3) in Table (1.1)). However, the average duration of ex-
posure on the exposed population at different age periods ranges from 1.24
years during the 19 to 60 years period to 1.25 during the 0 to 18 years period.
30The authors find evidence that war affects behavior in a range of situations (real and
experimental) and that individuals not only are more likely to participate in local groups,
but are also more prone to taking on leadership roles in their communities.
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The Tables in this section show the estimates from models including fixed
effects at the district of birth, year of birth and wave of the survey, along
with a linear trend at the province level. Besides the fixed effects and linear
trend, the preferred models also include controls for gender, marital status,
family size, and indicator variables for the head of the household, migration
(from the province of birth), residence in urban areas and native first lan-
guage. Finally, to help with the interpretation of the results, all the tables
include an additional row at the bottom showing the mean level of trust or
participation (from 0 to 1).
1.6.1 The effects of the Peruvian armed conflict on citizens’
trust in institutions
The estimated effects of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed con-
flict on trust in institutions are summarized in Tables (1.3) and (1.4). In
addition, Tables (1.5) and (1.6) show the estimated effects of conflict expo-
sure distinguishing the source or responsible of the violence suggesting that
the negative effects in trust are generally driven by exposure to government
violence. These results are robust to an alternative age classification based
in four age groups (detailed results available in Tables (3.10) and (3.11)).
Similarly, Tables (3.20) and (3.21) show the results for especifications using
only fixed effects and province trends and show that the estimates are robust
to the use of alternative control variables. Moreover, the results from placebo
tests reported in Tables (3.18) and (3.19) also bolster the robustness of the
main findings in this section.
The patterns described by the results in Table (1.3) suggest that exposure
to conflict has negative effects on trust in government institutions when the
exposure occurs between ages 07 and 18. The magnitude of these effects is
robust to the inclusion of a rich set of control variables. Table (1.3) shows the
effects of exposure to violence from the armed conflict on trust in institutions
representing four levels of government, going from local to national when
moving from left to right. In particular, columns (1) to (4) in Table (1.3) show
the results on trust in district government, provincial government, national
Congress (where multiple representatives could be elected in each region)
and regional government (where the main authority in each region is the
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Governor).31 Notice that even though the Peruvian Congress is a national
level institution located in the capital of Peru, Congressmen are elected at
the department or region level.
Column (1) in Table (1.3) summarizes the effects of exposure on trust in
district governments, the most local form of political organization and the
closest to the citizens. The estimates are not sensitive to alternative sets
of controls (see column (1) in Table (3.20)), and the relevant period of ex-
posure seems to be the age range from 0 to 18 years, coinciding with the
pre-school and school ages in Peru.32 Given the average length of exposure
to the Peruvian armed conflict among the affected population, and assuming
the average exposure during the 0 to 18 age period (see Table (1.1)), the
armed conflict reduces trust in district governments by 2.8 percent of the
average level of trust. Similarly, column (2) shows the effects from exposure
to the armed conflict on trust in the provincial government, with negative
significant estimates for ages 0 to 18. These results are also robust to the
inclusion of alternative control variables and the negative impacts are slightly
larger in magnitude than the results for district governments, about 3.5 per-
cent of the average level of trust in the provincial government. Column (3)
of Table (3.12) shows the effects of exposure to conflict violence on trust
in Congress. The estimates suggest that exposure during both age periods
(age range from 0 to 18 years and 19 to 60 years) are important for building
future trust in the Congress. Average exposure to the armed conflict during
ages 0 to 18 reduces the level of trust in the Congress by 3.2 percent (with
respect to the base average level of trust). However, column (3) also suggests
that exposure to the armed conflict during the age range from 19 to 60 years
also has a negative impact reducing the average level of trust in Congress in
2.1 percent. If we add the negative effect of exposure during both periods,
conflict exposure reduces trust in the Congress by 5.3 of the original average
level of trust. In the case of the effects of the armed conflict on trust in the
regional government, column (4) shows that these effects are not precisely es-
timated at any age range. One potential explanation for the lack of precisely
estimated results is that the regions are a relatively new level of government
31Incidentally, the last row in Table (1.3) seems to suggest that the levels of trust are
relatively low for all levels of government, but tend to be higher at the more local levels
such as the district or the province.
32The results in Table (3.10) indicate that the 7 to 18 years old is the key period for the
formation of trust in the district government.
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(created in 2002), so they did not exist when the armed conflict occurred.
These results are consistent with recent studies that find negative impacts
of conflict victimization on trust in the government and the congress (and
political institutions in general) in the context of the 50-year civil conflict
between the FARC33 and government armed forces in Colombia (Blanco and
Ruiz, 2013), as well as evidence from Nepal’s civil war showing that higher
exposure to violence reduces the levels of trust in the government (De Juan
and Pierskalla, 2016). One interpretation for these results suggests that civil
conflict violence would be perceived as a sign of the government’s inability
to protect its citizens and hold the monopoly on the use of power, thus
damaging the image of the state among the affected population. In addition,
the estimates from the alternative specifications in Tables (3.10) to (3.13)
suggest that the school-age period is key for the development of political
awareness and trust in institutions.34
Table (1.3) also shows the effect of exposure to the armed conflict on the
level of trust in two institutions responsible for the organization and supervi-
sion of the elections. Columns (5) and (6) of Table (1.3) show the estimated
impact of an additional year of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed
conflict on the level of trust in the Peruvian national jury of elections, the
government agency responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral pro-
cesses. Since the minimum legal age to vote in Peru is 18 years old, it is
sensible that the negative impacts of conflict are stronger and more signifi-
cant when exposure occurs at older ages, in contrast with the results on trust
in the different levels of government. The estimates indicate that the relevant
33The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces or FARC by its acronym in Spanish.
34According to Bauer et al. (2014), war exposure during the age period from 7 to 20
years affects egalitarian motivations later in life. In particular, Bauer et al. (2014) study
children and adults affected by wars in the Republic of Georgia and Sierra Leone finding
that greater exposure to war created a lasting increase in peoples egalitarian motivations–
the way individuals play in different behavioral experiments–toward their in-group, but
not toward their out-groups, during a developmental window starting in middle childhood
(around 7 years of age) and ending in early adulthood (around 20 years of age). Sears and
Valentino (1997) also find that exposure to political events such as presidential campaigns
between ages 10 to 17 affect party identification and later political predisposition. These
authors interview adolescents (from 10 to 17 years old) and their parents to study the
effects of socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign in the Unites States
finding that exposure to the campaign reduced the gap between pre-adults and adults in
party identification and can also affect socialization generating predispositions that persist
later in life. Similarly, according to Adhvaryu and Fenske (2014) the child’s political
view of the world starts to take shape by age 5, restricting the political reality she later
perceives (Adhvaryu and Fenske, 2014, pp.18).
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period of exposure is the age range from 19 to 60 years, where the effects
of exposure are negative, precisely estimated and robust to the inclusion of
additional control variables (see Table 3.20). Exposure to violence from the
armed conflict during the relevant age range and length reduces trust in the
jury of elections by 2 percent of the average level. Column 6 of Table (1.3)
presents estimates of the impact of exposure to the Peruvian armed conflict
on trust in the national office of electoral processes, the agency responsible
for organizing the elections, referenda and other popular consultations in
Peru. Similarly, the relevant age range of exposure seems to be from 19 to
60 years, where exposure reduces trust by about 1.8 percent of its average
level. These estimates are precisely estimated and stable to an alternative
set of control variables.
The last two columns in Table (1.3) show the effects of exposure to violence
on trust in mass media, a different type of institution, but important since it
is typically considered influential in shaping citizens’ opinions. The Peruvian
government has both an official newspaper and official television station,
though the information in the household survey is not detailed enough to
allow differentiation between state-owned media and private media. The
results in column (7) of Table (3.10) reveal that exposure to violence from
the armed conflict for the average duration does not affect the level of trust in
the written press (for both local and nationwide newspapers and magazines).
In addition, column (8) shows the effect of conflict on the level of trust in radio
and television. One important element to highlight is that even when the
average level of trust in radio and television seems relatively high (compared
with trust in the written press or in government institutions according to
Table (1.3)), the results suggest that exposure to the conflict at any age
period has a negative impact on trust. The effects of exposure to the average
duration of violence during the 0 to 18 years and 19 to 60 years imply a
reduction in the average level of trust in radio and television between 2.2
and 2.5 percent, respectively. These effects are not only precisely estimated,
but are robust to an alternative set of controls.
In contrast with the results in Table (1.3), exposure to conflict violence
does not affect the level of trust in non-government institutions such as the
Catholic church, political parties, the Ombudsman’s office or the national
police, as revealed by Table (1.4)). Notably, neither the Catholic Church,
nor the Ombudsman nor the political parties are government institutions,
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although the political parties could include trust in the party currently in
government or the leading majority in the Congress. It is also surprising that
there are no effects of violence on trust in the police, since some evidence
suggests (Gorriti, 2014; Truth and Commission, 2014) that members of the
police was associated with abuses during the 1980-2000 period (however, this
evidence could reveal the conduct of individual elements of the police and
not a generalized policy of the institution).
This paper also analyzes the effects of exposure to violence from different
perpetrators on trust in government organizations and the media. The results
in Table (1.5) suggest that the negative impacts of violence on trust are driven
by the exposure to government violence. In particular, columns (1), (2) and
(4) in Table (1.5) suggest that exposure to government violence has negative
impacts in trust in government institutions (at the district, province and re-
gional levels), while the effects of violence from terrorist groups are small and,
in most cases, not precisely estimated or negligible. While exposure to con-
flict from any source during the age range from 0 to 18 years had a negative
effect on trust in district and province governments (see TableTable (1.3),
after distinguishing between the effect of violence perpetrated by the gov-
ernment and by rebel organizations (e.g., the Shining Path), exposure to
government violence has a negative precisely estimated impact (the magni-
tude of the estimate twice as large as for violence from all sources) during
both age periods, 0 to 18 and 19 to 60 years. Moreover, in spite that expo-
sure to conflict violence from any source has negative effects on trust in the
national Congress during the 0 to 18 and the 19 to 60 age periods, once that
exposure to violence is separated by its perpetrator the effects of conflict ex-
posure are no longer precisely estimated (although, notice that the estimates
in Table (1.3) were only significant at the 10 percent level). In contrast,
classifying the exposure to violence by perpetrator reveals that exposure to
government violence has negative effects in trust on regional governments,
while there is also a positive and precisely estimated effect in trust in the
regional government of exposure to rebel generated violence.
In the case of the electoral institutions, columns 5 and 6 in Table (1.5) sug-
gest that while separating violence exposure by its perpetrators accentuates
the negative impacts of government violence on trust in the national jury of
elections, it also attenuates the estimates on the office of electoral processes
(no age period of exposure to violence is precisely estimated). In addition,
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exposure to government violence between ages of 0 to 18 years and 19 to 60
years has negative and precisely estimated impacts on trust for both written
press and radio and television. In contrast, the effects of rebel’s violence are
only precisely estimated for the case of trust in written press when exposure
occurs during the 19 to 60 years period. These results are important since
they indicate that conflict exposure might have multiple dimensions and that
the expected effects of civil conflict violence on trust would depend not only
on the intensity or period of exposure to violence, but also on the perception
of the party responsible for inflicting the violence.
Finally, in spite that the results in Table (1.4) suggest that exposure to
conflict violence does not affect the level of trust in non-government institu-
tions such as the Catholic church or the Ombudsman’s office, distinguishing
the violence by the perpetrators in Table (1.6) reveals that exposure to gov-
ernment violence reduces the level of trust in both the Catholic church and
the Ombudsman office. In contrast, exposure to violence from rebel groups
tends to increase the level of trust in these institutions. Columns 2 and 4
in Table (1.6) are consistent with previous results suggesting that conflict
exposure does not affect the level of trust in political parties or in the police.
1.6.2 The effects of the Peruvian armed conflict on
participation in social groups
The main effects of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict
on participation in organizations are summarized in Tables (1.7) and (1.8).
While Table (1.7) suggests that there are negative effects of conflict exposure
on participation in organizations for the public provision of services, the
results in Table (1.8) reveal negligible effects of exposure on participation in
other social, cultural and political organizations.35 These findings contrast
with previous literature arguing that conflict exposure increases community
group participation and political engagement (Bellows and Miguel, 2009;
Blattman, 2009; Bauer et al., 2016). In addition, the estimates of the effects
of violence from different sources on participation in social organizations
35Table (3.24) shows the results for alternative models controlling only for fixed effects
and a linear province trend suggesting that these results are not sensitive to the use of an
alternative set of controls. In addition, alternative specifications in Tables (3.14) and (3.15)
using four age periods are consistent with the general findings in Tables (1.7) and (1.8).
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reported in Table (1.9) suggest that there is no clear pattern associating
violence from a particular actor to positive or negative effects on participation
in organizations providing services and in social organizations.
The patterns of participation described by the results in Table (1.7) suggest
that exposure to conflict reduces participation in organizations for the public
provision of services in the long run. Column (1) of Table (1.7) reveals that
exposure to the armed conflict during ages 19 to 60 reduces the average
participation in mothers’ clubs by approximately 17 percent of the base level,
assuming the average duration of exposure during this period. The estimates
of exposure to the Peruvian armed conflict on participation in school parent
associations are presented in column (2). Exposure during ages 0 to 18,
and 19 to 60 years reduce participation in parents associations in 8.2 and
76 percent, respectively. The results suggest that exposure to the conflict
reduces participation in school parents’ associations by about 15.6 percent
of the base participation level, assuming the average duration of exposure
during each age period. The effects are precisely estimated for all age ranges
and are not affected by the inclusion of control variables.
In the case of participation in social organizations responsible for providing
affordable or subsidized food such as the glass-of-milk program36 the results
in column (3) of Table (1.7) indicate that exposure to the armed conflict had
no precisely estimated impacts in participation in this type of organization.
One possible explanation for this result is that the glass-of-milk program faces
targeting and filtration issues (i.e., the program does not reach its intended
target population and individuals who should not be receiving the benefit
actually have access to the program), reducing the incentives for effective
collaboration. In addition, the results in columns (4) also show the effects of
the conflict on organizations associated with the provision of food through
the soup-kitchen program. The estimated effects of exposure to the Peruvian
armed conflict are negative and precisely estimated, in particular when the
exposure occurs from ages 19 to 60 years old. This impact is equivalent to
a reduction of 5.9 percent of the current participation rate, if the individual
suffers the average length of exposure.
The last two columns in Table (1.7) show the effect of conflict exposure on
participation in neighbor associations and workers’ unions. Neighbor associ-
36Largest social assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes, cereals
and other commodities.
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ations are organizations of citizens living in the same or adjacent neighbor-
hoods and are usually linked to the provision of public services. For instance,
some of the members of the neighbor associations are chosen to be part of
the glass-of-milk or the soup-kitchen organizations. The unions are groups
of workers usually organized to carry on labor negotiations and claims with
employers. In contrast with previous results in Table (1.7), the effects are
negative and precisely estimated only during the period from 0 to 18 years
old. If we assume the average exposure length, conflict exposure reduced
participation in neighbor associations by 2.6 percent of its base level. In
addition, the average length of exposure to violence reduces participation
in unions by 3.8 percent if exposure occurred during the average duration
length for each period.
Overall, the results in Table (1.7) suggest that exposure to violence from
the Peruvian conflict reduces incentives for cooperative behavior, even at
the local level, as revealed by a lower participation in organizations directly
related to the local provision of public services. Although these results seems
to be aligned with Anderson et al. (2004), who use experimental data and find
that reductions in social capital reduce contributions for public goods, they
are in contrast with previous findings in the literature by Bellows and Miguel
(2009) and Blattman (2009) who find that conflict exposure is associated with
higher community group participation and political engagement. Similarly,
these estimates are not consistent with the recent review by Bauer et al.
(2016) of the effects of war on cooperative behavior which finds that exposure
to violence from war tends to increase social participation (more likely to
join local social and civic groups).37 In addition, it is not clear that there
is a particular period that is more important to affect later participation in
social organizations. The results from alternative specifications using four age
periods (0 to 6, 7 to 18, 19 to 30 and 31 to 60 years) presented in Tables (3.14)
and (3.15) also indicate that there is no clear pattern suggesting that a
particular period of exposure is key for later participation in organizations.
The negative effects of conflict on participation are relevant since they have
broad impacts–from the weakening the social insurance provided by strong
social capital (Bauer et al., 2016) to loss of political accountability in the
37The authors find evidence that war affects behavior in a range of situations (real and
experimental) and that individuals not only are more likely to participate in local groups,
but are also more prone to taking on leadership roles in their communities.
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functioning of institutions (Nannicini et al., 2013).
However, this paper also finds that the exposure to the Peruvian armed
conflict does not have a negative impact on participation in other types of
organizations such as social, political and cultural organizations, as revealed
by Table (1.8). A couple of common aspects of the organizations analyzed
in Table (1.8) are that they are not directly associated with the provision
of a public service, and that the average level of participation in all them
is very low. Even though exposure to conflict during the period from 19
to 30 years old seems to have a negative effect on participation in social
clubs, political organizations and cultural associations, these impacts are not
precisely estimated under any of the model specifications.
This paper also analyzes the heterogeneous effects of violence practiced
by different agents (i.e., government versus rebel forces) on participation in
organizations associated with the provision of public services. The findings
in Table (1.9) suggest that there is no clear pattern associating violence from
a particular actor to positive or negative effects on participation in organi-
zations that provide public services. For instance, the effects of exposure to
violence from either government or rebel forces on participation in mothers
clubs or soup-kitchens (columns 1 and 4) are no precisely estimated. Sim-
ilarly, exposure to violence has negative effects on participation in school
parents’ associations (column 2) only when rebels are responsible for the vi-
olence and when exposure occurs during the 7 to 18 year period. The case
of participation in the glass-of-milk is curious, since in Table (1.8) exposure
to violence did not affect participation, but column 3 of Table (1.9) indicates
that exposure to government violence during the 19 to 60 years has positive
impacts, while exposure to rebel violence during these periods had a negative
effect. Moreover, the results in columns 5 and 6 of Table (1.9) do not suggest
clear pattern for the effects of government and rebel violence on participation
in neighbor associations or labor unions.
Finally, the results in Table (1.10) suggest that exposure to government
violence seems to have a negative impact on participation in social organiza-
tions such as clubs and cultural associations (columns 1 and 2), while violence
from rebel groups appear to have positive effects. In contrast, column (3) of
Table (1.10) suggests the opposite pattern, with exposure to government vio-
lence increasing the participation in political organizations, while rebel force
violence reduces it. The last column of Table (1.10) suggest that in general
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the effects of exposure to government and rebel violence are not precisely
estimated.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence of the negative effects of conflict on social capi-
tal using trust in the state and civil organizations as a measure of the impact
of violence on institutions. In addition, it shows estimates of the effects of
conflict exposure on participation in groups related to the public provision of
services to identify the effects of violence on cooperative behavior, another
manifestation of social capital. In addition, an important contribution of
this paper is that it shows the heterogeneous effects of conflict when those
perceived responsible for the violence are government forces versus terrorist
organizations. The paper exploits the substantial spatial variation in the
timing and intensity of violence from the Peruvian conflict (1980-2000) along
with differences in the intensity of exposure on distinct cohorts of individu-
als. The importance of these results is threefold. First, reduced cooperative
behavior could hinder the public provision of goods and services and weak-
ens social networks (Putnam et al., 2003). Second, the weaker the trust in
the state, the harder it will be for the government to implement economic,
social or political reforms (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016), thus limiting the
effective capacity of the government. Third, this is the first paper to assess
whether the effect of violence on trust and participation is affected by those
responsible for the violence (either terrorist or government) and if such effects
depend on the age of exposure.
Understanding the long-term effects of conflicts on social capital is partic-
ularly important in countries such as Peru where, despite experiencing stable
growth rates during the last 15 years, the government has failed to imple-
ment major economic and political reforms since the early nineties. Moreover,
these results shed light over the potential constraints that countries torn by
conflict may experience in the medium-term, even when they are able to
achieve successful peace transitions and successive years of economic growth.
During the Peruvian conflict, civilians often suffered victimization inflicted
by state forces dispatched from bases outside their communities (Gorriti,
2014; Truth and Commission, 2014), and there is also suggestive evidence
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that Shining Path members were also perceived as outsiders in the places
affected by their acts of violence (Degregori, 2013; Comision de la Verdad y
la Reconciliacion, 2004b). This would lead to the belief that these results
could be linked to the question of how violence inflicted from outside the
community leads to favoring one’s own group over social and political action
in general. However, in spite that this paper finds evidence that exposure to
conflict has negative effects on trust in institutions and participation, given
data limitations this study is unable to causally determine whether the effects
of conflict affect perceptions or behavior in general or towards a particular
group.
Overall the results suggest that exposure to conflict has negative effects
on trust in institutions such as different levels of government, institutions of
the electoral system and the media, although these effects do not translate to
civil organizations like the Church, the Ombudsman’s office or to the police.
The patterns described by the effects of conflict on institutions suggest that
exposure to violence has negative effects on trust in different government
levels when exposure occurs between ages 0 to 18 years. In addition, exposure
to conflict has a negative effect on trust in government institutions associated
with electoral processes when exposure occurs between ages 19 to 60. These
results suggest that the age period from 0 to 18 years old is key for the
development of trust in government authorities, while the period after the
minimum legal age for voting (18 years old in Peru) is relevant to establish
trust in the institutions of the electoral system.38 These results echo the
negative effects of exposure to armed conflicts in trust on public institutions
in Colombia (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013) and from exposure to civil war violence
on trust in the national government in Nepal (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016).
In contrast, the paper finds no evidence of impacts of conflict on trust in
non-government institutions such as the Catholic Church or political parties.
This paper also analyzes the effects of exposure to violence from different
perpetrators on trust in government organizations and the media. The es-
timates suggest that government violence has negative impacts on trust (in
some cases the magnitude of the estimates is twice larger than the estimates
of aggregated violence), while the effects of violence from terrorist groups
38Additional estimates using four age periods are consistent with the idea that the
school-age period is key for the development of political awareness and trust in institu-
tions (Sears and Valentino, 1997; Adhvaryu and Fenske, 2014; Bauer et al., 2014).
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are typically smaller and, in several cases, negligible. One interpretation for
these results suggests that civil conflict violence would be perceived as a sign
of the government’s inability to protect its citizens and hold the monopoly
on the use of power, thus damaging the image of the state among the af-
fected population. These results suggest that conflict exposure might have
multiple dimensions and that the expected effects of conflict violence on trust
would depend not only on the intensity or period of exposure, but also on
the perception of the party responsible for inflicting the violence.
The results on the effects of civil conflict violence on participation reveal
a negative relation between conflict exposure and participation in groups
associated with the public provision of services such as education and food
security. These results suggest that exposure to violence from the Peruvian
conflict reduced incentives for cooperation in the public provision of services.
Exposure to the armed conflict reduced the average participation in moth-
ers’ clubs. Similarly, exposure to the conflict reduces participation in school
parents’ associations and in the soup-kitchen. However, exposure to conflict
does not seem to negatively affect participation in the glass of milk program.
This study also estimates the effect of conflict exposure on participation in
neighbor associations and workers’ unions estimating negative impacts when
exposure occur from ages 0 to 18 years. These results suggest that expo-
sure to violence from the Peruvian conflict reduces incentives for cooperative
behavior, even at the local level, as revealed by a lower participation in or-
ganizations directly related to the local provision of public services. These
results are broadly consistent with previous findings suggesting that reduc-
tions in social capital reduce contributions for public goods (Anderson et al.,
2004), but they contrast with previous findings in the literature by Bellows
and Miguel (2009); Blattman (2009) and Bauer et al. (2016) who find that
conflict exposure is associated with higher community group participation,
political engagement and political leadership. The negative effects of conflict
on participation have broad impacts from the weakening the social insur-
ance provided by strong social capital (Bauer et al., 2016) to the loss of
political accountability in the functioning of institutions (Nannicini et al.,
2013). Additional results suggest that the effects of violence on participation
in cultural, political and social organizations are negligible.
Finally, this paper also studies the existence of heterogeneous effects of
violence from different agents (i.e., government versus rebel forces) in partic-
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ipation, but does not find evidence of a pattern associating violence from a
particular actor to positive or negative effects on participation in organiza-
tions that provide public services.
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1.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Evolution of events of violence at district level
(1980-2000)
(a) Violence victims 1980-1982 (b) Violence victims 1983-1986 (c) Violence victims 1987-1989
(d) Violence victims 1990-1992 (e) Violence victims 1993-1995 (f) Violence victims 1996-2000
Notes: The figures above show the evolution of the incidence of violence from the Peruvian
armed conflict at six different periods between 1980 and 2000. The panels map the number
of acts of violence occurring in each district (province limits in solid lines) during the
periods: (a) 1980-1982; (b) 1983-1986; (c) 1987-1989; (d) 1990-1992; (e) 1993-1995; and,
(f) 1996-2000. Darker shades imply a higher number of events registered in the district.
The district is the smallest political organization level in Peru (the country is organized
in states/regions (largest), provinces (medium) and districts/municipalities (smallest)).
37
Figure 1.2: Events of violence at state level
(1980-2000)
Notes:
The map shows the intensity of violence in each state during the whole duration of the
Peruvian armed conflict (1980-2000). The states in darker shades experienced a higher
number of events of violence (either fatal or non-fatal) per 100,000 population. The red
circles represent number of deaths or fatalities per 100,000 population. The state is the
largest local political organization level in Peru (the local authorities are organized in
states/regions (largest), provinces (medium) and districts/municipalities (smallest)).
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Figure 1.3: Yearly evolution of violence by type
(Number of acts of violence per year)
Notes: The figure above shows the yearly evolution of the violence associated with the
Peruvian armed conflict from 1980 and 2000. The red bars represent the number of fatal
acts of violence per year, while the gray bars show the number of non-fatal events of
violence.
39
Figure 1.4: Yearly evolution of violence by perpetrator
(1980-2000)
Notes: The graph shows the monthly evolution of violence by alleged perpetrator. These
acts of violence include all the events (fatal or non-fatal) of violence where an allegedly
responsible part was identified. The blue line shows the number of events of violence
generated by the Peruvian government (either armed forces, the police or paramilitary
forces). The lines in red represent the acts of violence from the Shining Path or the Tupac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement.
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Figure 1.5: Identification Strategy
Notes: Civil conflict persisted for two decades from 1980 to 2000. Information about trust
comes from a pool of household surveys (2004-2014). Only individuals age 18 or older at
the moment of the survey (youngest born in 1996 and interviewed in 2014) responded
to the questions regarding trust in institutions. Analysis only considers people age 60
or younger at the beginning of the conflict (born after 1920). Exposure to conflict and
intensity of exposure depend on interaction between location-time of birth and evolution
of conflict violence in space and time.
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Table 1.1: Summary characteristics of the population
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Non-exposed Exposed
Exposure to violence (years of exposure)
Total exposure 0.941 0 1.512
(1.853) (0) (2.158)
Exposure from 0 to 18 0.459 0 1.254
(1.271) (0) (1.848)
Exposure from 19 to 60 0.482 0 1.237
(1.319) (0) (1.880)
Exposure from 0 to 6 0.153 0 0.786
(0.573) (0) (1.089)
Exposure from 7 to 18 0.306 0 0.966
(0.927) (0) (1.442)
Exposure from 19 to 30 0.246 0 0.905
(0.828) (0) (1.387)
Exposure from 31 to 60 0.235 0 1.072
(0.900) (0) (1.672)
Observable characteristics
Male 0.490 0.492 0.488
[male=1, female=0] (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Married 0.608 0.632 0.593
[yes=1, no=0] (0.488) (0.482) (0.491)
Head of household 0.507 0.556 0.476
[yes=1, no=0] (0.500) (0.497) (0.499)
Family size 4.773 4.596 4.884
[number of family members] (2.249) (2.333) (2.187)
Migrate birth province 0.380 0.409 0.362
[yes=1, no=0] (0.485) (0.492) (0.481)
Urban residence 0.682 0.590 0.739
[urban=1, rural=0] (0.466) (0.492) (0.439)
Indigenous 0.242 0.255 0.234
[yes=1, no=0] (0.429) (0.436) (0.423)
Number of observations 620,733 237,325 383,408
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The first column (1) shows descriptive statistics for the
full sample, columns (2) show the statistics for the sub-sample of individuals who where not affected
by the conflict and (3) the statistics for the affected sub-sample. The top section of Table 1.1 shows
the average years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict among individuals who
were ever exposed to the conflict for different subsamples. The bottom section of the table shows
the main descriptive statistics for different subsamples of the control variables used in the estimation
regression models. For a more detailed discussion of these variables see Section 1.5.2.
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Table 1.2: Statistics of trust in institutions and media and participation in
local organizations
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Non-exposed Exposed
Trust in institutions and the media
A.1. State government levels
District government 0.225 0.244 0.213
(0.418) (0.430) (0.410)
Province government 0.214 0.225 0.207
(0.410) (0.418) (0.405)
Regional government 0.164 0.180 0.153
(0.370) (0.384) (0.360)
National congress 0.117 0.133 0.108
(0.322) (0.339) (0.310)
A.2. Electoral institutions
Trust in national jury of elections 0.243 0.245 0.243
(0.429) (0.430) (0.429)
Trust in national office of electoral processes 0.281 0.280 0.281
(0.449) (0.449) (0.449)
A.3. Mass media
Written press 0.220 0.220 0.219
(0.414) (0.414) (0.414)
Radio & television 0.339 0.340 0.338
(0.473) (0.474) (0.473)
A.4. Other institutions
Catholic Church 0.566 0.584 0.553
(0.496) (0.493) (0.497)
Political parties 0.0657 0.0765 0.0589
(0.248) (0.266) (0.235)
Ombudsman office 0.421 0.438 0.411
(0.494) (0.496) (0.492)
National police 0.196 0.215 0.183
(0.397) (0.411) (0.387)
Participation in organizations
B.1. Provision of public services
Mothers’ club 0.017 0.020 0.014
(0.129) (0.141) (0.119)
School parents association 0.038 0.039 0.037
(0.190) (0.192) (0.188)
Milk-glass program 0.200 0.184 0.211
(0.400) (0.388) (0.408)
Soup-kitchen program 0.033 0.035 0.031
(0.178) (0.184) (0.173)
Neighbors associations 0.121 0.0926 0.141
(0.326) (0.290) (0.348)
Worker’s syndicate (union) 0.088 0.075 0.097
(0.283) (0.263) (0.296)
B.2. Social, political and cultural organizations
Social club 0.051 0.046 0.054
(0.220) (0.210) (0.226)
Political party 0.025 0.024 0.027
(0.157) (0.153) (0.161)
Cultural association 0.011 0.009 0.012
(0.104) (0.0961) (0.109)
Self-Defense group 0.067 0.096 0.046
(0.249) (0.295) (0.210)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The first column (1) shows descriptive statistics for the full
sample, columns (2) show the statistics for the sub-sample of individuals who where not affected by the
conflict and (3) the statistics for the affected sub-sample. Panels A.1., A.2., A.3. and A.4. of Table 1.2
show statistics for binary variables on trust. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when
the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
Panels B.1. and B.2. show statistics of participation in organizations. These binaries variables are equal
to “1” when the individual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise. For details see
Section 1.5.3.
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Table 1.3: Effects of conflict on trust in government institutions and the media
District Province National Regional National Jury Office Electoral Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.005** -0.006*** -0.003* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 -0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210915 206757 196327 195799 185444 188520 200729 210373
Mean level of trust 0.225 0.214 0.117 0.164 0.243 0.281 0.22 0.339
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level.
The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey
(pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend.
In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy
for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age period. The Peruvian
government system is organized in four levels, going from local to national: districts, provinces, regions and national government. In addition, the National Congress is the legislative
body of the government. Even though the Congress is a national level institution, the Congressmen are elected at the region level, with most regions having more than one represen-
tative in the Congress. The Peruvian National Jury of Elections is the agency responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral processes, proclaiming the official electoral results
and awarding recognition or credentials to the elected authorities. The National Office of Electoral Processes is the agency responsible for organizing the elections for the different
levels of political authorities in Peru. The Written Press includes local and nationwide public and private newspapers and magazines. Similarly, Radio & Television includes public
and privately owned radio and television stations. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution,
and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 1.4: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173602 204588 212178 211267
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes
only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at
the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models
include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and
a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size
and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language
(proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to
violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Catholic Church repre-
sents the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely Catholic country), the Political Parties
refer to political organizations (both local and national), the Ombudsman Office is the office of the pub-
lic defender responsible for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and the
community (created in 1993), and the National Police represents the police forces. The levels of trust
for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the
institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 1.5: Effects of conflict on trust in government institutions and the media identifying the source of violence
District Province National Regional National Jury Office Electoral Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.009*** -0.009** -0.006 -0.006** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.006** -0.004 -0.008*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.008** 0.002 -0.002 0.007** 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210915 206757 196327 195799 185444 188520 200729 210373
Mean level of trust 0.225 0.214 0.117 0.164 0.243 0.281 0.22 0.339
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The
sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys
from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models
control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict
exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Peruvian government system is organized in four levels,
going from local to national: districts, provinces, regions and national government. In addition, the National Congress is the legislative body of the government. Even though the Congress is a
national level institution, the Congressmen are elected at the region level, with most regions having more than one representative in the Congress. The Peruvian National Jury of Elections is
the agency responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral processes, proclaiming the official electoral results and awarding recognition or credentials to the elected authorities. The National
Office of Electoral Processes is the agency responsible for organizing the elections for the different levels of political authorities in Peru. The Written Press includes local and nationwide public
and private newspapers and magazines. Similarly, Radio & Television includes public and privately owned radio and television stations. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1”
when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 1.6: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions
identifying the source of violence
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.007* -0.000 -0.007** -0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.013** 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.009*** -0.001 -0.010*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 0.010** 0.003 0.011** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173602 204588 212178 211267
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger
than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the
household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort
of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models
control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, ur-
ban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the
years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Catholic Church
represents the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely Catholic country), the Political Parties re-
fer to political organizations (both local and national), the Ombudsman Office is the office of the public defender
responsible for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and the community (created in
1993), and the National Police represents the police forces. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1”
when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 1.7: Effects of conflict on participation in organizations that provide public services
Mothers School’s Parents Glass of Milk Soup-Kitchen Neighbors Worker’s
Club Associations Program Program Associations Union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.001 -0.002* 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78349 166545 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.017 0.038 0.200 0.033 0.121 0.088
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or
older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth,
cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status,
family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population).
Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Moth-
ers’ Club is a social organization typically formed by mothers (although, not exclusively) with the mission to serve as a link between the population and
the Government, in order to manage and organize the provision of some key social programs. The School Parents Association is a committee of parents
that is part of the schools council formed also by teachers and students under the direction of the principal. The Glass of Milk program is the largest
social assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes, cereals and other commodities among households with children, pregnant women
and elderly population. The Soup-kitchen are social dining halls based on locally organized charities to feed low-income households for free or for a small
contribution. The Neighbors Associations are social organizations for the provision of local public good or services. The Workers Union represents labor
union organizations. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 1.8: Effects of conflict on participation in social organizations
Social Cultural Political Self-Defense
Club Association Organization Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.051 0.011 0.025 0.067
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than
age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household
survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and
wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender,
marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native
language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence
from the Peruvian armed conflict during the age range 0 to 60. Social Clubs are social groups that include the practice
of sports and hobbies. The Political Organizations are associations related with both local and national level political
parties. Cultural Associations include theater, dance and other artistic organizations. The Self-Defense Groups are lo-
cal civil groups organized to provide security. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports
participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 1.9: Effects of conflict on participation in organizations that provide public services identifying the source of
violence
Mothers School’s Parents Glass of Milk Soup-Kitchen Neighbors Worker’s
Club Associations Program Program Associations Union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.002 -0.000 0.006 0.003 -0.007** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.006 -0.008** -0.011 -0.002 0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.003 -0.000 0.016*** -0.000 0.000 0.013**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.003 -0.005** -0.021*** -0.003 0.002 -0.019***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78349 166545 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.017 0.038 0.200 0.033 0.121 0.088
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment
of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of
the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables
for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents
the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Mothers’ Club is a social organization typically formed
by mothers (although, not exclusively) with the mission to serve as a link between the population and the Government, in order to manage and organize the
provision of some key social programs. The School Parents Association is a committee of parents that is part of the schools council formed also by teachers and
students under the direction of the principal. The Glass of Milk program is the largest social assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes,
cereals and other commodities among households with children, pregnant women and elderly population. The Soup-kitchen are social dining halls based on locally
organized charities to feed low-income households for free or for a small contribution. The Neighbors Associations are social organizations for the provision of
local public good or services. The Workers Union represents labor union organizations. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports
participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 1.10: Effects of conflict on participation in social organizations identifying the
source of violence
Social Cultural Political Self-Defense
Club Association Organization Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.015*** 0.004 -0.004 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.017*** -0.006** 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.008*** 0.003* -0.007* -0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 0.013*** -0.006*** 0.006* 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.051 0.011 0.025 0.067
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at
the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled
surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national
household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size
and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous
population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict
during the relevant age range. Social Clubs are social groups that include the practice of sports and hobbies. The Political
Organizations are associations related with both local and national level political parties. Cultural Associations include
theater, dance and other artistic organizations. The Self-Defense Groups are local civil groups organized to provide security.




FROM ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF
CONFLICT EXPOSURE ON THE
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE
PERUVIAN CONFLICT
2.1 Introduction
Civil war and armed conflicts probably inflict more suffering on humanity
than any other social phenomenon. The literature on the legacies of civil wars
and armed conflicts has found evidence of significant impacts of exposure to
conflict violence on multiple outcomes (see Blattman and Miguel (2010) for
a survey on the potential negative effects of conflicts) such as education
attainment,1 health,2 labor market outcomes,3 pro-social behavior,4 intra-
family violence,5 and the formation of trust and political beliefs.6 However,
studies discussing how to define and measure exposure to violence from armed
and civil conflicts are less common. This is an important topic since, as
the results of this paper suggest, both the estimated magnitudes of conflict
exposure and their statistical significance are likely to be affected by the
1Some examples of research on the effects of conflict exposure in education include
Akresh and de Walque (2008); Shemyakina (2011); Leon (2012).
2The following studies analyze the effects of conflicts on health outcomes: Bundervoet
et al. (2009); Grimard et al. (2010); Sanchez (2010); Akresh et al. (2011, 2012a,b); Grimard
and Laszlo (2014).
3An example for the case of Peru is Galdo (2013), while Kondylis (2010) discuss the
consequences of conflict in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bozzoli et al. (2013)
analyzes the relationship between self-employment and conflict exposure in Colombia.
4There is an important body of research including Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009);
Deng (2010); De Luca and Verpoorten (2011); Voors et al. (2012); Gilligan et al. (2014);
Bauer et al. (2016).
5Some working papers such as Gallegos and Gutierrez (2010); Morales and Singh (2014)
how violence exposure in early stages in life could affect later propensity to use or tolerate
violence in the household.
6Some examples of the effects of conflict exposure in the formation of political beliefs
can be find in Blattman (2009); Becchetti et al. (2013); Cassar et al. (2013); Garcia-Ponce
and Pasquale (2013); Adhvaryu and Fenske (2014); Gafaro et al. (2014); Voors and Bulte
(2014); Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2015); De Juan and Pierskalla (2016).
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definition of exposure used.
One of the challenges of measuring conflict exposure is that it can have
multiple dimensions. For instance, there is a classification problem to an-
swer questions such as whether exposure should be defined at the individual,
household, village or district level (and the associated issue of how migra-
tion would affect exposure). A second issue is associated with the intensity
of exposure and deals with the fact that exposure can be measured as a
dummy, number of fatalities, duration (in some time unit) of exposure, prox-
imity to conflict locations, etc. Few exceptions such as Akresh et al. (2012b,
2016) discuss alternative strategies to address the difficulty of measuring ex-
posure to conflict. Alternatively, other studies like Brück et al. (2013, 2015)
approach the topic of conflict exposure measurement from a perspective of
finding the best way to capture information on exposure to conflict violence
using household surveys. This study takes advantage of the detailed in-
formation on the acts of violence that occurred during the Peruvian armed
conflict (1980-2000)7 gathered in the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.8 It also relies on the detailed information on in-
dividual level characteristics from the Peruvian national household survey
to explore the effects of using alternative definitions of conflict exposure on
the estimated impact of conflict on variables associated with human capital
accumulation and labor market outcomes.
A large body of research has studied the negative effects of conflict expo-
sure on height, weight and nutrition. For instance, recent studies by Bun-
dervoet et al. (2009); Akresh et al. (2011) and Akresh et al. (2012a) focus
on the impacts of conflict exposure during the early stages of life in height
(z-scores) in Burundi, Rwanda and Nigeria, respectively. However, the study
of the effects of civil wars and conflicts goes beyond the analysis of the im-
pact on health. The literature on economic development has also assessed
the consequences of conflict exposure on other forms of human capital ac-
cumulation, especially on education. For instance, the Rwandan genocide
7One of the longest and most important armed conflicts in Latin America. As Degregori
(2013, pp.23) points out, the decades of 1980 and 1990 represent the longest and most
intense episode of violence in Peruvian history since the independence war. Moreover,
the Shining Path played a major role in the violence from the conflict and not only was
the most important maoist group of the continent, but was also the most deathly, being
responsible for about 46 percent of all fatal victims from the Peruvian armed conflict.
8Commission for the Truth and Reconciliation or Comisin de la Verdad y la Reconci-
liacin in Spanish.
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provided an adequate context to study the negative effects of violence on ed-
ucation attainment (Akresh and de Walque, 2008), while Shemyakina (2011)
and Leon (2012) analyze the long-run effects of the Tajikistan and Peruvian
conflicts on education attainment at adulthood.
Some studies such as Akresh et al. (2012b, 2016) briefly discuss the issue
of measurement of conflict exposure. First, Akresh et al. (2012b) use both
a binary and a continuous measure (months of war exposure) of conflict
exposure relying on household survey data with migration details to correct
for potential misclassification of exposure. More recently, Akresh et al. (2016)
use the duration (months) of exposure, a war-induced displacement index and
a indicator of proximity to conflict sites to produce global positioning system
(GPS) data on the distance between survey villages and conflict sites. The
authors argue that the latter procedure measures more accurately the child’s
likelihood of exposure to the conflict.
During civil wars and armed conflicts, extreme violence is deliberately
inflicted to terrorize and intimidate civilians through exemplary terror (Ka-
lyvas, 2006), and the Peruvian conflict was no stranger to this situation. In
recent years several studies have used the information from the Final Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to explore the effects of the
Peruvian civil conflict on different outcomes.9 This paper focuses in three
studies that analyze the long-term effects of the Peruvian civil conflict in
key variables associated with human capital accumulation (education and
height)10 and labor market outcomes (labor income).11
In addition to Leon (2012), who studies the effects of conflict exposure on
education in Peru relying on data from the Peruvian national census and
from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Laszlo and Santor (2009)
exploited the roll-out of the Peruvian conflict in space and time to construct
an instrument for migration with the objective of analyzing the importance of
social networks for access to credit. More recently, Grimard and Laszlo (2014)
used information from the Final Report of the Commission along with the
9See Leon 2012, Galdo 2013, Grimard and Laszlo 2014, Morales and Singh 2014 and
Gallegos and Gutierrez (2010) for studies on the impacts of civil conflict on education,
labor market outcomes, health, and violence in the household
10Leon 2012 analyzes the impacts of violence exposure on education–number of years-
attainment, while Galdo 2013 estimates the effects of conflict on a health indicator such
as height
11Grimard and Laszlo 2014 studies the impacts of exposure to conflict violence on par-
ticipation in the labor market, employment informality and monthly incomes.
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2004-2008 waves of the Demographic and Health Surveys to study the long-
term health effects of exposure to violence during in utero and early life stages
of non-migrant women.12 In addition, Galdo (2013) studied the effects of the
exposure to violence on labor market outcomes by relying on an instrumental
variable approach13 to assess if early life exposure to civil war in Peru affected
labor-market earnings later in life. Moreover, Gallegos and Gutierrez (2010)
studied the effect of women’s exposure to violence from the Peruvian civil
conflict on their probability of being victims of violence from their partners.14.
Similarly, Morales and Singh (2014) studied whether exposure to violence
from the Peruvian conflict affects the later use of physical punishment as a
child discipline method.15
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the estimated effects of alternative
measures of exposure to violence from the Peruvian civil conflict on human
capital accumulation, measured through educational attainment (years of
education completed) and health indicators (such as height), as well as on
labor market outcomes (labor income). To do so, this paper follows two
complementary strategies. First, it tries to reproduce the approaches of
three published studies that use alternative measures of conflict exposure to
estimate the effect of the Peruvian conflict on years of education, height (both
proxy variables for human capital accumulation) and labor market outcomes
(the logarithm of the labor income).16 Second, this paper takes advantage of
a unique data base that describes the evolution of conflict violence with high
12The DHS only includes information on current location of residence, so the authors
were only able to assign exposure to conflict to women who never moved from their places
of origin.
13Galdo (2013) combines information from two waves of the ENAHO (2006 and 2007)
with the database from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and instruments the
intensity of violence at the district of birth using the acts of violence at the three closest
districts. The study argues that early childhood exposure to violence leads to a decrease
in adult monthly earnings, with women disproportionately affected, and finds evidence of
heterogeneous effects by different type of violence.
14Relying on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys for the 2005-2008 period.
The authors found that exposure to conflict violence, especially during a woman’s late
childhood and early teenage years, is associated with an increased risk of becoming a
victim of domestic violence herself
15Morales and Singh (2014) used a fix effects model and information on women aged
between 15 and 49 years old from three cross-sections (2000, 2011 and 2012) of the Pe-
ruvian Demographic and Health Surveys to report that mothers exposed to one hundred
additional conflict-related events during their lifetime are 3.4 to 3.8 percentage points less
likely to abuse their children, equivalent to 4 to 10 additional years of education.
16Importantly, note that this paper analyzes how using a particular definition of conflict
exposure in each of the papers affects the estimated results for each of these three outcomes.
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precision to analyze how three alternative definitions of conflict exposure
affect the estimated impacts of conflict violence in three key outcomes. In
general, the measures of exposure to conflict violence rely on information from
a detailed report of acts of violence and a rich set of individual characteristics
from the Peruvian household survey. The identification strategy exploits the
progression in time and space of the civil conflict, along with information on
time and location of birth and individual level characteristics to assess the
long-run effects of violence.
The Peruvian conflict offers attractive features to analyze the effect of using
alternative measures of conflict exposure on the long-run effects of conflicts.
For instance, the Peruvian conflict presents substantial spatial variation in
the timing and intensity of the violence during the 20-year period of its dura-
tion (1980-2000), while detailed information on the evolution of the conflict
at the district and month level is available from the Final Report of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. In addition, the Peruvian national house-
hold survey includes information on individual level characteristics providing
a unique opportunity to analyze multiple human capital and labor market
outcomes relying on a single consistent data base. Moreover, the existence of
published peer-reviewed research on the key variables associated with human
capital accumulation and labor market outcomes allows this study to assess
the sensitivity of the estimated effects to alternative measures of conflict
exposure.
This study offers multiple contributions to the emerging literature on the
microeconomic legacies of conflict.17 First, this paper attempts to show how
alternative definitions of conflict exposure affect the estimated impacts of
violence on several key outcome variables. The study is able to achieve
this by taking advantage of a previously unexploited database that captures
health information18 from a sub-sample of households in the Peruvian na-
tional household survey during the 2007-2010 period and combines it with
the household survey to obtain a full array of individual level characteristics.
Second, this study offers an integrated approach to asses the long-run effects
of exposure to the Peruvian civil conflict during different periods early in
17The literature on the microeconomic analysis of the effects of conflicts studies the
effects of exposure to violence on income, wealth, health and education (measures of human
capital accumulation); in contrast with the macroeconomic approach, which focuses on
physical capital, economic growth and population.
18For details on this survey refer to Section 2.3.2.
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life on variables associated with human capital accumulation, as well as on
labor market outcomes. In addition, this paper complements previous results
obtained by Leon (2012) on the impacts of exposure on education,19 and the
estimates of Grimard and Laszlo (2014) on the effects on height of exposure
to the Peruvian conflict during early childhood.20
Overall, this paper finds that the definition of exposure to conflict signifi-
cantly affects the estimated effects of conflict exposure. Although an exercise
shows that it is possible to roughly reproduce the main results for the effects
of conflict on education (Leon, 2012), health (Grimard and Laszlo, 2014) and
income (Galdo, 2013), this paper finds that the estimated effects are sensitive
to the definition of exposure to violence. For instance, using the definition of
exposure to conflict proposed by Galdo (2013) (in his study on the effects of
conflict of labor market outcomes) to estimate the effect of conflict exposure
on education, the results are inconsistent with those by Leon (2012), who
used a different definition of exposure. This paper also takes advantage of
the unique information available to construct a single data set to estimate the
impact of a binary measure of exposure and two continuous measures based
on the number of events and the length of exposure on education, height
and labor income. This approach focuses on the effects of exposure during
the fetal or in-utero period (up to 24 months before birth), early childhood
(the first 36 months after birth) and the pre-school period (4-6 years old).
It reveals that no obvious definition of conflict exposure produces consistent
results across multiple outcomes of interest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
origins and history of the civil conflict in Peru and outlines the progression
of violence. Section 2.3 describes the main sources of information for the
paper, the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
Peruvian National Household Surveys and the Nutritional Household Survey
(CENAN). Section 2.4 discusses the main methodology and identification
strategy proposed to assess the effects of exposure to civil conflict violence
on human capital accumulation. In addition, this section reviews the three
studies used for comparison. Section 2.5 presents the main estimation and
19Notice that Leon (2012) uses samples from the national Census to estimate the impacts
of conflict exposure on education.
20Providing a useful addition to their results that used a sample restricted only to
femalesby identifying both the district of birth and the district of current residence of
males and females.
57
empirical results of both the replication exercise and the comparison of al-
ternative measures of conflict exposure, while section 2.6 is reserved for the
main conclusions of the paper.
2.2 The Evolution of Civil Conflict in Peru
In May of 1980, in the middle of a transition towards democracy after more
than a decade of military rule and within a context of fragile democratic in-
stitutions,21 the Shining Path22 began their self-denominated “people’s war”
aimed at tearing down the Peruvian state and imposing a communist regime
on the country (Truth and Commission, 2014). The Shining Path initially
focused on symbolic political actions, like the theft and destruction of vot-
ing ballots from the 1980 Peruvian Presidential election,23 but their actions
promptly escalated into violence against the state and the civil population.
Although the violence started in Ayacucho and the central highlands of
Peru,24 it rapidly expanded to other areas of the country, as depicted by
Figure 2.1. The main strategy of the Shining Path was to expand from the
21In October of 1968, a military coup led by Gen. Juan Velazco Alvarado seized power
from democratically elected President Fernando Belaunde, starting a left wing-oriented
military dictatorship. However, economic and social unrest followed the reforms imple-
mented by the military government, and in 1975 Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez took
control of the military forces and the government. Nevertheless, due to the lack of popu-
lar support, the new military government committed to leading a transition towards full
democracy. This commitment was fulfilled in the late 70s when the military government
called a general election for a special Assembly in 1978 responsible for writing a new Con-
stitution and to the Presidential election of 1980. The former President of Peru, Fernando
Belaunde (who had returned from living in exile in 1978), triumphed in the general election
and was anointed as President for the 1980-1985 period (Gorriti, 2014, pg.81)
22Note that the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or “MRTA” for its acronym
in Spanish, was also involved in acts of terror during the 1980s and 1990s, although the
violence from this terrorist group was not as widespread as that of the Shining Path.
23Although Crost et al. (2013) argue that electoral fraud can be a catalyst for conflict,
it is accepted that this was not the case in the Peruvian elections in 1980 (Degregori,
2013; Truth and Commission, 2014). On the contrary, this electoral process was generally
perceived as transparent, with wide participation of groups from across the whole political
spectrum, including most of the left wing political parties, although the Shining Path
denounced the leftist organizations participating in the elections as being reactionary.
However, the transition towards new democratic institutions in countries with low levels
of per capita income tends to be relatively unstable (Collier et al., 2003, pgs.64-65).
24The leader of the Shining Path was Abimael Guzman, a former university philosophy
professor who spent most of the 1960s and 1970s on the faculty at the Universidad Nacional
San Cristbal of Huamanga in Ayacucho. The initial core of leaders of the Shining Path
included several colleagues, family members and former students of Abimael Guzman.
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highland countryside to the cities25 using violence and intimidation as part
of their tactics (McCormick, 1992). In particular, although the presence of
the Shining Path in the city dates back to the beginnings of the conflict, the
initial actions of the Shining Path in the highlands were both a short prelude
to and a precondition of a larger plan to take Lima, the country’s capital
city.
In just a few years, the rebel organizations proved to be a threat to the
Peruvian government, gaining influence in large areas of the country and rel-
egating the presence of the government to the capital and a handful of larger
towns (McCormick, 1992). In just three years the share of provinces affected
by the conflict increased from 17 percent to 36 percent, including the capital
of the country, Lima, and by 1986 almost half of the country was under siege
(Galdo, 2013). Moreover, by 1991 half of the Peruvian population lived under
a “state of emergency” (Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion, 2004a),26
and by 1992 large tracts of the highlands were effectively ceded to the rebel
group while “predictions of Lima’s impending collapse dominated national
conversations.”27 In 1988, the Peruvian Senate estimated that the economic
cost of the armed conflict (by then) was equivalent to 66 percent of the exter-
nal debt of the country or 45 percent of its gross domestic product (Comision
de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion, 2004b, pg.308). In terms of human cost, the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission received reports of more than 23,000
civilian deaths or disappearances during the 1980-2000 period, although sta-
tistical estimations put this number closer to 69,000 (Comision de la Verdad
y la Reconciliacion, 2004a, pg. 87).
Despite the initial success of the Shining Path in expanding its influence
across the Peruvian territory, the episodes of violence declined abruptly after
1992 when the leader of the Shining Path was captured in Lima and subse-
quently requested a peace agreement with the Peruvian government in 1993
from prison (Burt, Jo-Marie, 2008). In contrast with the prediction that
25In contrast with recent literature that tries to relate conflict occurrence with natural
phenomenon like rainfall (Crost et al., 2015) or exogenous interventions like international
aid (Crost et al., 2014), the general consensus is that the Peruvian conflict originated from
the political ambitions and the quest for power by the Shining Path’s leader (Gorriti, 2014;
Truth and Commission, 2014). See Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion (2004b, Ch.
1) on the motivations of the Peruvian conflict.
26A state of emergency is supposed to be an exceptional situation where certain civil
liberties are suspended to maintain peace and order.
27Stern (1998, pgs. ix-x)
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once a rebellion occurs in a society it is at risk of being caught in a conflict
trap (Collier et al., 2003; Bank, 2011), after the capture of the leader of the
Shining Path the violence not only decreased rapidly, but the rebel groups
were effectively defeated (Stern, 1998).
Two main hypotheses attempt to explain why the intelligence services of
Peru were initially unable to understand the insurgent phenomenon, thus
facilitating the expansion of the violence during most of the 1980s. First,
because the intelligence system was in poor condition due to the fragile in-
stitutional framework in transition towards democracy.28 Second, the intel-
ligence forces dedicated themselves to looking for local equivalents of leftist
groups that had appeared in the region during the 1960s and 1970s (such
as the Tupamaros and the Montoneros from Uruguay and Argentina) along
with the symptoms of social unrest that typically precede these groups’ ap-
pearance (Gorriti, 2014).
Faced with the threat of increasing violence from the Shining Path, the
initial response of the Peruvian government was slow and ineffective (Mc-
Cormick, 1992). This occurred even though, at its peak during the late
1980s, the Shining Path only had approximately 5,500 members and fewer
than one thousand combatants (Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion,
2004a).29 Neither the intelligence agencies, nor the police, nor the armed
forces noticed the substantial differences between the processes developing
in Peru and those occurring in other parts of the Southern Cone of Latin
America (Gorriti, 2014). Unable to perceive nuances, some groups within
the police and military forces used indiscriminate violence against civilians.
As a consequence, in some occasions the civil population felt trapped in the
crossfire between government forces (army, police and paramilitaries) and
the Shining Path, as suggested by Figure (2.3). In particular, the rural civil
population was the most severely affected by the violence. As highlighted
by the Truth and Commission (2014), on one hand, the police and military
forces often forgot that human beings were the supreme end of order and
adopted a strategy of massive violation of rights. On the other, the Shining
Path and other subversive organizations showed contempt for their victims,
28See Gorriti (2014, Ch.V “The Missing Files”) for an account of the loss of intelligence
files of the Ministerio del Interior (i.e., Department of State) in 1980 during the transition
to democracy from a military dictatorship.
29The population of Peru was estimated in more than 20 millions by 1990.
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who counted only as a blood toll to be paid to carry out their revolution and
achieve their political objectives.
2.3 Sources of Information and Relevant Sample
This section describes the main sources of information used to construct the
measures of exposure to violence and explores the set of long-run outcomes
influenced by the civil conflict, complementing and extending previous re-
search on the effects of exposure to conflict violence. The first part of this
section describes the report on violent acts from the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission. The details of the report allow to outline the progression of
the civil conflict in time and space. The second part describes the Peruvian
national household survey, which is the main source of individual level infor-
mation, like district and month of birth, as well as characteristics regarding
education and labor.
2.3.1 Evolution of violence
The information on the individual acts of violence associated with the civil
conflict comes from the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission. The measure of exposure to violence relies on district level records
on events of violence that occurred during the period 1980-2000, and on
individual level information from the Peruvian National Household Survey.
The information from the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission offers two main advantages. First, it provides a detailed account
of the monthly progress of the civil conflict at the district level. Furthermore,
it includes information on the type of violence30 and alleged perpetrators of
each event.31 Second, the information provided by the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission can be matched with information on the place of birth and
current residence from the national household survey. This paper takes ad-
vantage of the district level records collected by the Truth and Reconciliation
30Classified as illegal detentions, kidnappings, murders, extra-judicial executions, tor-
tures, or rapes.
31Either from Shinning Path, MRTA, government armed forces, the police force or auto-
defense groups, as identified by the person who gives testimony on the episode of violence.
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Commission along with individual level information from household surveys
to construct measures of exposure to violence during the period 1980-2000.
The detailed information from the Final Report of the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission allows to outline progression of the conflict in time and
space at the district and month level. The Final Report of the Commission
was released in August 2003 after 26 months of investigations, interviewing
more than 17,000 victims, holding public hearings and reconstructing hun-
dreds of instances of atrocities through forensic and social research (Truth
and Commission, 2014). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission inves-
tigated and reported data on violence over a 20-year period (1980-2000),
recording every single instance of civil war violence (about 36,000 acts) as
an independent event in a given location (district) and time (month). Fig-
ure (2.3) depicts the evolution of the civil war’s violence in Peru during the
period 1980-2000.
Even though the Truth and Reconciliation Commission gathered informa-
tion for the period from 1980 to 2000, violence was more intense from 1983
to 1992. Afterwards, the conflict subsided, as shown by Figure (2.3), in large
part due to the capture of the leader of Shining Path,32 the most active of
the rebel groups. The violence associated with the Peruvian conflict33 began
in May of 1980, according to the information gathered by the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. Two peaks of violence occurred during the pe-
riod 1980-2000, with 25 percent of the acts of violence taking place between
1983-1984, and 23 percent during 1989-1990. In total, almost half of the acts
of violence recorded by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission occurred
during these 4 years (1983-1984 and 1989-1990).
The members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission traveled across
Peru holding public hearings where they gathered testimonies from victims,
relatives, witnesses and survivors of acts of violence in an effort to collect in-
formation on acts of violence related to the civil conflict. All the testimonies
32The leader of the Shining Path (SL), Abimael Guzman Reynoso, was captured on
a Saturday, September 12, 1992 in a house in the residential area of Surquillo, in Lima,
the capital of the country. A year after his capture, in 1993, Abimael Guzman requested
a Peace Agreement with the Peruvian government, although small factions of the rebel
groups decided to continue their acts of violence (several of them linked to the illegal drug
trafficking groups).
33Blattman and Miguel (2010, pp. 3-4) define as civil conflicts those internal conflicts
that count at least 25 battle deaths per year, while civil wars are those conflicts that count
more than 1,000 battle deaths during a single year.
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were individually coded to identify the type of act, location, alleged responsi-
ble, identity of the victim, date of occurrence, as well as other characteristics
of each episode of violence.
With the objective of minimizing potential problems due to the self-selected
nature of the sample (the dataset prepared by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission comes from a nonrandom sample of self-reported acts of vio-
lence), authors such as Leon (2012) and Grimard and Laszlo (2014) use the
presence of violence in the district (either constructing a variable for dura-
tion, Leon (2012), or a dummy for occurrence, Grimard and Laszlo (2014)),
rather than the number of acts of violence (a proxy for intensity) to define the
measure of violence exposure. This approach contrasts with Galdo (2013),
who instruments the intensity of the conflict using the occurrence of violence
in neighboring districts. Under the former strategy, the presence of violence
is defined as the occurrence of at least one violent act in the district,34 in-
dependent of the type and intensity of the event of violence. However, the
literature on the effects of conflict does not offer a consensus on the adequate
way to measure conflict exposure. Therefore, this paper proposes to compare
the results of using three alternative measures of conflict exposure based on
the occurrence of events (defining a dummy or binary variable), number of
events that occurred and the number of months when events of violence took
place (a proxy variable for duration or length of exposure to the conflict).
Finally, an additional limitation of the database of the Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission is that it only includes information on human rights vio-
lations, not on attacks to public infrastructure. Hence, this study is only able
to identify the effects of exposure to civil conflict violence against individuals,
not the consequences or impacts of destruction of public infrastructure.
2.3.2 Individual characteristics
The main source of information on individual level characteristics is the Pe-
ruvian national household survey35 and its nutritional module36 gathered by
34The intensity of violence is more subject to bias if particular unobserved characteristics
lead to higher reporting in some areas.
35Peruvian National Households Survey or Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, “ENAHO”
for its acronym in Spanish.
36Monitoreo de Indicadores Nutricionales en la Encuesta Nacional de Hogares.
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the National Statistics Office (INEI37) for the period 2007-2010. This paper
exploits the information from the household survey regarding the district
and month of birth of each individual, to construct measures of exposure
to violence from the civil conflict. In addition, the national household sur-
vey include variables associated with human capital accumulation and labor
market outcomes. This paper also relies on information from two additional
data sources to replicate the estimations presented by Leon (2012); Galdo
(2013) and Grimard and Laszlo (2014). The first additional database is the
Peruvian national Census of 2007 that was used by Leon (2012) to estimate
the long-run effects of exposure to conflict on education attainment. In ad-
dition, this paper also uses the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for
Peru during the 2004-2008 period to replicate the results by Grimard and
Laszlo (2014) on the effects of the conflict in height. Finally, Galdo (2013)
also relies on the Peruvian national household survey, although he uses a
pool of the years 2007 and 2008.
The Peruvian national household survey is a continuous annual survey
conducted by the Peruvian National Statistics Office containing rich data on
household consumption and spending patterns, household assets, education
and health, among other variables.38 The main objective of the survey is to
provide a reliable source of information for public and private institutions
and researchers interested in evaluating the evolution of living conditions of
Peruvian households. The level of detail available in the Peruvian house-
hold survey facilitates the analysis of a wide set of outcomes39 for the whole
population,40 relying on individual level measures of violence exposure based
on month, year and district of birth. The Peruvian household survey also
includes information about participation in the labor market, working in the
formal sector, monthly labor income (from primary occupation), number of
hours worked and incidence of chronic disease, among others. This survey
is the main source of information for control variables for individual and
37Peruvian national statistics authority or Instituto Nacional de Estadstica e Informti-
ca., “INEI”.
38The survey is conducted by the Peruvian Statistical Office at the national level in urban
and rural areas in the 25 departments (states) of Peru with the objective of constructing
monthly indicators to track the general well-being conditions of Peruvian households.
39Galdo (2013) focuses on labor market participation and formality, while Leon (2012)
limits his analysis to years of education attainment with information from the Peruvian
Census.
40Grimard and Laszlo (2014) focus on a sub-sample of non-migrant women and children
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household characteristics.
In addition to the Peruvian national household survey, this paper exploits
the information contained in the nutritional module (Peruvian nutritional
survey or CENAN41) regarding human capital accumulation, espcially on
health variables. Gathered by the Peruvian Centro Nacional de Alimentacin
y Nutricin and the Peruvian National Statistics Office, this survey is the
main source of information for individual health outcomes. The objective of
the nutritional survey is to obtain information on the nutritional condition,
general health and healthy habits (practice of sports, sedentary habits, etc)
of the households. The nutritional survey is a national survey, covering both
urban and rural areas in all 25 states of Peru.42
The design of the nutritional survey is based on the sample of households
selected to be interviewed for the national household survey, such that a
second visit is performed to gather health information on the households
previously interviewed. For the 2007-2008 CENAN survey, 10,867 households
were interviewed. However, for the 2009-2010 waves of the survey, the number
of households interviewed nearly doubled, reaching 21,680.43
This paper uses data from the national household surveys for the period
2007-2010.45 The selection of this period responds to the need to match the
information from the national household survey with the base on anthropo-
morphic characteristics in the nutritional survey, which took place in two
waves between 2007 and 2010. Two key variables provided by the National
Household Survey are the district of birth as well as the year and month of
birth of each individual. The new base contains information at the individual
41“CENAN” for its acronym in Spanish.
42Including the Provincia Constitucional del Callao.
43The nutritional survey has three (3) units of analysis of modules, each focusing on a dif-
ferent dimension of individual health. For the modules of Anthropometry and Hemoglobin,
20 and 21 questions were asked on the 2007-2008 and 2009-2010 nutritional’s surveys. For
the Physical activity module, the number of questions rose from 7 to 31 between the
two waves of the survey. The anthropometry module registers information for height and
weight of each member of the household. For the hemoglobin module, children age three
or younger and women of fertile age (between 12 and 49 years)44 were interviewed. Fi-
nally, all the individuals 14 years old or older answered questions on the physical activity
module.
45The information of each wave (year) of the household survey is organized in differ-
ent modules or topics, which were matched in order to create yearly files. These yearly
data sets were appended to build a single base. In particular, this paper uses modules 1
(characteristics of house), 2 (characteristics of household members), 3 (information on ed-
ucation attainment for household members), 4 (basic information on health for household
members) and 5 (information on employment, labor and non-labor income).
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level as well as variables recording the number of human rights violations in
the birth district of each individual.
This study also relies on information from the Integrated Public Use Mi-
crodata Series (IPUMS) International, the world’s largest individual-level
population database, to gain access to information on the Peruvian census of
2007.46 The IPUMS-International project provides public access to samples
of national census across the world, and in the case of Peru offers access
to a 10 percent sample of the census of 2007. However, one of the limita-
tions of this data base is that the smallest geography level it identifies is the
province.47 Thus, it is not possible to estimate exposure to violence from
the conflict at the district of birth level and replicate precisely the method-
ology followed by Leon (2012). This paper then assigns exposure to conflict
based not on the district of birth (unavailable), but on the province of birth.
This approach is expected to attenuate the actual intensity of exposure to
the conflict, so the effects estimated with this data could be interpreted as
lower-bounds of those that would be obtained with district level information.
The final data set used in this paper is the Demographic and Health Sur-
veys (DHS) of Peru for the 2004-2008 period. The DHS is a nationally-
representative household survey that provides data for a wide range of mon-
itoring and impact evaluation indicators in the areas of population, health,
and nutrition. For this paper, the key variables included in the DHS are
anthropomorphic measures, in particular height, weight and body mass in-
dex (BMI). However, this database also present some limitations. First, the
survey only includes information on height for women interviewed in the sur-
vey. Second, it only includes information on the current district of residence
of the individual and on the previous district of residence during the last
five years. Therefore, it is only possible to identify the district of birth for
those individuals who have never migrate. As a consequence, any analysis
on the effects of conflict exposure (assigning conflict based on the district of
birth) on health using the DHS must be limited to the sample of non-migrant
women.
46According to its website “IPUMS-International is an effort to inventory, preserve,
harmonize, and disseminate census microdata from around the world. The project has
collected the world’s largest archive of publicly available census samples.”
47Peru has three levels of political organization: regions, provinces and districts, from
larger to smaller areas.
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2.3.3 Main variables
This section describes the main characteristics of the relevant sample as clas-
sified by exposure to conflict violence. This paper uses information on events
of violence from the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission matched with information on household and individual level
characteristics from the Peruvian national household and nutritional sur-
veys to construct the main sample of interest. Table (2.1) shows the control
variables used in the models estimating the effects of exposure to conflict
violence. Each row shows the statistics for a particular variable used as an
exogenous covariate in the estimated models. The set of variables includes
age (measured in years), an indicator variable for gender (under the name
“male” and equal to one for men and zero otherwise), a binary indicator
showing if the individual has a partner (equal to one if the person is either
married or cohabits, and zero in any other case), an indicator variable equal
to one if the individual is the head of the household, the family size (exclud-
ing people who live in the household but who are not part of the family cell),
the number of income earners in the household, the number of children under
the age of 14 who live in the household, and indicator variables for urban
(which takes the value of one if the household is located in an urban setting
and zero otherwise) and for migration (equal to one if the person reports
living in a district different from the one where she was born, or if the person
lives in a different province from her province of birth, or reports living in
a region different from the one where she was born). The statistics in Ta-
ble (2.1) suggest that the average individual is 25.5 years old, with exposed
persons being younger (age 23.3 on average) than non-exposed (27.5 on aver-
age). The whole sample as well as the exposed and non-exposed population
are evenly divided among males and females. However, non-exposed individ-
uals are more likely to be married (54 percent) and heado of households (39
percent) than exposed ones (31 and 28 percent, respectively). In addition,
although exposed population is more likely to migrate their district of birth
(51 percent versus 45 for non-exposed), they are less likely to migrate their
province and state of birth. Finally, the subsample of exposed individuals is
more urban (77 percent urban versus 64 percent for non-exposed) and less
indigenous (15 percent for exposed and 18 for non-exposed).
Table (2.2) shows the main statistics for a set of outcomes used as depen-
67
dent variables in this paper. The organization of Table (2.2) is similar to
Table (2.1), with rows showing the different variables, and pair of columns
describing the mean averages and the standard deviations. The variables in
Table (2.2) can be classified in two categories. First, are variables associ-
ated with human capital accumulation such as education (years of education
attainment), height (in centimeters), weight (in kilograms), Body Mass In-
dex or BMI (measured as weight in kilograms divided by the square of the
height in meters), incidence of chronic diseases, reported having been ill in
the last four weeks, and probability of having visited a hospital in the last
four weeks. The second group of variables are associated with labor supply
and labor market outcomes. The variables shown in Table (2.2) are work
(indicator variable equal to one if the person reported working in the last
week, and zero otherwise), an indicator for labor informality (this variable
reports that the individual is employed but is not contributing to the social
security system, has no contract or works in a private firm with less than
10 employees), labor force participation (for household members at least 14
years or older), number of hours worked last week (only for employed peo-
ple), labor income (measure in Nuevos Soles of 2010), total income of the
individual (includes labor and non-labor incomes, in Nuevos Soles of 2010)
and an indicator variable for poverty (based on the definition of the Peruvian
national statistics office). The statistics in Table (2.2) suggest that exposed
individuals achieve more education (10.3 years), are taller (158 cm.) and
earned less (s/. 647) thant non-exposed population (8.4 years, 157 cm. and
S/. 720, respectively).
2.4 Methodology
Starting from the hypothesis that there is no rigorous way to define exposure
to conflict violence, this section studies the effects of using alternative mea-
sures of conflict exposure on the estimated impacts of the Peruvian conflict
on human capital accumulation and labor market outcomes. This section fol-
lows two complementary steps. First, this section reproduces the approaches
of three published (peer-review) studies that use alternative measures to de-
fine conflict exposure and estimate the effect of the Peruvian conflict on years
of education, height and labor income. Second, this paper takes advantage of
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a unique data set to measure exposure to conflict violence with high-precision
(up to the month and district level–the lowest level of political subdivision of
the country–during the 1980-2000 period) to compare the estimated effect of
using three alternative measures of exposure: a dummy variable, the number
of events, and the length–number of years–of exposure. Overall, the identi-
fication strategy of this paper exploits the progression in time and space of
the Peruvian civil conflict during the 1980s and 1990s. The paper relies on
repeated cross section data, an approach previously used in the literature to
estimate the effects of the Peruvian conflict48 taking advantage of the spatial
variation of violence to assess how violence impacts educational attainment,
health indicators and labor market outcomes.
2.4.1 Replication exercises
The first part of section 2.4 provides a detailed account of the methodologies
used in three original studies on the effects of the Peruvian civil conflict on
education attainment (Leon, 2012), height (Grimard and Laszlo, 2014) and
labor income (Galdo, 2013).
The approach of Leon (2012) on the effects of conflict on education
First, this paper discusses the work by Leon (2012) on the long-term effects of
the Peruvian civil conflict on human capital. Leon (2012) exploits the tempo-
ral and geographical variation in the incidence of conflict to find evidence of
the persistent impact of exposure to political violence on educational attain-
ment. The paper measures exposure to violence as the number of years when
an episode of violence (either fatal or non-fatal) occurred in the district of
birth of the individual during the in-utero (1 to 2 years before birth), early
childhood (0 to 3 years old) and preschool (4 to 6 years old) age periods.
The identification strategy exploits the temporal and geographical variation
in the incidence of the Peruvian conflict, relying on both district of birth and
year of birth fixed effects, province-specific trends and demographic charac-
teristics.49 The results suggest that the average person exposed to violence
48For examples of works on microeconomics effects of the Peruvian civil conflict see Leon
(2012), Galdo (2013), Grimard and Laszlo (2014) or Morales and Singh (2014).
49In particular, Leon (2012) argues that after controlling for these covariates the deter-
minants of educational achievement at adulthood are not correlated with the incidence
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during the in-utero, early childhood and preschool age periods achieves 0.31
fewer years of education at adulthood. The paper also analyzes the effect
of exposure during the primary school (7 to 12) and high-school (13 to 17)
ages, but during these periods the impacts were not precisely estimated.
Leon (2012) relies on individual records from the 2007 (and 1993) census
to identify the year and district of birth of each individual, as well as the
number of years of primary and secondary schooling accumulated. Since
the outcome of interest is educational achievement,50 the paper restricts the
analysis to individuals who were at least 18 years old at the time of the
Census (thus, were old enough to have completed their schooling cycle).
However, the relevant sample also includes individuals born since 1975 (who
were approximately 6 years old at the beginning of the conflict). In addition,
the information on the presence and intensity of conflict comes from the
data collected by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which
includes detailed reports (such as month and location) of every human rights
violation that occurred during the two decades of the conflict (1980-2000).
The author merges the data on violence with the information on the census
to identify the number of human rights violations taking place during the
year and in the district of birth of each individual, as well as during the
years before and after.51
Leon (2012) estimates the reduced form equation 2.1 to assess the impact
of conflict exposure on later educational attainment. In equation 2.1, Sijt
represents the number of years of schooling achieved by individual i, who
was born at district j during year t. The equation includes cohort of birth
fixed effects, ηt, and district of birth fixed effects, νj, as well as a vector
of conflict violence since “the geographical and temporal expansion of the conflict followed
clear political and strategic guidelines from the rebel group, taking the war from rural areas
in the highlands to the rich coastal districts (to attempt at controlling Lima, the capital
city), and the coca region in the jungle (to secure sources of financing).”
50The author truncates the education variable at 11 years corresponding to the comple-
tion of the secondary school cycling in Peru.
51The theoretical approach of the paper relies on the education production function
proposed by Hanushek (1979) where the education stock in each period t is represented
by St and is a function of the endowments of the individual (Et) in each period, the
educational inputs available (Nt), demographic characteristics (X) and community char-
acteristics (Ct): St = s(E1, ..., Et, N1, ..., Nt, X,C1, ..., Ct). The endowment in each period
E1, ..., Et is determined by demand-side and supply-side factors such as genetic variables
G, endowments at the household level Eh0 , and external factors at the beginning of each
period Vt. Supply side factors such as number of schools or teachers are denoted by Ct:
Et = g(G,E
h
t , Vt, Ct).
70
of demographic characteristics Xi (e.g., gender and ethnicity). In addition,
equation 2.1 includes a flexible cubic trend at the province level to control
for long-run trends in education at the province of birth. The error term is
captured by εijt:
Sijt = α + ηt + νj + δ ·Xi + γp(t) +
17∑
τ=t−2
βτ · Exposurejτ + εijt (2.1)
The variable of interest in equation 2.1 is Exposurejt which represents
dummies indicating exposure to violence at district j since the two years
before birth until 17 years after. However, note that Leon (2012) aggregates
these indicators into variables that capture the number of years of exposure
during the in-utero (1 to 2 years before birth), early childhood (0 to 3 years
old), preschool age (4 to 6 years old) periods, primary school (7 to 12 years
old) and high-school (13 to 17 years old). The main identification assumption
in Leon (2012) is that the error term εijt is uncorrelated with the incidence of
violence after controlling for the fixed effects, the demographic characteristics
and the province specific cubic time trends.
The approach of Grimard and Laszlo (2014) on the effects of conflict on
health
A second relevant study is the paper by Grimard and Laszlo (2014) on the
effects of the Peruvian conflict on female health and psycho-social outcomes.
This paper exploits the extensive geographic and time variation in the in-
tensity and extent of the conflict to find evidence for the critical period
programming hypothesis.52 The authors measure exposure to violence using
binary variables indicating if the district of birth experienced death or disap-
pearances during each of the two years before birth, at birth and during the
first five years of life. The authors find evidence suggesting that exposure
to conflict deaths and disappearances in the year prior to birth (the in-utero
exposure period) reduces a woman’s height at adulthood by between 5.7
(when they control for education and wealth) and 6.1 (with no controls on
education and wealth) millimeters. The authors find no evidence of effects
52This hypothesis argues that shocks to nutrition at critical stages of human development
can have permanent deleterious effects on an individual’s health over the course of her life
(Grimard and Laszlo, 2014, pp.139).
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of conflict violence during the six first years of life on short-term health or
psycho-social indicators.
Grimard and Laszlo (2014) use two main sources of data. First, like Leon
(2012), this paper relies on the information gathered by the Peruvian Truth
and Reconciliation Commission to outline the progression of the Peruvian
conflict in time and space. The identification strategy relies on violence at
the district of birth, and the report suggests important heterogeneity in the
location of the conflict, measured as the number of districts experiencing
deaths and disappearances. Second, the paper uses the 5th wave of the
Demographic and Health Survey in Peru, a continuous survey from 2004 to
2008, to obtain a sample of non-migrant women born between 1970 and 1990.
The relevant sample includes only females “because it is believed that women
tend to suffer disproportionately from adverse shocks”.53 Since the authors
are interested in the effects of conflict on height at adulthood, the sample is
restricted to women aged 19 to 49 years old, in practice restricting the sample
to women born before 1990 and after 1970. In addition, since the survey
only provides information on the district of residence at the moment of the
interview, it is only possible to observe the district of birth for non-migrants
(about 55 percent of the individuals reported never moving). The paper
uses an indicator variable to show whether the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission reported any conflict-related deaths and disappearances at each
district in every year. This information is then merged with each individual
on the Demographic Household Survey based on their birth-district year.54
53Grimard and Laszlo (2014, pp.140)
54The theoretical frame for this paper relies on the reduced-form version of the health
production function proposed by Grimard et al. (2010). In this function health ht
at any period t is a function of health in all previous periods, initial health h0, hu-
man capital investments E also in all previous periods, wealth Y , local environmen-
tal variables C in all periods, and time-invariant individual and regional characteris-
tics Xi. In addition, Grimard and Laszlo (2014) argue that health at any period is
a recursive function of health, education and wealth in all previous periods: hi0 =
H(hi0, Ei1, ..., Eit, Yi0..., Yit, Ci0, ..., Cit, Xi). The main objective of Grimard and Laszlo
(2014) is to test the critical period programming hypothesis. Thus, they estimate regres-
sion including only fixed effects and omitting adult socioeconomic factors–e.g., education
and wealth–to test if early shocks at the district of birth have long-lasting effects on females
health outcomes. If these effects are precisely estimated and persistent after controlling
for adult socioeconomic factors, the authors claim evidence of critical period programming
effects. On the contrary, if the effects weaken after controlling for adult socioeconomic fac-
tors, there would be evidence that life-course mechanisms are also in place (Grimard and
Laszlo, 2014). The authors model the initial health hi0 as a function of unobserved ge-
netic factors G and community level characteristics C0 which take the form of district-level
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Grimard and Laszlo (2014) estimate a reduced form relationship between
current health and initial shocks. In particular, in equation (2.2) the health
variable hij represents the height of individual i born at district j (since the
sample only includes non-migrant females the district of birth and current
residence are the same), year of birth fixed effects (ηt), and district fixed
effects (νj). The vector Xi includes individual demographic characteristics
(such as marital status, mother’s native tongue, a binary variable for urban
or rural residence), while εij is a stochastic error term:
hij = α + ηt + νj + δ ·Xi +
6∑
τ=t−2
βτ · Exposurejτ + εij (2.2)
The key variables in equation 2.2 are the dummies for Exposurejt indi-
cating whether the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recorded events
(deaths and disappearances) experienced by individual i born or living at
district j during the year before (if t < 0) or after (if t > 0) birth. The au-
thors include binary variables indicating if the district of birth experienced
any death and disappearances for each of the two years before birth, at birth
and for the first five years of life. Note that while the Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission provides information on other forms of violence such as
sexual assaults, kidnappings and others, Grimard and Laszlo (2014) focus on
the most extreme cases of violence (deaths and disappearances).
The approach of Galdo (2013) on the effects of conflict on labor outcomes
In Galdo (2013) the author studies the effects of the Peruvian conflict on
labor market outcomes such as employment and working in the formal la-
bor sector. The identification strategy relies on a difference-in-differences
approach where the author estimates if children born in districts affected by
conflict violence have more adverse labor-market earnings later in life than
their counterparts born before or after them in the same district, relative to
children born during the same year but at other regions of the country (Galdo,
2013). However, in contrast with Leon (2012) or Grimard and Laszlo (2014),
who rely in an ordinary least squares (OLS) with fixed effects regression ap-
proach to estimate the long run effects of conflict exposure, Galdo (2013)
conflict shocks: hi0 = g(Ci0, Gi, Xi)
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uses both an OLS and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) with instrumental
variables (IV) methodology to assess the impacts of conflict on labor market
outcomes.55 The results suggest that an increase in one standard deviation
during the early childhood period (first 12 quarters of life) reduces adult
monthly earnings by 5 percent, while the probability of working in formal
jobs falls by 3.5 percent. The author finds no evidence that either the fetal
(four quarters previous to the birth date) or preschool (between 13 and 24
quarters of life) periods were related to adult earnings or formality.
The two main sources of information in Galdo (2013) are the report from
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 2006 and 2007 waves of
the Peruvian National Household Survey. The Peruvian National House-
hold Survey includes information on the date and district of birth at the
individual level. Since the main interest of Galdo (2013) is to analyze the
impact of violence on labor earnings, and only individuals aged 14 and older
were subject to the employment and earnings module of the survey, the rel-
evant sample includes individuals aged 14 to 34 years old (i.e., working age
individuals born between 1974 and 1993) and thus potentially exposed to
conflict violence during their first 6 years of life. The author relies on the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission data set to compute the sum of acts
of violence associated with the Peruvian conflict in a given district between
the 4 quarters before birth until age 6, then merges this information with
each birth/district date combination represented in the Peruvian household
survey.56
The main regression equation for labor income (y) in (2.3) use year of birth
fixed effects (ηt) to control for specific cohort effects, district fixed effects (νj)
to control for persistent effects of violence where the individual was born and
a district specific linear trend (γjt) to isolate individual effects from long-
run trends at the district of birth. In addition, the equation includes a set
55In particular, in order to deal with the potential effects of attenuation bias, Galdo
(2013) instruments violence at an individual’s district of birth using the violent acts mea-
sured at the three closest districts to the respondent’s birth location.
56The theoretical framework proposed by Galdo (2013) is similar to Grimard and Laszlo
(2014), since it also relies in the critical-period programming theory to argue that early
life exposure to the Peruvian civil conflict affects labor-market earnings later in life, as
well as other labor market outcomes, highlighting the role of circumstances early in life
in determining long-run economic outcomes. However, the author does not present a
formal development of the reduced form for his main regression, and instead emphasizes
the instrumental variable approach of his paper.
74
of socio-demographic characteristics (Xi) such as gender, education, marital
status, urban or rural residence and ethnicity, as well as an idiosyncratic
error term with mean zero, εij:
yij = α + ηt + νj + δ ·Xi + γjt +
6∑
τ=t−1
βτ · Exposurejτ + εij (2.3)
The main variable of interest in equation (2.3) is Exposurej representing
civil war violence exposure measured as the number of shocks of violence
affecting district j in a given quarter. For a given district in a given quarter
Galdo (2013) defines “fetal exposure” as the sum of violent acts in the first
four quarters before birth, “early childhood exposure” as the sum of violent
acts during the first 12 quarters of life, and “preschool exposure” as the sum
of violent acts between 13 and 24 quarters of life.
2.4.2 Empirical identification strategy: Assessing the effects
of civil conflict
This second part of section 2.4 discusses the identification strategy used in
this study to compare the effects of alternative measures of conflict exposure
on education, height and labor income. The identification strategy exploits
the substantial spatial variation in timing and intensity of violence from
the Peruvian civil conflict building on previous work by Leon (2012); Galdo
(2013); Grimard and Laszlo (2014). The identification of the causal effects
of violence exposure comes from comparing cohorts born during the shock
time period with those born before and after, and from comparing districts
affected by violence with the rest of the country. Then, the exposure to the
conflict depends on where and when the individuals were born. A key as-
sumption is that the incidence of violence is not correlated with determinants
of human capital accumulation or labor, since the geographical and temporal
expansion of the conflict violence followed political and strategic guidelines
from the rebel group, and the acts of violence aimed to create uncertainty
and a permanent feeling of terror among the population.
This paper proposes to exploit the variation in conflict exposure provided
by the interaction between the time and place of birth and the occurrence
of civil conflict violence in order to build measures of exposure for different
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birth cohorts. The non-exposed group includes individuals born in districts
unaffected by conflict violence (before or after the beginning of the civil
conflict in May of 1980). This group also includes persons born at districts
affected by violence, but who were not exposed to conflict violence during
the relevant (e.g., in-utero or early childhood) periods due to the interaction
between time and location of their birth and the progression of the violence.
The exposed group comprises individuals born in districts affected by the
civil conflict, and who were effectively exposed to conflict violence during
the relevant (e.g., in-utero through the first six years of life) period of study.
The identification of the effects of conflict exposure comes from two sources.
On one hand, the identification comes from differences between groups of in-
dividuals born in the same cohort group but at distinct locations affected
by different intensities of violence (e.g., one district could have experienced
several events of fatal violence associated with the conflict, while another was
unexposed). A second source of identification comes from including individ-
uals born at the same district but belonging to distinct age cohorts, thus
experiencing different levels of exposure to the conflict during the relevant
periods. The combination of both sources of conflict exposure identifies the
causal effect of violence on human capital accumulation and labor market
outcomes. The identification of the effects of conflict violence also relies on
a wide set of controls for geographical and time fixed effects, along with
province-specific time trends.
Note, however, that the proposed identification strategy suffers from some
limitations. First, the actual exposure to violence of each individual is unob-
served. In practice, this paper assigns exposure to conflict violence based on
the interaction between the time and district of birth and the progression of
the violence across time and space. Second, in contrast with shorter-length
conflicts, the Peruvian civil conflict spanned a 20-year period, with at least
12 years of high intensity violence (from 1980 to 1992). In this context,
families and individuals faced incentives to relocate from areas with high in-
cidence of violence to less violent areas. Therefore, permanent or temporal
migration could affect the treatment at different stages of life. Even though
this study constructs a migration control variable (included in the preferred
model specification), information on the full migration history of individuals
is not available. As a consequence, the results presented in this paper should
be assessed in light of these limitations.
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Preferred econometric specification
This section outlines the econometric strategy of the paper, based on a re-
peated cross-sections approach. The basic specification includes district of
birth fixed effects, birth-cohort (year) fixed effects and wave of survey fixed
effects. However, defining exposure at the district-level leads to the possi-
bility that location-specific time trends are driving the results.57 Therefore,
following a strategy similar to Akresh et al. (2011), Bundervoet et al. (2009)
and Leon (2012), the regressions include province of birth time trends to
control for location trends.
For exposition purposes, equation (2.4) uses “years of education” as the
dependent variable and a single exposure period, although a similar model
specification is used for the models estimated the effects of conflict exposure
in health (height) and labor market outcomes (labor income):




βτ · Exposurejτ + θXi + εijkt
(2.4)
The key variable in equation (2.4) is “Exposurejτ”, which indicates the
exposure to conflict violence in district j during year τ = t−1, ..., t+6, based
on the period of birth “t”.58 In addition, this equation includes district fixed
effects (αj), cohort of birth (year) fixed effects (δt), wave of survey (year of the
Peruvian national household survey) fixed effects (γk), and a location-specific
time trend that captures potential differences in time patterns at province
“p” where district “j” is located (ProvinceTrendp). In addition, the set of
observable characteristics included as control variables is represented by Xi,
while εijkt is a random, idiosyncratic error term.
The main parameter in equation (2.4) is βτ , which multiplies the Exposure
variable in the equation. Note that, similar to Leon (2012) and Galdo (2013),
this paper I aggregates years of exposure into the periods: in-utero (1 to 2
57Under a specification including only fixed effects, the identification strategy will be
valid only as long as changes over time in the average values of the dependent variable
were similar across locations in the absence of civil conflict violence.
58So far, we have not discussed the definition of Exposurej τ , but under its most simple
configuration the variable Exposurei τ represents a binary measure to indicate a child
born in a district affected by conflict, who was exposed to conflict violence during the
relevant age period.
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years before birth), early childhood (0 to 3 years old) and preschool age
(4 to 6 years old) periods. However, the study also present the results from
analyzing the exposure at each year. Importantly, in order to do evaluate the
sensitivity of the results to the definition of conflict exposure this paper uses
four alternative definitions of exposure to assess the impacts of the Peruvian
conflict:
• Dummy : The most simple specification assumes that Exposure is a
binary variable equal to one if the individual is exposed to violence
during the relevant period of analysis, and zero otherwise.
• Events : A second case models Exposure as the number of events of
violence affecting the individuals during a determined period.
• Duration: The third way to measure exposure is based on the number
of years (in months) during which the individual was exposed to events
of violence associated with the Peruvian armed conflict, during the
period of interest.
In addition, note that as an additional way to have a proxy measure of the
intensity of violence, the paper distinguishes between exposure to any type of
event of violence (i.e., fatal or non-fatal) and exposure only to fatal events of
violence. Therefore, in total we present 6 alternative specifications for each
of the outcomes of interest.
The main results in section 2.5 show the estimates for the models including
additional control variables for observable characteristics. Notice also that
Equation (2.4) includes trends for province of birth as control variables to
buttresses the argument that changes in the dependent variable would have
been similar in the absence of civil conflict violence. In Equation (2.4),
coefficient βtau measures the impact of civil conflict exposure on education
for an individual exposed to conflict violence as a child in a district affected
by the civil conflict.
Finally, note that the inclusion of a large set of fixed effects modifies the
interpretation of the results. Namely, the estimates do not represent the
impact of violence on the dependent variable at a national level, but rather
the average effect with respect to local (district) averages and period (cohort
of birth) averages, purged of province-specific trends. In this sense, the
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estimates could be interpreted as conservative, since the district fixed effects
eliminate some valuable cross-sectional variation in the violence data.
2.5 Results
This section presents the main findings of the paper organized in two parts.
The first one shows the results from a replication exercise (from Tables (2.4)
to (2.6)) of three peer-review published studies using data from the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission to construct alternative measures of conflict
exposure. These studies assess the long-run effects of the Peruvian conflict on
years of education, height and labor income. The second part takes advantage
of a unique database reporting information on education, height and labor
income to show the effects of using three alternative measures of conflict
exposure (a binary indicator variable, the number of events of violence and
the duration of exposure) on the estimated long-run impacts of the conflict
in Peru. By using a single database to measure multiple outcome variables
of interest, this paper is able to compare the effects of alternative measures
of conflict exposure on the estimated impact of violence while controlling for
a wide set of variables. Overall, the results (from Table (2.8) to Table (2.10))
suggest that the definition of exposure to conflict has a significant impact on
the estimated effects of exposure, not only in terms of the magnitude of the
estimates, but also regarding the precision and the statistical significance of
the results.
2.5.1 Replication exercises
Recognizing that there is no obvious way to define exposure to conflict vio-
lence, this section assesses the effects of alternative measures of exposure to
violence from the Peruvian conflict on the estimated impacts of conflict on
two variables associated with the accumulation of human capital (education
and height at adulthood) and one labor market outcome (labor income). In
all three cases the identification strategy relies on the exogenous roll-out of
the civil conflict and the different exposures due to the individual variation
on date and location of birth. In addition, the three papers use the Final
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as their primary source
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of information on the evolution of violence associated with the Peruvian con-
flict.
Table (2.4) is organized in ten columns. The first column starting from
the left identifies alternative periods of exposure. While the top six rows
show exposure at different age groups (beginning with two years before birth,
followed by in-utero, ages 0 to 3 years, 4 to 6, 7 to 12 and 13 to 17), the
six rows in the bottom show the effects of exposure at each year of life,
from ages 0 to 5. In addition, the periods are organized from exposure at
younger ages to older. Then, the next nine columns show the estimates of
using alternative measures of conflict exposure in education (in columns (1)
to (3)), labor incomes (columns (4) to (6)) and height (columns (7) to (9)).
In addition, each column uses data similar to one of the papers analyzed in
this study. For instance, columns (1) to (3) of Table (2.4) measure the effects
of conflict exposure on education using the Peruvian national census of 2007
as the main source of information, similarly to Leon (2012). Columns (4)
to (6) rely on data from the Peruvian national household survey to measure
labor market outcomes, like in Galdo (2013). The last three columns use data
from the Demographic and Health Survey to assess the impacts of the conflict
on height, following Grimard and Laszlo (2014). In column (1), Table (2.4)
shows the results of using the measures of exposure to conflict proposed
by Leon (2012)59, while column (2) uses the measures of exposure favored
by Galdo (2013)60, and column (3) shows the estimates of exposure to conflict
under the definition by Grimard and Laszlo (2014).61 A comparison between
these three columns suggest some relevant ideas. First, the estimates in the
first column are similar to the ones reported in Leon (2012), since conflict
exposure has negative and precisely estimated effects during the in-utero
period and during ages 0 to 3, while the effects of exposure at older periods
are negligible. However, the magnitudes of the estimated effects are smaller
than the ones reported by Leon (2012). One reason explaining these smaller
effects is that this paper defines exposure based on a larger geographical area
(the Province) than in Leon (2012), given data limitations, thus potentially
attenuating the effects of the conflict.62 In addition, the estimated results
59Based on the duration of exposure during different age ranges.
60Number of events of violence.
61An indicator variable equal to one if a fatality occurred during each relevant year.
62The author of this study was unable to find publicly available data from the Peruvian
census that includes information on the district of residence of the household and failed
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in column (3) suggest that the measure of exposure proposed by Grimard
and Laszlo (2014) produces results consistent with Leon (2012) during the
periods before birth, but fail to identify precisely estimated negative effects
later in life. Moreover, the measure of conflict exposure used by Galdo (2013)
(column (2)) fails to find precisely estimated effects of conflict exposure on
education at any age period.
Similarly, columns (4) to (6) of Table (2.4) use the Peruvian national house-
hold survey (ENAHO) of 2006 and 2007 to measure the impact of conflict ex-
posure in labor income using the preferred definitions by Leon (2012), Galdo
(2013) and Grimard and Laszlo (2014), respectively. Note that column (5)
reproduces the original approach by Galdo (2013) to estimate the impacts of
conflict on labor income, defining exposure as the number of events occurred
at the district of birth during three age periods (in-utero, ages 0 to 3, and 4
to 6 years old). Similarly to the original paper by Galdo (2013), the results
in column (5) show that only exposure during ages 0 to 3 are negative and
precisely estimated. In addition, the results in column (4) show that using
the definition of exposure to conflict proposed by Leon (2012) with data from
the Peruvian household survey do not produce negative estimates of expo-
sure during the period 0 to 3. The only result that is statistically significant
is associated with exposure during ages 4 to 6, but is not very precisely esti-
mated (only significant at the 10 percent level), and its magnitude is rather
small. Moreover, the estimates reported in column (6) using the definition
of conflict exposure proposed by citetGL2014, based on a binary variable for
fatalities, and data on labor incomes from the Peruvian national household
survey, are negative for each year between ages 0 and 2, but are not precisely
estimated (only exposure during age 2 is statistically significant at the 10
percent level).
Finally, column (9) of Table (2.4) reproduces the approach by Grimard
and Laszlo (2014) to estimate the effects of conflict exposure on height using
data from the Demographic and Health Survey and measuring conflict as a
dummy indicating if a fatality occurred at the district of birth during each
year since the in-utero period until 5 years of age. Similar to the original
paper by Grimard and Laszlo (2014), column (9) shows that exposure during
the in-utero period has a negative and precisely estimated impact on height.
to procure it directly from the Peruvian National Statistics Office.
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However, neither the measure conflict exposure using duration (proposed
by Leon (2012)) nor number of events (as proposed by Galdo (2013)) in
columns (7) and (9), respectively, find precisely estimated effects of exposure
to fatal violence from the conflict.
The estimates in Table (2.4) suggest that it is possible to roughly repro-
duce the main results on the effects of conflict on education (Leon, 2012),
health (Grimard and Laszlo, 2014) and income (Galdo, 2013). However, this
paper also finds that these estimates are sensitive to the definition of expo-
sure. For instance, using the definition of exposure to conflict proposed by
Leon (2012) (duration, to study the effects of conflict on education) to ana-
lyze the impacts of the Peruvian civil conflict in labor income (an outcome
analyzed by Galdo (2013)) this paper does not finds precisely estimated ef-
fects during the 0 to 3 years old period (see column (4)), in contrast with
the estimates reported by Galdo (2013) (compare the results in column (4)
to those in column (5)). Similarly, the measure of conflict exposure proposed
by Galdo (2013) (events, to estimate the impacts of exposure to conflict in
labor incomes, reported in column (8)) do not produce precisely estimated
effects on height, in contrast with the results reported by Grimard and Laszlo
(2014) in column (9).
In addition, Table (2.5) shows the estimates using alternative definitions of
exposure by Leon (2012); Galdo (2013); Grimard and Laszlo (2014) as well as
their proposed exposure periods. Thus, Table (2.5) follows an organization
similar to Table (2.4), but now columns (1) to (3) estimate the impact of
exposure from the in-utero period to the age period 13 to 17 as in Leon
(2012); while columns (4) to (6) show the effects of exposure from the in-
utero period to ages 4 to 6, as in Galdo (2013); and columns (7) to (9) show
the results of exposure during age year from 24 months before birth until
age 5, as proposed by Grimard and Laszlo (2014). As in the previous Table,
the results in Table (2.5) suggest that the estimated effects of exposure are
sensitive to the measure of conflict used. For instance, the effects of the
number of events of violence (see column (2)) on education attainment are
not precisely estimated for the in-utero or the ages 0 to 3 periods. In spite
that using a binary variable to indicate exposure to fatal event produces
negative estimates for the in-utero and the ages 0 to 3 periods (column (3)),
such impact are less precisely estimated than the specification relying on the
duration of exposure (column (1), based on the model proposed by Leon
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(2012)). Similarly, the effects of conflict exposure on labor income are also
dependent on the measure of conflict exposure used. While the number of
events produces precise estimates during the ages 0 to 3 period (column (5),
based on the measure proposed by Galdo (2013)), the effects are less precisely
estimated using the duration of exposure (column (4), based on the measure
used by Leon (2012)) and not statistically significant when using a binary
variable for fatal violence (column (6), following the measure of Grimard
and Laszlo (2014)). Finally, a similar pattern of sensitivity occurs when we
analyze the effects of exposure to conflict on female height at adulthood,
since the precise estimates results for exposure to fatal conflicts during in-
utero period using a binary variable (see column (9)) are not significant when
using the number of events (column (8)) and less precisely estimated using
duration (column (7)).
This paper also shows the effects of estimating the same models and spec-
ifications discussed in columns (1) to (9) from Tables (2.4), but using data
from the Peruvian national household survey (ENAHO) along with informa-
tion on anthropomorphic measures form the CENAN module. The results in
Table (2.6) suggest that the estimated effects of conflict exposure are sensitive
not only to the measurement of conflict, but also to the source of information
used for the estimation. In particular, using the national household survey
merged with the anthropomorphic module (from now on the “preferred” ap-
proach), the estimates of conflict exposure on education are not precisely
estimated. The effects calculated using the measure of duration of conflict
exposure proposed by Leon (2012) are no longer significant during the in-
utero period and the 0 to 3 years old period, although the estimates are
still negative. Similarly, using the measure of number of events of violence
proposed by Galdo (2013) the estimates of the effects of conflict exposure on
education are no longer significant. However, using the dummy measure for
fatal violence exposure proposed by Grimard and Laszlo (2014) this paper
finds a precisely estimated negative impact of conflict exposure during the
first year of life.
This section of the paper discusses alternative measures of exposure based
on the approaches proposed by Leon (2012), Grimard and Laszlo (2014) and
Galdo (2013), to estimate the effects of the conflict using data from the
Peruvian national census (2007), the Demographic and Health Survey (2004-
2008) and the Peruvian national household survey (2006-2007), respectively.
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Each of these sources of information have advantages and limitations. For
instance, while the National census of 2007 provides a large and nationally
representative sample with enough power to identify even small effects, the
censuses typically gather information on less variables than household sur-
veys. Therefore, although Leon (2012) precisely estimates the impact of
conflict on years of education, he is unable to use the census to study the im-
pacts of conflict exposure on variables associated with health such as height
or anemia, or with labor market outcomes like labor incomes or formality.
On the other hand, although the Demographic and Health survey contains
detailed information on health related variables (height, weight and anemia
indicators) and individual characteristics, the sample size is smaller and is
not representative of the whole population, limiting the ability to study the
effects of conflict. For instance, the results by Grimard and Laszlo (2014)
using the Demographic and Health Survey are only representative of non-
migrant females. In addition, notice that although the Demographic and
household survey contains variables on health, it does not includes detailed
information on labor market outcomes such as labor income. Moreover, the
Peruvian national household survey is a nationally representative and com-
prehensive database, although it typically does not include information on
anthropomorphic measures.63
Overall, the results in Tables (2.4) to (2.6) suggest that using alternative
measures of conflict exposure could affect the estimated impacts of the vi-
olence (compared with previous studies). However, a complementary and
useful exercise would be to analyze the effects of using multiple alternative
measures of conflict exposure in several potential outcomes of interest, but
controlling for other factors such as the sample design, consistency of the
outcome variables, definition of the control variables, among others. Unfor-
tunately, it is not possible to do this with the information used to estimate
the results reported in Table (2.4). For example, the Peruvian census has
information on years of education, but does not includes anthropomorphic
measures such as height, nor labor incomes. Similarly, the waves of 2006 and
2007 of the National household survey does not include data on height. In
addition, the sample used of the Demographic Health Survey only includes
women who never moved from their district of birth, while both the census
63An exception is the inclusion of the CENAN module from 2008 to 2010, that this
paper uses to produce the results from Tables (2.8) to (2.10).
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and the household survey are nationally representative for the whole popu-
lation. Therefore, in Tables (2.8) to (2.10)), this study includes estimation
of the effects of alternative measures of conflict exposure relying on a sin-
gle data base, thus offering the possibility to control for other factors when
comparing the effect of using alternative conflict measures.
2.5.2 Comparison exercises
The second part of section 2.5 takes advantage of a rich database to construct
three alternative measures of exposure to conflict violence (defining exposure
at the month and district level (the lowest level of political subdivision of the
country) during the 1980-2000 period) and compare their effects on three
outcomes of interest: education, labor income and height. Following the
discussion in section (2.5.1), these three alternative measures of conflict ex-
posure include a binary indicator, and two continuous measures based on the
number of events and the length or duration of exposure. In addition, these
measures will be calculated based on all the events of violence occurred64 and
counting exclusively fatal events.65 By using a single data base, these results
are able to control for factors different from the measure of conflict used.66
The first set of results in Table (2.8) show the effects of exposure to con-
flict violence grouped in three age ranges: the in-utero period, ages 0 to 3,
and ages 4 to 6, similarly to Leon (2012) and Galdo (2013). In addition, the
estimates are organized in six columns. The first three columns show the
estimates of exposure to any type of violence (i.e., both fatal and non-fatal
events). Columns (4) to (6) construct measures of conflict exposure consid-
ering only fatal events of violence. If the most intense (fatal) events drive the
negative effects in the long-run, the results from columns (1) to (3) and (4)
to (6) would differ.67 The measures of duration in columns (1) and (4) rep-
resent the number of years of exposure to violence (similar to the approach
64Note that both Leon (2012) and Galdo (2013) construct measures of exposure to any
kind of violence (disappearances, deaths, kidnappings, tortures, etc).
65? construct a binary variable of exposure to fatal events of violence.
66The main data set used for this section includes information for the three outcomes
variables of interest, in contrast with the papers by Leon (2012); Galdo (2013) and Grimard
and Laszlo (2014) that focus in one of these variables each.
67If only fatal events mattered, the estimates using all type of violence would under-
estimate the true impact of conflict exposure, since some noise from non-fatal events of
violence would be introduced in the measure.
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by Leon (2012)). However, there is an important distinction between the
duration in Tables (2.8) to (2.10)) and the definition used by Leon (2012).
While the original paper of Leon (2012) assigns exposure to conflict based
on the combination between the district and the year of birth (due to limita-
tions in the Peruvian census data),68 the national household survey identifies
the exact date of birth, therefore the exposure to conflict can be assign at
a more precise district and month-year of birth level. In addition, the mea-
sures of conflict exposure in columns (2) and (4) are based on the number of
events of violence (all events and only-fatal) occurred at the district of birth
during the respective age ranges. Moreover, the binary indicators variables
in columns (3) and (6) indicates that an event of violence occurred in the
district of birth for each of the relevant age periods.
The results in column (1) of Table (2.8) indicate that only the exposure
to violence during ages 4 to 6 has a negative and precisely estimated effect
on education. This result contrast with the estimates obtained using census
data (Table 2.4)) where the relevant periods of exposure are the in utero
period and ages 0 to 3. In addition, the measures of duration of exposure to
fatal violence are negative but are not precisely estimated for all age periods.
Consistent with the results in column (2) of Table 2.4), columns (2) and (4)
measuring the effects of the number of events of exposure on education do
not produce any precisely estimated effect, although the magnitude of the
impacts is negative. However, the estimated effects of exposure to conflict in
column (3) using a dummy are negative and precisely estimated for all age
ranges. These results contrast with column (3) in Table 2.4) that suggest
that only exposure during the pre-birth periods generate precisely estimated
negative effects.
To complement the results in Table (2.8), based on exposure during dif-
ferent age ranges, Table (2.7) of this paper shows the effects of exposure
to violence at each year from the in-utero period to age 5.69 It is hard to
provide an intuitive interpretation for the results based on the duration of
exposure to any event of violence (in column (1)) since only the negative
effects of exposure during ages 0 and 4 are precisely estimated, but not the
68Note that the Peruvian census of 2007 only registered the age of the members of the
household at the moment of the interview, not their exact date of birth. Therefore, Leon
(2012) is able to identify the year of birth of the individual, but not their month of birth.
69This is consistent with the exposure periods proposed by Grimard and Laszlo (2014),
although they are not match exactly the decomposition of the age ranges in Table (2.8).
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ages between these years. In addition, in column (5) only the negative effects
of exposure to fatal events (measured as duration) during age zero are pre-
cisely estimated. The results based on the number events of violence exposed
presented in column (2) provide a similar puzzle, since only exposure during
ages 0 and 5 have negative and precisely estimated impacts, while exposure
during age 4 has a positive effect. The estimates of exposure during age 0 and
3 have similar magnitudes but opposite signs, probably accounting for the
lack of effects when aggregating the impacts by age ranges. Finally, the ef-
fects of a dummy measure of exposure in column (3) reveal that experiencing
conflict during the in-utero period and ages 2 and 4 have precisely estimated
negative effects. However, the estimates in column (6) suggest that exposure
only to fatal events (again, measuring exposure as a dummy) during ages 1
and 4 are precisely estimated.
Tables (2.9) and (2.10) show the effects of conflict exposure on labor in-
come, grouping the exposure by age ranges and at individual years, respec-
tively. The results of the effects of the duration of exposure in columns (1)
and (4) of Table (2.9) suggest that conflict does not have significant effects
on labor income. However, the analysis of the effects of exposure at different
age ranges in Table (2.10) indicate that experiencing conflict at age 5 could
have a negative impact on labor income. These effects are precisely estimated
for exposure to any type of violence (collumn (1)) and only to fatal violence
(column (4)). In addition, exposure to conflict measured as number of events
of violence suggest that exposure during the in-utero period have negative
consequences on labor income. The evidence of column (2) and (5) of both
Tables (2.9) and (2.10) suggest that exposure during the in-utero period have
negative and precisely estimated effects. This result differ slightly from those
reported in Table (2.6) where the relevant period of exposure was between
ages 0 and 3. Moreover, the estimates using a dummy measure of exposure
suggest that experiencing conflict from ages 0 to 3 has negative effects in
labor income (column (3) of Table (2.9)), probably driven by the impacts
at age 2 (column (3) of Table (2.9)). In contrast, the estimated impacts
using binary variables on fatal events are not statistically or economically
significant.
The effects of conflict exposure on height using alternative measures are
discussed in Tables (2.11) and (2.12). While Table (2.11) shows the estimates
of exposure by age ranges, Table (2.12) shows similar effects but at different
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years of age. In the case of height, exposure to conflict using duration has
negative and precisely estimated effects during the age range 4 to 6, both
for all events of violence and only for fatal events. However, the estimates
of exposure to any event of violence are larger and more precisely estimated
than exposure to only fatal events. The results in column (1) (which include
all events of violence) might be driven by exposure during age 5, according to
the results reported in the first column of Table (2.12). However, the effects
reported in column (3) are harder to explain by exposure at individual ages,
since the results in column (4) of Table (2.12) suggest negative impacts of
exposure at age 1 and 4, but positive effects at age 3. In addition, the
results in column (4) of Table (2.12) suggest that the measures of exposure
calculated using only fatal violence might be more noisy and thus produce
estimates that are not robust. In addition, exposure to conflict violence using
a measure based on the total number of events and number of fatal events
(columns (2) and (4) of Tables (2.11) and (2.12)) suggest that violence do
not affect height.70 Finally, the effects of exposure to conflict using dummy
variables in column (3) of Tables (2.11) and (2.12) are not consistent. While
exposure to any event of violence does not seem to be significant at any age
range, the impact of conflict at age 0 is precisely estimated. However, the
results of exposure to fatal violence using a dummy variable (column (6))
suggest that the effect of exposure during the age range 0 to 3 is negative
and precisely estimated. Similarly, the effects of exposure at age 2 are also
negative but only significant at the 10 percent level.
The results discussed in section (sec:comparisons) suggest that there is
no obvious definition of conflict exposure71 that produces consistent results
across multiple outcomes of interest.72 The results of this analysis suggest
70Although, note that the results columns (2) and (4) of Table (2.12) indicate some
negative effects of exposure at age 1, these impacts are small and only significant at the
10 percent level.
71All the measures of exposure to conflict are based on the interaction between individ-
ual time and location of birth (from the 2007-2010 Peruvian household surveys) and the
progression of civil conflict violence in space and time (from the Final Report of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission).
72As in the previous section, the estimation methods to assess the impact of conflict
exposure on education attainment, health indicators and labor market outcomes rely on a
repeated cross-sections approach, based on the underlying assumption that the incidence
of violence is not correlated with the determinants of any of the variables of interest. This
methodology is a fairly standard approach in the literature of microeconomics for analyzing
the effects of conflicts and is flexible enough to accommodate the empirical approaches for
the three alternative measure of conflict exposure.
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that the selection of the measure of conflict exposure is not a trivial decision,
since it may have important implications for the estimated impacts of violence
and the statistical significance of the estimates.
2.6 Conclusions
The literature on the legacies of conflict is still in early stages and there is no
obvious answer to the question of how to measure conflict exposure, with re-
searchers using measures ranging from binary variables, to number of events
(or fatalities), proximity to conflict areas and length of exposure, among
other options. This paper estimates the effects of using alternative mea-
sures of exposure to the Peruvian civil conflict (1980-2000) on the long-run
outcomes of individuals potentially exposed to the violence. In particular,
the paper discusses the effects of conflict exposure on human capital accu-
mulation (education attainment and health indicators such as height) and
labor market outcomes (income) focusing on three alternative measures of
exposure during early stages in life.
In spite of a large body of economic research that has established the
significant impacts of exposure to conflict on multiple outcomes there are
few studies analyzing the most adequate way to measure conflict exposure.
This paper contributes to the literature on the legacies of conflict by showing
how alternative definitions of exposure to the Peruvian conflict could affect
the estimated impacts of violence on three key outcome variables.
One of the challenges of measuring exposure to conflict is that it that expo-
sure has multiple dimensions. For instance, there is a classification problem
regarding if exposure should be defined at the individual, household, village
or district level, and how migration would affect exposure in these contexts.
A second issue is associated with the intensity of exposure and deals with the
question of whether exposure should be measured using a dummy indicator
variable, the number of fatalities, the duration (time) of exposure, the prox-
imity to the conflict locations, etc. This paper focuses in the second issue,
by comparing alternatives measures of intensity of conflict exposure.
The Peruvian case is aptly suited to analyze the effect of using alterna-
tive measures of exposure on the long-run impacts of conflicts. For instance,
the Peruvian conflict presents substantial spatial variation in the timing and
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intensity of violence over a sustained period of time (1980-2000). In ad-
dition, detailed information on the evolution of violence allows this study
to construct alternative measures of conflict and compare their performance
using information from a single consistent database, the Peruvian national
household survey. The availability of information on conflict violence, an-
thropomorphic measures and labor market outcomes in a single database
provides a unique opportunity to analyze multiple human capital and labor
market outcomes relying on consistent information.
This study provides evidence that the definition of conflict exposure does
matter to estimate the effects of civil and armed conflicts, and therefore ar-
gues that more research is required on the characteristics and advantages and
disadvantages of alternatives measures of exposure to conflict. For instance,
the choice of the measure of conflict exposure could be influenced by the
nature of the expected transmission mechanism of the shock (i.e., violence
from civil conflict) on the variable of interest. A study arguing that stress
from traumatic conflict experiences during the in-utero period reduces health
of the baby afterwards probably would favor a measure like the number of
neighbors or family members killed during, over alternatives such as a binary
variable indicating the occurrence of any event of violence at the district level.
In contrast, if the researcher argues that the relevant mechanism for the neg-
ative effect of conflict exposure on health is the lack of access to food and
drinking water, a variable measuring the length of exposure to the conflict
(and thus the potential spell of the food shortage) might be more adequate.
This paper suggests that future studies on the effects of conflict exposure
should include a sensitivity analysis to alternative measures of exposure to
conflict. In addition, a discussion of the expected transmission mechanisms
would also help to bolster the validity of the measure of conflict chosen.
Overall, the estimates in this paper suggest that the impacts of conflict
exposure on human capital accumulation and labor market outcomes are
negative, but they are not consistent across different measures of exposure.
However, notice that exposure during early stages of life appears to have
precisely estimated negative effects on education attainment, height and la-





It must be noted that each of this topics is considered as an independent
“module” in the database available in the website of INEI 73:
• Module 1: Characteristic of the house and household (6 questions re-
lated to type of the house and 13 questions about the household).
• Module 2: Characteristics of the household members (18 questions).
• Module 3: Education (27 question for household members older than
3.5 years).
• Module 4: Health (27 questions for all household members).
• Module 5: Employment and income (93 questions for members of the
household older than 14 years).
• Module 6: Social security system (2 questions about the characteristics
of the affiliation of the household members to a social security system).
• Module 7: Household expenditure (67 questions regarding expenditure
in food and in other items).
• Module 8: Social programs (7 questions regarding poverty alleviation
programs received by the household).
• Module 9: Civil participation (6 questions about the participation of
the household member in political parties or other kinds of civil and
political activities).
• Module 10: Opinion (37 questions regarding self perception and opin-
ions about political and legal institutions).




In this study I use two wages of the CENAN, which coincide with waves of
the Peruvian national household survey (ENAHO) from 4 different years:
• CENAN 2007-2008:
(i) Fourth quarter of 2007 (ENAHO-2007).
(ii) First quarter of 2008 (ENAHO-2008).
• CENAN 2009-2010:
(i) Fourth semester of 2009 (ENAHO-2009).
(ii) First semester of 2010 (ENAHO-2010).
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2.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Evolution of events of violence at district level
(1980-2000)
(a) Violence victims 1980-1982 (b) Violence victims 1983-1986 (c) Violence victims 1987-1989
(d) Violence victims 1990-1992 (e) Violence victims 1993-1995 (f) Violence victims 1996-2000
Notes: The figures above show the evolution of the incidence of violence from the Peruvian
armed conflict at six different periods between 1980 and 2000. The panels map the number
of acts of violence occurred in each district (province limits in solid lines) during the
periods: (a) 1980-1982; (b) 1983-1986; (c) 1987-1989; (d) 1990-1992; (e) 1993-1995; and,
(f) 1996-2000. Darker shades imply a higher number of events registered in the district.
The district is the smallest political organization level in Peru (the country is organized
in states/regions (largest), provinces (medium) and districts/municipalities (smallest)).
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Figure 2.2: Events of violence at Province level per 100,000 population
(1980-2000)
Notes: The map shows the intensity of violence in each state during the whole duration
of the Peruvian armed conflict (1980-2000). The states in darker shades experienced a
higher number of events of violence (either fatal or non-fatal) per 100,000 population.
The red circles represent number of deaths or fatalities per 100,000 population. The state
is the largest local political organization level in Peru (the local authorities are organized
in states/regions (largest), provinces (medium) and districts/municipalities (smallest)).
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Figure 2.3: Yearly violence evolution by type
(Number of acts of violence per year)
Notes: The figure above shows the yearly evolution of the violence associated with the
Peruvian armed conflict from 1980 and 2000 as registered in the Final Report of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The red bars represent the number of fatal acts of
violence per year, while the gray bar show the number of non-fatal events of violence.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - Covariates
Full Sample Exposed Non-Exposed Difference p-val
Age 25.52 23.26 27.53 4.27 0.000
Male 0.50 0.51 0.50 -0.01 0.060
Married 0.43 0.31 0.54 0.23 0.000
Head of household 0.34 0.28 0.39 0.12 0.000
Family size 5.34 5.38 5.30 -0.07 0.004
Number of earners 2.75 2.90 2.62 -0.28 0.000
Number of children 1.38 1.18 1.56 0.38 0.000
Migrate District 0.48 0.51 0.45 -0.06 0.000
Migrate Province 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.06 0.000
Migrate State 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.02 0.000
Urban 0.70 0.77 0.64 -0.13 0.000
Indigenous 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.000
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - Dependent Variables
Full Sample Exposed Non-Exposed Difference p-val
Education (in years) 9.37 10.31 8.44 -1.88 0.000
Height (in Cm.) 157.59 158.19 157.10 -1.09 0.000
Weight (in Kg.) 61.29 60.43 61.98 1.56 0.000
Body Mass Index 24.55 24.00 25.00 1.01 0.000
Obesity (=1) 0.34 0.36 0.32 -0.04 0.000
Illness (=1) 0.53 0.53 0.52 -0.00 0.808
Hospital (=1) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.842
Worked last week (=1) 0.67 0.63 0.72 0.09 0.000
Informal worker (=1) 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.02 0.002
L.F.P. (=1) 0.79 0.75 0.83 0.08 0.000
Hours worked last week 41.59 41.21 41.89 0.68 0.013
Labor income (m.u.) 684.84 647.45 719.58 72.13 0.00097
Table 2.3: Correlation matrix of measures of violence (all observations)
Exposure
All Fatal
Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
Leon (2012) Galdo (2013) Grimard and Leon (2012) Galdo (2013) Grimard and
Laszlo (2014) Laszlo (2014)
Exposure All Duration 1 - - -
Event 0.86 1 - - -
Dummy 0.49 0.31 1 - - -
Fatal Duration - - - 1
Event - - - 0.87 1
Dummy - - - 0.34 0.49 1
Notes: Information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed for the Peruvian national household surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-
interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). The sample includes individuals born after 1973 who were 17 years old or older at the moment of
the household survey. The measure of “Duration” refers to the number of years of exposure to either any type of violence and only to fatal violence,
similar to the measure used by Leon (2012). The measure of exposure to the “Events” of violence refers to either the total number of events of
violence or to the number of fatal events of violence, like in Galdo (2013). The measure of exposure “Dummy” is a binary variable equal to one if
exposure to any type of violence or to fatal events of violence occurred, similar to Grimard and Laszlo (2014).
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Table 2.4: Replication exercise on the effects of conflict exposure using approaches by Leon (2012) (Census), Galdo
(2013) (National Household Survey) and Grimard and Laszlo (2014) (Demographic Household Survey)
Outcome variable Education (years) Labor income (log-Soles) Height (Cm)
Main database Census 2007 ENAHO 2006-07 DHS 2004-08
Measure of Exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Conflict exposure 12-24 months before birth -0.047* -0.003 0.916
(0.028) (0.002) (0.634)
Conflict exposure during in-utero -0.040*** -0.016 -0.026** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -2.395 -3.695 -3.314**
(0.007) (0.017) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (1.706) (3.806) (1.653)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 3 -0.017*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.091*** -1.726 -1.447
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (1.253) (2.502)
Conflict exposure ages 4 to 6 -0.004 0.015 -0.002* -0.010 -1.300 -3.300
(0.007) (0.040) (0.001) (0.008) (2.364) (2.226)
Conflict exposure ages 7 to 12 0.001 0.001 -0.581
(0.007) (0.001) (2.324)
Conflict exposure ages 13 to 17 0.003 0.002 2.209
(0.009) (0.002) (2.685)
Conflict exposure at age 0 -0.002 -0.002 2.299
(0.014) (0.002) (2.984)
Conflict exposure at age 1 0.011 -0.000 0.166
(0.013) (0.002) (3.657)
Conflict exposure at age 2 0.003 -0.003* 1.575
(0.016) (0.001) (3.238)
Conflict exposure at age 3 0.011 -0.004 -1.351
(0.007) (0.003) (2.844)
Conflict exposure at age 4 -0.003 -0.002 -3.224
(0.009) (0.002) (2.789)
Conflict exposure at age 5 0.025*** 0.001 0.184
(0.008) (0.002) (2.560)
Observations 721928 721928 721928 15764 15764 15764 8142 8142 8142
R-square 0.266 0.265 0.257 0.391 0.392 0.391 0.200 0.200 0.200
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province of birth level for
columns (1) to (3) and at the district of birth level for models (4) to (9). Models (1) to (3) are based on data from the Peruvian Census of 2007 and the sample includes individuals born
from 1974 to 1993 following Leon (2012). The models in columns (4) to (6) use information from the Peruvian National Household Survey from 2007 and 2008, and the sample include
individuals born between 1975 and 1993 such as in Galdo (2013). Columns (7) to (9) use data from the Demographic Household Survey (DHS) from 2004-2008 and the sample includes
women who live in their district of birth born between 1974 and 1988 years old similar to Grimard and Laszlo (2014). All models include fixed effects for location of birth, cohort of
birth and wave of the national household survey, and a location specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence
and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the level of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant
age or period. The exposure is measured using three alternative definitions. Columns (1), (4) and (7) measure exposure as the duration or length (in years) that the individuals were
exposed to any type of violence (measure proposed by Leon (2012)). Columns (2), (5) and (8) measure exposure as the number of fatal “Events” of violence that affected the individual
during the relevant age period (as proposed by Galdo (2013)). In columns (3), (6) and (9) exposure is measured as a binary variable equal to one if the individual was exposed to fatal
events of violence during the relevant age range (like in Grimard and Laszlo (2014)).
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Table 2.5: Replication exercise on the effects of conflict exposure using periods by Leon (2012) (Census), Galdo
(2013) (National Household Survey) and Grimard and Laszlo (2014) (Demographic Household Survey)
Outcome variable Education (years) Labor income (log-Soles) Height (Cm)
Main database Census 2007 ENAHO 2006-07 DHS 2004-08
Measure of Exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Conflict exposure 12-24 months before birth -2.263 -1.918 -0.916*
(1.181) (2.163) (0.534)
Conflict exposure during in-utero -0.004 -0.016 -0.020* -0.002 -0.002 0.015 -1.323* -1.219 -3.314**
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.817) (2.578) (1.653)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 3 -0.017*** -0.002 -0.012* -0.001* -0.091*** -0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054)
Conflict exposure ages 4 to 6 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.010 -0.004
(0.007) (0.003) (0.024) (0.001) (0.008) (0.005)
Conflict exposure ages 7 to 12 0.001 -0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.000) (0.025)
Conflict exposure ages 13 to 17 0.003 -0.001 0.005
(0.009) (0.010) (0.026)
Conflict exposure at age 0 0.073 -1.259 2.299
(0.156) (22.588) (2.984)
Conflict exposure at age 1 -0.019 5.475 0.166
(0.167) (20.124) (3.657)
Conflict exposure at age 2 0.268 2.781 1.575
(0.154) (2.472) (3.238)
Conflict exposure at age 3 0.100 2.233 -1.351
(0.133) (2.310) (2.844)
Conflict exposure at age 4 0.088 -1.904 -3.224
(0.132) (1.814) (2.789)
Conflict exposure at age 5 -0.002 -1.558 0.184
(0.131) (1.929) (2.560)
Observations 721928 721928 721928 15764 15764 15764 8142 8142 8142
R-square 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.391 0.392 0.392 0.200 0.200 0.200
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province of birth level
for columns (1) to (3) and at the district of birth level for models (4) to (9). Models (1) to (3) are based on data from the Peruvian Census of 2007. The sample includes individuals born
from 1974 to 1993 and the age grouping follows Leon (2012). The models in columns (4) to (6) use information from the Peruvian National Household Survey from 2007 and 2008. The
sample includes individuals born between 1975 and 1993, and the age grouping is similar to Galdo (2013). Columns (7) to (9) use data from the Demographic Household Survey (DHS)
from 2004-2008. The sample includes women who live in their district of birth born between 1974 and 1988 years old, and the age grouping is similar to Grimard and Laszlo (2014).
All models include fixed effects for location of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a location specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for
gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the level of exposure to
violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age or period. The exposure is measured using three alternative definitions. Columns (1), (4) and (7) measure exposure as
the duration or length (in years) that the individuals were exposed to any type of violence (measure proposed by Leon (2012)). Columns (2), (5) and (8) measure exposure as the number
of fatal “Events” of violence that affected the individual during the relevant age period (as proposed by Galdo (2013)). In columns (3), (6) and (9) exposure is measured as a binary
variable equal to one if the individual was exposed to fatal events of violence during the relevant age range (like in Grimard and Laszlo (2014)).
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Table 2.6: Replication exercise on the effects of conflict exposure using approaches by Leon (2012), Galdo (2013) and
Grimard and Laszlo (2014) and data from the Peruvian Household Survey
Outcome variable Education (years) Labor income (log-Soles) Height (Cm)
Measure of Exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Conflict exposure 12-24 months before birth -0.130 0.038 -1.197
(0.200) (0.154) (6.196)
Conflict exposure during in-utero -0.011 -0.0008 0.001 -0.087 -0.0021*** -0.379** -0.849 0.1248** 3.319
(0.140) (0.001) (0.184) (0.070) (0.001) (0.162) (3.266) (0.052) (5.875)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 3 -0.072 0.0007 -0.036 -0.0003 1.520 0.0057
(0.069) (0.001) (0.033) (0.000) (2.497) (0.013)
Conflict exposure ages 4 to 6 0.085 -0.0003 0.031 -0.0003 -2.248 -0.0324
(0.077) (0.001) (0.050) (0.000) (2.981) (0.024)
Conflict exposure ages 7 to 12 0.0191 0.041 1.845
(0.066) (0.028) (1.755)
Conflict exposure ages 13 to 17 -0.003 -0.082 -1.165
(0.127) (0.060) (2.403)
Conflict exposure at age 0 -0.089 -0.057 1.642
(0.176) (0.126) (4.164)
Conflict exposure at age 1 -0.316* 0.082 -3.439
(0.161) (0.107) (4.030)
Conflict exposure at age 2 -0.004 0.080 -1.748
(0.143) (0.097) (3.555)
Conflict exposure at age 3 -0.012 0.004 0.496
(0.137) (0.098) (5.087)
Conflict exposure at age 4 -0.177 -0.138* -1.369
(0.134) (0.080) (4.266)
Conflict exposure at age 5 0.227 -0.034 -2.891
(0.156) (0.101) (3.887)
Observations 29046 43624 8844 9947 12058 1823 20917 32773 7329
R-square 0.296 0.474 0.558 0.246 0.518 0.580 0.370 0.413 0.213
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level.
In all columns, the information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed in household surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). All
models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey. Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the level of exposure to violence from
the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age or period. The exposure is measured using three alternative definitions. Columns (1), (4) and (7) measure exposure as the duration or
length (in years) that the individuals were exposed to any type of violence (measure proposed by Leon (2012)). Columns (2), (5) and (8) measure exposure as the number of fatal “Events”
of violence that affected the individual during the relevant age period (as proposed by Galdo (2013)). In columns (3), (6) and (9) exposure is measured as a binary variable equal to one if
the individual was exposed to fatal events of violence during the relevant age range (like in Grimard and Laszlo (2014)).
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Table 2.7: Effects of conflict exposure on years of education at different years
Type of violence Any type of violence Only fatal violence
Measure of exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure while in-utero -0.255 -0.000 -0.157** -0.176 0.186 -0.072
(0.229) (0.002) (0.078) (0.261) (0.153) (0.100)
Conflict exposure at age 0 -0.526** -0.005* 0.003 -0.561* 0.023 0.004
(0.261) (0.003) (0.073) (0.328) (0.123) (0.090)
Conflict exposure at age 1 -0.138 -0.001 -0.095 -0.362 -0.251* -0.122*
(0.218) (0.002) (0.060) (0.317) (0.147) (0.069)
Conflict exposure at age 2 0.106 -0.003 -0.212*** 0.365 0.080 0.030
(0.245) (0.002) (0.066) (0.263) (0.141) (0.066)
Conflict exposure at age 3 -0.192 0.004** -0.043 0.129 0.130 -0.011
(0.228) (0.002) (0.065) (0.290) (0.125) (0.077)
Conflict exposure at age 4 -0.592*** -0.003 -0.209*** -0.434 -0.132 -0.142*
(0.214) (0.002) (0.060) (0.317) (0.130) (0.085)
Conflict exposure at age 5 -0.166 -0.004** -0.049 -0.148 -0.049 -0.045
(0.192) (0.002) (0.061) (0.280) (0.122) (0.084)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30561 30561 30561 30561 22179 30561
R-square 0.381 0.380 0.381 0.380 0.419 0.380
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes individuals born after 1973 who were 17 years old
or older at the moment of the household survey. Information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed in the Pe-
ruvian national household surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). All models include
fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend.
In addition, the models control for gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for
indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ represents the level of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict
at the corresponding age. The exposure to conflict violence is measured using three alternative definitions (roughly following Leon
(2012); Galdo (2013); Grimard and Laszlo (2014)). Columns (1) and (4) measure the “Duration” (expressed in years) of exposure
to any type of violence and only to fatal violence, respectively. Columns (2) and (5) measure exposure as the number of “Events”
of violence or fatal events of violence, respectively, that affected the individual during the relevant age period.In columns (3) and
(6) the exposure is measured as a binary variable (“Dummy”) equal to one if the individual was exposed to any type of violence or
to fatal events of violence, respectively, during the relevant age range.
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Table 2.8: Effects of conflict exposure on years of education at different age ranges
Type of violence Any type of violence Only fatal violence
Measure of exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure while in-utero -0.374 -0.002 -0.191** -0.383 -0.002 -0.075
(0.249) (0.002) (0.088) (0.272) (0.003) (0.116)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 3 -0.161 -0.002 -0.279*** -0.131 -0.002 -0.129
(0.100) (0.001) (0.069) (0.131) (0.002) (0.093)
Conflict exposure ages 4 to 6 -0.294*** -0.001 -0.205*** -0.106 0.000 -0.142*
(0.103) (0.001) (0.066) (0.138) (0.002) (0.084)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30561 30561 30561 30561 30561 30561
R-square 0.381 0.380 0.381 0.380 0.380 0.380
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes individuals born after 1973 who were 17 years old
or older at the moment of the household survey. Information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed for the Pe-
ruvian national household surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). All models include
fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In
addition, the models control for gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for in-
digenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the level of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict
during the relevant age range. The exposure to conflict violence is measured using three alternative definitions (roughly following
Leon (2012), Galdo (2013) and Grimard and Laszlo (2014)). Columns (1) and (4) measure the “Duration” (expressed in years) of
exposure to any type of violence and only to fatal violence, respectively. Columns (2) and (5) measure exposure as the number of
“Events” of violence or fatal events of violence, respectively, that affected the individual during the relevant age period.In columns
(3) and (6) the exposure is measured as a binary variable (“Dummy”) equal to one if the individual was exposed to any type of
violence or to fatal events of violence, respectively, during the relevant age range.
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Table 2.9: Effects of conflict exposure on labor income at different age ranges
Type of violence Any type of violence Only fatal violence
Measure of exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure while in-utero -0.061 -0.003*** -0.040 -0.175 -0.005*** -0.038
(0.161) (0.001) (0.030) (0.168) (0.002) (0.044)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 3 -0.058 -0.000 -0.064** -0.018 -0.000 -0.022
(0.053) (0.000) (0.027) (0.064) (0.001) (0.032)
Conflict exposure ages 4 to 6 0.007 -0.000 0.004 -0.036 -0.000 -0.002
(0.046) (0.000) (0.028) (0.057) (0.001) (0.033)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10466 10466 10466 10466 10466 10466
R-square 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.366
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes individuals born after 1973 who were 17 years old or older at the
moment of the household survey. Information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed in the Peruvian national house-
hold surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). All models include fixed effects for district of
birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control
for gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict
exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the level of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range.
The exposure to conflict violence is measured using three alternative definitions (roughly following Leon (2012); Galdo (2013); Grimard
and Laszlo (2014)). Columns (1) and (4) measure the “Duration” (expressed in years) of exposure to any type of violence and only to
fatal violence, respectively. Columns (2) and (5) measure exposure as the number of “Events” of violence or fatal events of violence,
respectively, that affected the individual during the relevant age period.In columns (3) and (6) the exposure is measured as a binary
variable (“Dummy”) equal to one if the individual was exposed to any type of violence or to fatal events of violence, respectively,
during the relevant age range.
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Table 2.10: Effects of conflict exposure on labor income at different years
Type of violence Any type of violence Only fatal violence
Measure of exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure while in-utero -0.032 -0.002*** -0.020 -0.062 -0.005* -0.024
(0.160) (0.001) (0.032) (0.190) (0.003) (0.045)
Conflict exposure at age 0 -0.056 -0.000 -0.027 -0.135 -0.001 -0.036
(0.172) (0.001) (0.038) (0.217) (0.003) (0.045)
Conflict exposure at age 1 -0.128 0.001 -0.015 -0.205 0.001 -0.051
(0.133) (0.001) (0.032) (0.192) (0.003) (0.038)
Conflict exposure at age 2 0.019 -0.001 -0.054* 0.194 -0.000 0.046
(0.098) (0.001) (0.029) (0.133) (0.002) (0.036)
Conflict exposure at age 3 0.115 -0.001 -0.011 0.168 -0.002 0.026
(0.108) (0.001) (0.028) (0.160) (0.003) (0.032)
Conflict exposure at age 4 -0.299*** 0.002 -0.039 -0.333** 0.003 -0.016
(0.095) (0.001) (0.031) (0.136) (0.003) (0.033)
Conflict exposure at age 5 0.206* -0.001 0.036 0.020 -0.003 -0.020
(0.111) (0.001) (0.024) (0.128) (0.002) (0.031)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10456 10466 10456 10456 10456 10456
R-square 0.368 0.367 0.368 0.368 0.367 0.367
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes individuals born after 1973 who were 17 years old or older
at the moment of the household survey. Information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed in the Peruvian national
household surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). All models include fixed effects for
district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the
models control for gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous popu-
lation). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ represents the level of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict at the corresponding
age. The exposure to conflict violence is measured using three alternative definitions (roughly following Leon (2012); Galdo (2013);
Grimard and Laszlo (2014)). Columns (1) and (4) measure the “Duration” (expressed in years) of exposure to any type of violence
and only to fatal violence, respectively. Columns (2) and (5) measure exposure as the number of “Events” of violence or fatal events
of violence, respectively, that affected the individual during the relevant age period.In columns (3) and (6) the exposure is measured
as a binary variable (“Dummy”) equal to one if the individual was exposed to any type of violence or to fatal events of violence,
respectively, during the relevant age range.
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Table 2.11: Effects of conflict exposure on height (in mm.) at different age ranges
Type of violence Any type of violence Only fatal violence
Measure of exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure while in-utero 1.647 0.071 0.652 0.626 0.184 0.582
(8.236) (0.061) (2.574) (8.849) (0.120) (2.326)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 3 1.609 -0.011 -2.948 1.196 -0.039 -3.687*
(3.316) (0.016) (2.037) (2.993) (0.032) (2.124)
Conflict exposure ages 4 to 6 -5.797** -0.018 -0.471 -5.227* -0.011 -1.842
(2.921) (0.019) (2.073) (3.025) (0.035) (1.995)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22179 22179 30561 22179 22179 22179
R-square 0.419 0.419 0.381 0.419 0.419 0.419
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes individuals born after 1973 who were 17 years old or older
at the moment of the household survey. Information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed in the Peruvian na-
tional household surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). All models include fixed effects
for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition,
the models control for gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous
population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the level of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during
the relevant age range. The exposure to conflict violence is measured using three alternative definitions (roughly following Leon
(2012); Galdo (2013); Grimard and Laszlo (2014)). Columns (1) and (4) measure the “Duration” (expressed in years) of exposure
to any type of violence and only to fatal violence, respectively. Columns (2) and (5) measure exposure as the number of “Events”
of violence or fatal events of violence, respectively, that affected the individual during the relevant age period.In columns (3) and
(6) the exposure is measured as a binary variable (“Dummy”) equal to one if the individual was exposed to any type of violence
or to fatal events of violence, respectively, during the relevant age range.
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Table 2.12: Effects of conflict exposure on height (in mm.) at different years
Type of violence Any type of violence Only fatal violence
Measure of exposure Duration Events Dummy Duration Events Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure while in-utero 4.524 0.077 1.906 -1.446 0.186 1.394
(8.739) (0.072) (2.633) (9.040) (0.153) (2.309)
Conflict exposure at age 0 -1.519 0.004 -6.719*** 17.153 0.023 -1.989
(8.180) (0.060) (2.406) (11.578) (0.123) (2.203)
Conflict exposure at age 1 -12.798 -0.123* 1.140 -28.952** -0.251* -0.495
(8.854) (0.074) (2.198) (13.078) (0.147) (2.242)
Conflict exposure at age 2 9.982 0.053 0.892 10.244 0.080 -4.310*
(7.712) (0.065) (2.250) (10.011) (0.141) (2.261)
Conflict exposure at age 3 13.033 0.072 1.389 19.031* 0.130 2.798
(8.350) (0.051) (2.027) (10.510) (0.125) (1.969)
Conflict exposure at age 4 -10.335 -0.090 -1.753 -15.928* -0.132 -3.614
(6.772) (0.063) (1.823) (8.964) (0.130) (2.283)
Conflict exposure at age 5 -18.926** -0.043 -1.173 -15.450 -0.049 -2.104
(8.668) (0.067) (1.710) (10.065) (0.122) (2.166)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22179 22179 22179 22179 22179 22179
R-square 0.420 0.419 0.419 0.420 0.419 0.419
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes individuals born after 1973 who were 17 years old
or older at the moment of the household survey. Information corresponds to a subsample of individuals interviewed in the Pe-
ruvian national household surveys from 2007 to 2010, and re-interviewed for the nutrition module (CENAN). All models include
fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend.
In addition, the models control for gender, head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for
indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ represents the level of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict
at the corresponding age. The exposure to conflict violence is measured using three alternative definitions (roughly following Leon
(2012); Galdo (2013); Grimard and Laszlo (2014)). Columns (1) and (4) measure the “Duration” (expressed in years) of exposure
to any type of violence and only to fatal violence, respectively. Columns (2) and (5) measure exposure as the number of “Events”
of violence or fatal events of violence, respectively, that affected the individual during the relevant age period.In columns (3) and
(6) the exposure is measured as a binary variable (“Dummy”) equal to one if the individual was exposed to any type of violence or
to fatal events of violence, respectively, during the relevant age range.
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Chapter 3
DOES FAMILY SIZE AFFECT FEMALE
LABOR SUPPLY? EVIDENCE FROM
LATIN AMERICA
3.1 Introduction
The massive incorporation of women into the labor force was one of the
most significant changes in human behavior during the past century (Cruces
and Galiani, 2007), fueling a body of theoretical and empirical literature at-
tempting to explain female labor supply and the drivers behind this trend.
In particular, social scientists, demographers and labor economists have been
interested in assessing the impact of childbearing on female labor supply for
decades.1 The association between fertility and the participation of women
in the labor force has been profusely documented in theoretical models of
family and labor economics, and economic literature has repeatedly reported
a negative correlation between fertility (or family size) and female labor sup-
ply.2 Moreover, the economic literature has often considered children as a
constraint limiting the labor force participation of women (Azimi, 2015).
However, the interpretation of the correlation between fertility (or family
size) and female labor supply remains a controversial topic. The skepticism
about causality claims based on the negative correlation observed in the data
arises because in most theoretical models the decisions about fertility and
labor supply are jointly determined by rational agents under a households
utility maximization problem.3 For instance, for women (or the household,
in a more general framework) both fertility and labor force participation are
likely to be decided simultaneously and are prone to be affected by simi-
lar omitted factors, such as ambition or talent, among others (Aguero and
1See Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Becker (1991) and Pollak (2002) for discus-
sions on the relationship between family size and labor supply.
2For instance, see the two classic surveys by Willis (1987) and Browning (1992).
3See Browning et al. (2014) and Bryant and Zick (2005) for simple models of the
economics of the family and the relationship between family size and female labor force
participation.
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Marks, 2008). Therefore, ignoring the potential endogeneity between fertility
and labor supply may result in biased estimates of the effect of childbearing
on labor supply. As a result, a large body of research has been devoted to
disentangling the causal mechanisms between family size and female labor
supply (Cruces and Galiani, 2007). The objective of this paper is to assess
the relationship between childbearing and different dimensions of the female
labor supply (e.g., intensive and extensive margins of the labor supply, as
well as the quality of employment) in urban areas in the LAC region.4
In Latin America the last three decades have witnessed a 10 percentage
point increase in female labor force participation (Busso and Romero Fonseca,
2015). During the same period, fertility rates showed a continuous decrease,
a stylized fact common to most countries in the region according to the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and discussed also by Tortarolo
(2014). Regarding this phenomenon, Chioda (2011) argues that labor force
participation and family size are intrinsically associated in LAC, since one
of the main drivers of labor force differentials between genders in the region
is the fact that women face a disproportionate load of the responsibilities of
bearing and raising children.5
Multiple studies have exploited exogenous sources of variations in family
size to claim causality in their analysis of the relationship between fertility
and female labor supply. For instance, Angrist and Evans (1998) proposed an
IV strategy based on the preference for a mixed gender children composition
using census data for the United States from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
They find a negative impact of family size on female participation in the labor
force (and that family size would not affect male labor supply). Alternatively,
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) rely on twinning at first birth to assess the
effects on female labor supply decisions of exogenous (and unanticipated)
extra children. The authors conjectured that the occurrence of twins is a
failure in the timing of birth, but that it would not affect the desired total
fertility. They suggest that the initial withdrawal from the labor force of
4Nevertheless, keep in mind that the relationship between family size and female labor
supply might have changed at different points in time. For instance, Tortarolo (2014,
pp.31) and Chioda (2011, pp.111) argue that structural changes in LAC households have
affected women’s labor decisions and the allocation of their resources within the household.
5Moreover, Chioda (2011, pp.19) argues that “Fertility rates in Latin America dropped
dramatically over the past 50 years, converging to those of high-income OECD countries
in the recent years. A distinctive feature of this decline is that it took place without any
major changes in the timing of family formation (or marriage) and fertility.”
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women who experience twins in their first pregnancy could be compensated
for by an earlier return to the labor force later in their life cycle. Aguero
and Marks (2008) proposed an empirical approach that exploits the random
assignment of infertility as an exogenous variation in family size6 and find
that having children was not a barrier to participation in the paid labor force
in six countries of the LAC region during the decade of the 1990s.
Different authors have applied the approach proposed by Angrist and
Evans (1998) to alternative scenarios.7 For instance, Cruces and Galiani
(2007) study the effect of fertility on maternal labor supply by exploiting
the “mixed gender preference” strategy and census data from Argentina and
Mexico in 1991 and 2000, respectively. The authors findings suggest that the
estimates for the US by Angrist and Evans (1998) can be generalized both
qualitatively and quantitatively to the populations of these two Latin Amer-
ican countries. This contrasts with the results by Aguero and Marks (2008)
who, using data on infertility, find no causal relationship between female
participation in the labor force and childbearing. More recently, Tortarolo
(2014) assesses the causal effect of fertility on the probability of working by
using census data from fourteen Latin American countries8 and the U.S. over
three decades from the 1980s to the 2000s. The identification approach of
the study relies on parental gender preferences as a source of exogenous vari-
ation in fertility. The author finds that the IV approach fails to identify a
causal relationship between fertility and female labor supply at the country
level, although the results suggest a negative relationship when using a pool
of married women.
The identification strategy relying on gender preferences to construct an
instrument has been applied to analyze the effect of family size on fertility
beyond the U.S. and the LAC region. For example, Priebe (2010) studies the
effects of fertility on female labor force participation rates in Indonesia9 and
6Aguero and Marks (2008) use cross-sectional data from the Demographic and Health
Surveys in Peru (conducted in 1996), Guatemala (1998), Colombia (1995), Bolivia (1994
and 1998), Nicaragua (1998), and the Dominican Republic (1996).
7See Kugler and Kumar (2013), Priebe (2010), Cruces and Galiani (2007) and Wong,
Ho-Po Crystal (2014).
8Tortarolo (2014) includes the following countries in his analysis: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
9Priebe (2010) uses annual data from the Indonesian national household survey for the
period 1993-2008, a sample of 850,000 women age 21 to 35 with at least two children and
follows the empirical strategy outlined in Angrist and Evans (1998).
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finds evidence that a considerable percentage of women in Indonesia enter
the labor market to finance basic expenditures for their children. Therefore,
the reductions in fertility rates observed in recent decades would have led to
opposing effects that contributed to the aggregate levels of female labor sup-
ply remaining constant. In addition, Wong, Ho-Po Crystal (2014) presents
IV estimates of the effect of childbearing on the female labor supply in Hong
Kong, exploiting the preference for boys in Chinese families. The author
finds that IV estimates of the effect of childbearing on female labor supply
are substantially higher than the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, in
contrast with the results of Angrist and Evans (1998).10
Following the instrumental variable approach initially proposed by An-
grist and Evans (1998), this paper relies on the stylized fact that parents of
same-sex siblings in Latin American countries are more likely to go on to
have an additional child. Parental preferences for a gender mix of children
could lead to differences in the probability of having an additional child,
depending on the sex of the first two children. Since sex assignment of chil-
dren is virtually random, this allows to generate instruments for subsequent
childbearing. This study uses the dummy Same Sex to indicate whether the
gender of the second child matches that of the first child. This serves as an
instrument for further childbearing among women with at least two children.
The indicator variable Same Sex can be decomposed into two variables that
indicate the composition of the first two children, Two Boys and Two Girls,
to estimate an overidentified model (Cruces and Galiani, 2007). According
to Angrist and Evans (1998), this specification would be useful since any
secular effects of child gender on labor supply should be different from these
two instruments, while the consequences of childbearing seem likely to be
independent of whether Same Sex is equal to either Two Boys or Two Girls.
Therefore, the results will show IV estimates using a single instrument (Same
Sex ) for family size, as well as the pair of instruments Two Boys, Two Girls.
The empirical literature on parental preferences for a particular gender is far
from conclusive, suggesting that parents either desire a balanced number of
sons and daughters in some countries (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Cruces and
10Wong, Ho-Po Crystal (2014) also analyzes the effect of child gender on fertility by
stratifying the sample by education level and finding that child gender is a weaker predictor
of fertility in higher education groups (which may reflect that more educated women are
less affected by traditional values) and that the traditional female labor supply responds
more strongly to increased fertility.
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Galiani, 2007), have strong preferences for male children (Kugler and Ku-
mar, 2013), or there is no correlation in other countries (Azimi, 2015), with
differences in preferences resulting from some combination of social, cultural
and economic factors.11
This paper contributes to the microeconomic literature of female labor sup-
ply in developing countries in several ways. First, by exploiting the richer set
of labor market variables available in household surveys (relative to more lim-
ited information in some national censuses), this paper assesses the impact
of family size on three dimensions of the labor supply of women, thus com-
plementing previous results such as Cruces and Galiani (2007) or Tortarolo
(2014) which focus on labor force participation.12 In addition to its analysis
of the effect of family size on female labor force participation (the extensive
margin of the labor supply) and on the total number of hours worked per
week (an intensive margin dimension of female labor supply), this paper an-
alyzes the effect of childbearing on the probability of being employed in the
formal sector (which could be viewed as a proxy for quality of employment).13
Second, expanding the analysis by Cruces and Galiani (2007), who apply the
children sex-mix strategy to Argentina and Mexico, this paper tries to an-
swer the question of whether the estimates reported by Angrist and Evans
(1998) for the United States (U.S.) can be generalized to the population of a
region that, compared to the U.S., presents higher fertility, lower education
levels, and fewer facilities for childcare. In this sense, the paper builds up
11For instance, in a comparative study of seventeen countries in Europe, Hank and
Kohler (2000) find a strong preference for a mixed gender composition for families. How-
ever, in three countries (Czech Republic, Lithuania and Portugal) the authors find evidence
of a preference for girls, which has been described as atypical. For the Nordic countries
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) Andersson, Gunnar and Hank, Karsten and
Rnsen, Marit and Vikat, Andres (2006) show a distinct preference for a child of each sex,
at least during the last three decades of the 20th century. Andersson, Gunnar and Hank,
Karsten and Rnsen, Marit and Vikat, Andres (2006) argues that in all Nordic countries,
the probability of a third birth is 25 percent if the first and second children are both males
or both females. In contrast, the findings by Gangadharan and Maitra (2003) suggest that
in several developing countries there is a strong preference for male children, since male
children live longer in their parents households, increasing family income and generating
economic support for the parents in their old age. Daughters, on the other hand, are more
likely get married earlier and move to another home.
12Similar to Angrist and Evans (1998), most research uses census or census samples
data that usually contain only basic information about labor supply and labor market
outcomes of the household like labor force participation or current status of employment.
See Tortarolo (2014), Dehejia et al. (2015) and Bisbee et al. (2015) for recent examples of
the analysis of the relationship between fertility and labor supply in the extensive margin.
13For details on the variables refer to Section 3.2.
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on previous research to assess the external validity14 of the causal estimates
of family size on female labor supply.15 Finally, this paper seeks to identify
the main drivers or determinants of the results by analyzing how different
subgroups of the population respond to shocks in family size (households
where the first two siblings are of the same gender).
The main results are based on a pool sample of fifteen countries in Latin
America and suggest that there is no evidence of a causal effect of family
size on female labor force participation using the IV approach (although the
OLS estimates are significant and negative). On the contrary, despite the
OLS estimates suggest a positive correlation between informality and family
size, the IV estimations suggest that childbearing reduces the probability
of working in a informal job among married women, although this result
only precisely estimated at the 10 percent level.16 Similarly, while the OLS
estimates indicate that a larger family size is negatively correlated with the
number of hours worked per week, the instrumental variable approach finds
that such relationship is positive among married women. In addition, the
results on the three dimensions of female labor supply are consistent with
those obtained using a sample including just married women with only two
or three children (the instrument is expected to be more binding for this
group), although less precisely estimated. Moreover, the paper finds that
the estimates are not homogeneous across all groups of women. The effects
on informality are driven by married women with at least some secondary
education, while younger women (18 to 28 years old) tend to reduce the
number of hours they work with family size, contrary to the estimate for all
married women aged 18 to 35. Finally, even though the age of the mother
influences the effect of family size on labor supply, neither the age of the
youngest child or the presence of grandparents in the household affects female
labor supply.
14According to Stock and Watson (2011), external validity means that inferences and
conclusions from a statistical study can be generalized from the population and the setting
under study to other populations and settings. External validity can be threatened by
differences in the characteristics of the population, geographical differences, differences in
the institutional environment, in laws, or in the physical environment (Stock and Watson,
2011, pp.355-357,807).
15As argued by Angrist (2004), the external validity of instrumental variable estimates
is ultimately established less by new econometric methods than by replication in new data
sets.
16Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses
the main characteristics of the pool database of 15 countries in Latin Amer-
ica and of the sub-groups (women stratified by education level) analyzed in
this paper. Section 3.3 discusses the main identification strategy and the
econometric model which relies on the approach originally proposed by An-
grist and Evans (1998). Section 3.4 discusses the relationship between the
gender mix of the first two children and the fraction of families that had
another child. Section 3.5 presents the results of the main models. Finally,
Section 3.6 presents the main conclusions of this paper and future research
agenda.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section briefly describes the data set constructed for the analysis, the
labor supply variables analyzed, and the main independent variables used in
the models. The gender-mix estimation strategy is implemented using infor-
mation on labor market outcomes (employment, labor formality and hours
worked per week), the sex mix of the first two children in the household and
an indicator variable for multiple births. Data for these variables, along with
additional information regarding observable characteristics, are available in
most national household surveys prepared by the different National Statistics
Offices in the LAC region for the year 2010 (or the closest year available).17
This paper relies on household survey information from 15 countries in
Latin America around the year 2010. Although the default year to include a
household survey in the sample was 2010, when there was no available sur-
vey in 2010 for a particular country, either a survey from one year later (first
option), or from one year earlier (second option) was used instead. Note
that the fifteen countries in the sample had available information either for
2009, 2010 or 2011. The list of countries included in the sample comprises
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru
and Uruguay. Notice also that despite using national household surveys, the
National Statistics Offices of Argentina and Uruguay only gather informa-
tion for their urban populations, although both surveys are representative
17See Annex 3.7 for the details of the 15 surveys included in this paper.
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at the national level (since the wide majority of the population in these two
countries lives in urban areas).
A key variable for this paper is the identification of the number of children
per household and, in particular, per mother, as well as basic demographic
characteristics of the children such as gender and age (a key variable to
identify the order of birth). The matching of children to their mothers, a
necessary step to construct the main sample, follows a two-stage procedure.
First, this paper constructs a base including only observations of individuals
who belong to the main household. This implies dropping observations cor-
responding to individuals who could live in the household but not belong to
the family, such as household workers or temporary guests. Moreover, note
that although most household surveys clearly identify the members of the
main family cell, this is not always the case with extended family members
such as aunts, uncles and grandparents. Second, the study uses the base
including only family members to construct two databases, one base identi-
fying all women recorded as either head of the household or spouse of the
head of the household, and a second one with all the individuals identified as
sons or daughters of the head of the household. These two data bases were
then merged using a unique household-identifying variable. One of the pit-
falls of this procedure is that it could lead to the miss-allocation of children
to females who are not their biological mothers, for instance when a child is
identified as son or daughter of the head of the household and a female is
the spouse of the head but not the biological mother (in this situation, the
algorithm would be effectively assigning a child to her step-mother). How-
ever, this limitation is also found in Cruces and Galiani (2007) and Tortarolo
(2014), but is not expected to invalidate the results.
This paper limits the analysis to the labor supply of females living in ur-
ban households, since urban and rural households in Latin America tend to
be larger, independent of the sex of the first two siblings. For instance the
average number of children in rural households is 2.5, while just 1.8 among
urban households. Therefore, the IV strategy proposed by Angrist and Evans
(1998) produces weak instruments for this group of the population (a pre-
liminary analysis on the data supports this findings). Moreover, the national
household surveys for both Argentina and Uruguay only gather information
for urban areas, although they are representative at the national level. Fol-
lowing Angrist and Evans (1998), the empirical analysis is conducted dividing
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the database into two categories. The first includes all women with two or
more children, while the second includes only married women, since this is
the sample that many economic theories of household production are meant
to describe (see Bryant and Zick (2005) for a discussion of intra-household
bargaining models and the household production function).
The main database includes basic individual demographic characteristics
such as gender, age in years and relationship with the head of the household
(either head, spouse, child, or other) as well as household level characteristics
like residence in urban or rural areas. Among the labor market variables of
interest the database includes a binary variable for employment, an indicator
variable for labor formality18 and number of hours worked per week. First,
since the paper is interested in studying women with two or more children, it
identifies the number of children in each household, as well as their order of
birth, to construct the instrument and estimate the causal effect of family size
on female labor supply. To instrument for a larger family size, in particular
using a binary variable indicating that a household has more than 2 children,
the database includes a dummy equal to one if the first two children of the
household were of the same gender and zero otherwise. A discrete variable
indicating the order of birth takes the value of one for the eldest child in
the household, two for the second oldest child, and so on. Second, a set of
indicator variables at the household level was created to indicate if the first
child born in the house was a boy (“Boy 1st” equals one if the oldest child
in the household is a boy, and zero otherwise), and if the second child in
the house was a boy (“Boy 2nd” equals one if the second oldest child in the
household is a boy, and zero otherwise).19 Third, the previous variables were
used to construct household level dummies indicating if the first two children
born in the household were boys (“Two boys”) or girls (“Two girls”), and to
create the main instrumental variable, “Same Sex”, if the two oldest children
had the same gender. In addition, the age of the oldest child and the age
of the mother were used to estimate the age of the mother when she gave
birth to her first child, which is one of the control variables in the estimated
18Note that there is not a unique definition for informality. This paper defines the
worker as informal if she works in a private firm and one of the following situations occur:
the firm has less than 10 workers, the worker does not have a contract, or neither the
employer nor the worker contributes to a social security system
19Similarly, indicator variables at the household level were constructed to identify house-
holds were the third and fourth child were boys.
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models.20
Table (3.1) shows some of the main statistics associated with women who
are either heads or spouses of the head of the household using data from a
pooled sample of fifteen countries. The statistics include the average (mean)
number of children in the household, the current age and the age of the
women at first birth, the share of females with 2 or more children, the per-
centage of women employed (reported working last week), if the employed
women works in a informal job and the number of hours worked per week. For
this analysis of family size we only include women whose children are younger
than 18 years old, since younger children are more likely to be household de-
pendents and influence affect their parents’ decisions labor decisions. Table
(3.1) shows these characteristics for four groups of females. The top panel
shows these characteristics for all women 18 years old or older but younger
than 36 years.21 The second panel shows these characteristics for the sub-
group of women age 36 to 50 years old. The third and bottom (fourth)
panels show these statistics for women age 18 to 35 who have two or more
children, and for married women from 18 to 35 years old who have two or
more children in the bottom panel, respectively.
The statistics in the top section of Table (3.1) suggest that women age
18 to 35 have 1.5 children on average, an average age of 28.7 years old, and
that they gave birth to their first child at age 21.5. In addition, this study
tries to identify how many households report living with the parents of the
head or spouse of the head of the household, to gain more insight on the
structure of the family for the household production function, in particular
if the grandparents were present to help raise the children. Unfortunately,
some countries such as Brazil or the Dominican Republic do not capture
information on the presence of the parents of the head of the household and
or do not distinguish them from the parents from the spouse. Therefore,
this paper only control for the presence of the parents or in-laws of the
head.22 According to information of eleven countries in the sample that
20Notice that I am not be able to register females whose older sons or daughters had
already moved from the household at the moment of the survey or had passed away before
the survey interview.
21Notice that the original paper by Angrist and Evans (1998, pp.453) only women aged
21 or older were included in the study, but as females in LAC tend to become mothers for
the first time at younger ages, the lower age limit was relaxed and brought down to 18.
22Notice that due to data limitations on the questionnaires of the household surveys I
am only able to identify parents or parents-in-law, since several surveys do not distinguish
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capture information on the presence of parents or in-laws in the household,
only 2 percent of females share their household with their parents or in-laws.
Notice that this is an imperfect control for the household production function
since ideally the study should use information regarding who is responsible
for taking care of the children during most of the day.
The last three variables are associated with labor market outcomes related
to the extensive margin of the labor supply (being employed), the quality
of the employment (working in a formal or informal job) and the intensive
margin of the labor supply (hours worked per week). According to Table
(3.1), 57 percent of women in the sample were employed, 44 percent of those
employed hold informal jobs, and women in the sample work on average 28.5
hours per week. However, note that the sample of interest includes females
age 18 to 35 years who had two or more children. The women with two or
more children who are older than 17 but under 35 years old have on average
2.5 children (one more than all women age 18 to 35), are on average 30.2
years old (1.5 years older than the all-women subsample) and had their first
child at age 20.4 (one year younger than the sample with all women). Labor
market outcomes show that 51 percent of women age 18 to 35 who have
two or more children are employed, 54 percent of them have an informal job
(in contrast with only 44 percent of all women age 18 to 35) and work 26.4
hours per week (almost two hours less than all women age 18 to 35). In
addition, among women with two or more children, Table (3.1) shows that
younger women (ages 18 to 35) are more likely to be employed than their
counterparts (ages 36 to 60), but those employed tend to work about 6 hours
less.
Table (3.2) shows the main descriptive statistics of my main sample of in-
terest, women between 18 and 35 years old who have two or more children for
the pool sample of fifteen Latin American countries. In addition, Table (3.2)
includes information on the subsample of married and non-married women,
for those females age 18 to 35 with two or more children. In contrast with
the main statistics showed in Table (3.1), Table (3.2) includes information
on the binary or dummy variable indicating that a household had more than
two children (about 40 percent of women in the sample had more than two
among these. In addition, it is only possible to identify the parents or parents in law for
eleven countries in the sample, with the following countries missing: Brazil, Colombia,
Honduras and Panama.
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children and this number is similar among married and non-married females).
It also shows the characteristics of the sibling composition in the household.
For instance, Table (3.2) shows that about 52 percent of households had a
boy as their first child, 51 percent had a boy as their second child and about
26.7 percent had only boys as their first two children. Moreover, 50 percent
of the sample had their first two children of the same sex. These character-
istics are similar across the sub-sample of married and unmarried women.
Labor market outcomes show that unmarried women are more likely to be
employed (57.8 percent versus 46 percent of married), but tend to work fewer
hours per week (23.4 hours versus 32 hours for married women).
3.3 Methodology
This paper implements an instrumental variable (IV) strategy based on the
children gender mix in families in urban areas of fifteen countries in Latin
America with two or more children. This strategy exploits the widely ob-
served phenomenon of parental preferences for a mixed gender composition
for their children as documented for the U.S. by Becker and Lewis (1973)
and Angrist and Evans (1998).
The gender preference has been exploited in different contexts to disen-
tangle the causality between fertility and labor market outcomes23, or to
evaluate long-standing hypotheses like the quantity-quality model (Kugler
and Kumar, 2013). In particular, following Angrist and Evans (1998), this
study argues that in a sample of countries from Latin America, parents of
same-sex siblings are more likely to go on to have an additional child. Fol-
lowing the early work by Becker and Lewis (1973) and, more recently, by
Bryant and Zick (2005), the impact of the preference for sex mix on fertility
can be captured by the standard quantity-quality model. According to this
approach, couples derive satisfaction from “children services” that depend
on the number of children, N , as well as on elements such as the human
capital invested in a child, Q.24 The quantity-quality hypothesis could be
23For instance, see Cruces and Galiani (2007), Andersson, Gunnar and Hank, Karsten
and Rnsen, Marit and Vikat, Andres (2006), Priebe (2010) and Hank and Kohler (2000)
for applications in Argentina and Mexico, Nordic countries, Indonesia and South Africa,
respectively.
24The quantity-quality model was proposed as a hypothesis to explain the long-term
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formalized by defining child services, C, as the product of the number of
children and the human capital invested per child, that is: C = NQ. To
produce “children quality” it is necessary to purchase inputs and to spend
parent’s time in home production. Letting the price of child services be, πc,
and the prices of other services beπs, then the budget constraint of this model
could be represented as πcC + πsS = Y , where the respective prices recog-
nize the home production processes underlying C and S and the existence of
an income constraint, Y . According to the quantity-quality approach, while
“child services” may be a normal good, the number of children does not need
not be normal. Angrist and Evans (1998) discuss the idea that the sex mix
is something that determines child quality in the quantity-quality model.
Parental preference for a mixed gender composition of children could there-
fore lead to differences in the probability of having an additional child, de-
pending on the gender of their births. Given the fact that sex assignment of
children is virtually random, it is possible to exploit this preference to con-
struct an instrument for subsequent childbearing. Therefore, a dummy for
whether the gender of the second child matches that of the first provides a
plausible instrument for further childbearing among women with at least two
children. The estimation strategy involves the use of the Two Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models to re-
late labor-market outcomes to fertility and a variety of exogenous covariates.
Additional regressors or covariates are included to control if the sex of the
child affects the labor supply for reasons other than family size and to reduce
the likelihood of an omitted-variables bias from this source (section 3.2 shows
some of the main statistics and variables in the sample). Moreover, the 2SLS
estimation allows us to exploit the fact that the Same Sex instrument can
be decomposed into two instruments, Two boys and Two girls, leading to
an over identified model. Angrist and Evans (1998), this specification would
be useful since any secular effects of child gender on labor supply should be
different from these two instruments, while the consequences of childbearing
seem likely to be independent of whether Same Sex is equal to either Two
Boys or Two Girls. The evidence in Table (3.3) seem to support the hypoth-
esis of parental preferences for male children, what is known in the literature
reduction in fertility rates observed in the U.S. Under the quantity-quality model, as family
income rises, parents will demand more child services either by increasing the number of
children they have, or by increasing the human capital invested in each.
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as the secular effect (Angrist and Evans, 1998).
The proposed regression model relates labor-supply and labor market out-
comes to the endogenous binary variable More than 2, and a list of exogenous
covariates, xi, including additive effects for the sex of each child:
yi = α0 · wi + α1 · s1i + α2 · s2i + β · xi + εi (3.1)
In equation 3.1 wi is a vector of demographic variables, and s1i and s2i
are indicators for the sex of the first two children of mother i. In the just-
identified model where Same sex is the only instrument in the first-stage, the
equation for the first-stage for the relationship between More than 2 children
and children gender mix is:
xi = π0 · wi + π1 · s1i + πs · s2i + γ · (Same Sexi) + εi (3.2)
An alternative identification strategy uses the two components of Same
Sex (Two Boys and Two Girls) as instruments for More than 2 children. In
this case, however, either s1i of s2i must be dropped from the list of covariates
because s1i, s2i and (1− s1i)(1− s2i) are linearly dependent. In this case the
equation of interest becomes:
yi = α0 · wi + α1 · s1i + +β · xi + εi (3.3)
The first-stage relationship between xi and gender mix is:
xi = π0 · wi + π1 · s1i + γ0 · (Two Boysi) + γ1 · (Two Girlsi) + εi (3.4)
Note that across all the specifications, we let s1 and s2 be indicators for
male first born and second-born children. The instrument can thus be written
as:
Same Sex = s1 · s2 + (1 − s1) · (1 − s2) (3.5)
3.4 Gender Mix and Fertility
This section includes a brief analysis of family size and the gender mix pref-
erence for children. In particular, this section shows evidence suggesting that
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families or women are more likely to have another child after their first two
born children are of the same gender. In addition, the gender mix preference
seems to be stronger for married women than for the unmarried ones.
Table (3.3) represents the pool sample of fifteen countries in Latin America
and shows the estimates of the impact of child sex and the sex mix on fertility,
similar to those reported in Ben-Porath and Welch (1976). The Table shows
the share of families that had another child given the gender the their first
two children for both the entire sample and for only married women. The
sample including only married women is of especial interest since the models
that discuss the effect of family size on female labor supply in the context
of a household production function typically rely on a bargaining process
between the head of the household and the spouses to explain why a women
might provide household services of child care withing the household and thus
refrain to participating in the labor market(Bryant and Zick, 2005; Browning
et al., 2014).
Table (3.3) is divided in two sections. The top section shows the statistics
for the families with one or more children. The first and third columns in
the top section of Table (3.3) describe the fraction of the sample whose first-
born child was a girl (first row) or a boy (second row), both for tje all-women
sample and for only married women, respectively. The second and fourth
columns in the top section show the share of families that had another child
given that their first-born child was a girl (first row) or a boy (second row).
In addition, standard errors are reported under the fraction estimates.
The first row in the top section of Table (3.3) indicates the statistics for
families whose first-born child was a girl. Similarly, the second row shows the
statistics for families whose oldest child is a boy. The third row shows the
difference in the share of families that had another child, when the first born
was a boy versus a girl. In other words, it shows how much more likely a
family is to have another child when the first born child is a boy versus a girl.
The bottom section of Table (3.3) describes the statistics for families with
two or more children. These statistics directly inform the question about the
relationship between fertility and female labor supply. The first and third
columns in the bottom of Table (3.3) show the share of families whose first
two children were a boy and a girl (first and fourth rows), both of them girls
(second row), both of them boys (third row), or of the same gender (fifth
row).
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The second and fourth columns in Table (3.3) present the fraction of fam-
ilies that had another child given that their first two children had different
genders (first and fourth row), two girls (second row), two boys (third row),
or of the same gender (fifth row). Under the estimated share the Table report
the standard errors. The last row in the bottom section of Table (3.3) shows
the difference in the share of families who went on to have another child after
having two children of the same sex, versus the share of families who decided
to have another child given that their first two children were both of the same
gender. Thus, the last row (sixth row) indicates the preference for a balanced
sex mix. Larger values suggest that families show stronger preferences for
a gender mix in their children, while smaller values would indicate that the
gender of the first two children plays no role in the fertility decisions of the
family.
3.5 Results
This section presents the main results of implementing the instrumental vari-
able approach based on the sex mix of the first two children to analyze the
effects of family size on female labor supply in a sample of fifteen countries in
Latin America during 2010. The regressions instrument family size using the
binary variable Same sex as well as the pair of indicator variables Two boys
and Two girls. First, this paper discusses the effects of family size on three
labor market outcomes of women with two or more children: employment,
informality and hours worked per week. Then, the paper shows the results
for a sample including only women with two or three children. Note that
both set of results show the estimates including a sample with all-women
and a sample only with married women. Next, this section shows the esti-
mates of family size on female labor supply for different groups of married
women classified by their education level, their age, the age of the children
and the composition of the household.
Table (3.4) shows the main results of the sex-mix strategy to estimate
the effect of the number of children on employment, informality and hours
worked per week for all women who have two or more children, in columns
(1) to (3), and for the subsample of only married women with more than two
children in columns (4) to (6). In addition, columns (1) and (4) of Table (3.4)
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show the OLS regressions for all women with two or more children and for
the subsample of married women, respectively. Columns (2) and (5) show the
IV estimations using a single instrument (Same Sex ) for the binary variable
“More than 2 children” in the samples including all women and only married
females. The results of the IV estimations using two instruments (Two Boys
and Two Girls) for the variable “More than 2 children” corresponding to all
women and married women with two or more children appear in columns
(3) and (6). Moreover, Table (3.4) is divided in two sections. The top
section of the table reports estimates of the coefficient on the “More than 2
children” variable in equations (3.1) and (3.3) for the labor markets outcomes
of employment (Employed), labor formality (Informal) and hours worked per
week (Hours). Notice that each estimated coefficient is accompanied by its
standard error (below, in parenthesis) and stars indicating their statistical
significance (three, two and one stars for significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively).
The bottom section of Table (3.4) presents some important statistics as-
sociated with the first stage of the instrumental variable analysis between
family size and each of the female labor outcomes of interest. These statis-
tics include the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic for the
joint significance of the instruments excluded from the structural model (the
rule of thumb indicates that a value lower than 10 suggests a weak instru-
ment25), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (the Sargan
Test null hypothesis is that the set of instruments is valid and the model is
correctly specified such that a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the in-
struments are valid) for the models where more than one instrument is used
(i.e., columns (3) and (6) where “Two Boys, Two Girls” serve as instruments
for “More than 2 children”).
The results on employment in the first row of Table (3.4) suggest that there
is no precisely estimated causal effect of family size on female labor force
participation once we use an IV approach,26 in spite that the OLS estimates
are statistically significant and negative. This results are consistent with
previous estimates by Aguero and Marks (2008) and Azimi (2015), although
25This rule of thumb is suggested in Cameron and Trivedi (2010, pp.198).
26These results can be interpreted as if “the average effect of moving from a two-child
family to a larger one is statistically zero for those women whose fertility decisions are
changed by the instrument” Tortarolo (2014, pp.32).
124
they contrast with estimates using census data for Colombia and Mexico
in the 1990s and early 2000s (Cruces and Galiani, 2007) and for fourteen
countries in Latin America during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (Tortarolo,
2014).
The second row in Table (3.4) shows the effects of female labor supply on
job informality. Despite the OLS estimates in columns (1) and (4) suggest
a positive correlation between informality and family size (estimates of 0.10
and 0.09 for the full sample and the sample on married women, respectively),
the results in column (5) using the Same Sex instrument for “More than 2
children” suggest that a larger family size reduces the probability of working
in a informal job for married females by 57 percent (note that the F-statistic
is 15.4, above the typical rule of thumb value of 10). However, this result
is estimated only with a 10 percent confidence level. The magnitude of this
estimate is very large, particularly since 54 percent of all females who work
are employed in the informal labor sector, raising concerns about the validity
of the instrument, in spite that it is not possible to reject their validity using
statistical tests. In addition, the IV estimates using the pair of instruments
Two Boys and Two Girls are not estimated precisely, and the F-statistics
and p-value of the Sargent Test suggest that these instruments are weak and
are not valid.
The third row shows the effects of a larger family size on the number of
hours worked per week. The OLS results indicate that a larger family size
is negatively correlated with the number of hours worked per week (about
3.6 fewer hours worked per week for the full sample of women and 2.7 fewer
hours for married women). However, the instrumental variable approach
suggests that the relationship between family size and hours worked per week
is positive among married women, with the time worked per week increased
between 19 and 24 additional hours, based on the selection of instrument.27
Note that the F-statistic values indicate that Same sex as well as Two Boys
and Two Girls are not weak instruments, but the p-value of the Sargent test
suggest that the model using Two boys and Two girls is overidentified.
Overall, these results suggest that even though family size would not affect
27In addition to the results in Table (3.4), an additional scenario not shown in this
version of the paper reveals that after dropping women in the top 3 percent of the number
of hours worked per week (i.e., truncating the maximum hours worked per week at 70), a
larger family size raises the number of hours worked per week in 16 hours.
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female labor supply in the extensive margin (labor force participation), it
seems to have a positive impact in the intensive margin (more hours worked
per week) and in the quality of the employment (less informality), although
only among married women.
Since the instrument based on the gender mix (Same Sex ) of the first
two siblings is expected to be binding for families and women who prefer
a smaller family size, Table (3.5) shows the results of estimations similar
to Table (3.4) for the subset of women with just two or three children. The
results in Table (3.5) suggest that the instrument is relevant for the subsample
of married women. Although the effect of family size on employment is still
negligible (in spite of the fact that the OLS estimates are significant, the
IV estimates are not precisely estimated), a larger number of children is
associated with a lower probability of informality (the effect is -0.88 and
significant at the 10 percent confidence level), but with longer hours worked
per week (additional 52). The magnitudes of the effects are larger than for
married women with 2 or more children (about 50 percent larger in absolute
terms for informality and more than twice the estimate for hours) and it is
no longer possible to reject the hypothesis that the instrument is weak in the
model of informality. In addition, the pair of instruments Two Boys, Two
Girls are weak and the models in column (6) for both labor informality and
the number of hours worked per week are overidentified (Sargan Test p-value
higher than 5 percent).
Taken as a whole, the results in both Tables (3.5) and (3.4) suggest that a
larger family size is associated with more hours of work in the formal labor
market among married women. One interpretation of these results echoes
the findings by Priebe (2010) which suggest that women in Indonesia work
to help finance basic expenditure for their children. However, in contrast
with the hypothesis that the instruments would be stronger in the sample of
women with just two or three children than for all women with more than
2 children–since this subsample is limited to those households expected to
have a stronger preference for smaller family sizes–the results suggest that
this is not the case.
After showing that the instrumental variable estimation approach suggests
that family size has a negative effect on labor market outcomes for married
females, Tables (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) attempt to shed light on the charac-
teristics that might be driving the results. To do this the study focuses on
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the subsample of married women, who seem to be most responsive to the
instrument, and study the effects of family size in female labor supply for
different groups of married women classified by their education level, current
age and age of their youngest child.
First, in Table (3.6) this paper analyzes the effects of education on the
relationship between family size and female labor supply by classifying the
married women in three groups based on their education level. As opposed to
Tables (3.4) and (3.5), the results in Table (3.6) are organized in 9 columns.
The first 3 columns of Table (3.6) show the results for the subsample of
women who have attained only primary education or less. While column (1)
presents the OLS estimates, columns (2) shows the IV regression using Same
Sex as the sole instrument and column (3) shows the estimates using Two
Boys and Two Girls as instruments. In addition, columns (4) to (6) show
similar estimates (OLS, IV regression using Same Sex, and using Two Boys
and Two Girls) for women who had partial or complete secondary education.
The last three columns–from (7) through (9)–show the estimated results
for the sample of women who have partial or complete tertiary education.
Similar to Tables (3.4), the top section shows the second stage results while
the bottom of the table shows the main statistics of the first stage estimates
(the details are available in Table (3.32)).
In contrast to previous results in Tables (3.4) and (3.5), higher fertility
is associated with a 0.68 percent higher probability of working informally
for married females with the lowest education level, while the F-statistic of
this estimate suggests that the instrument is not weak. However, the results
using the pair of instruments Two Boys and Two Girls do not pass the
overidentification test. Table (3.6) suggests that the positive effects of family
size on the number of hours worked per week are mainly driven by married
women with complete or partial tertiary education, 36.4 additional hours,
and by females with only primary education or less, 18 additional hours
per week. However, the effects are also positive but not precisely estimated
among women with complete and partial secondary education. In general,
the negative effects of family size seem to be driven by women with at least
partial secondary education (among women with only primary education
a larger family size increases informality), while the positive effect on the
number of hours worked per week is common across married women of all
education levels, but is not precisely estimated among females with partial
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or complete secondary education.
In addition, Tables (3.7) and (3.8) use two alternative strategies to analyze
the effects of the family structure on the female labor decisions of married
women. In Table (3.7) this paper evaluates whether the age of the mother
affects the relationship between female labor supply and family size, with
the underlying hypothesis that households with “young mothers” behave
differently than households where the mothers are older. In Table (3.8)
the paper analyzes if the age of the younger child affects the response of
the female labor supply to changes in family size, under the assumption that
younger children would require more attention and care and that women tend
to be the primary care providers for children in Latin American countries.
Columns (1) through (3) of Table (3.7) show the estimates for women age
18 to 28 at the moment of the survey, and in columns (4) through (6) show
the estimates for women aged 29 to 35. The results suggest that among
households with younger mothers larger family sizes are associated with neg-
ative effects on labor force participation. The models estimates a 51 percent
lower probability of working using either the Same Sex or the Two Boys
and Two Girls instruments. In neither case the instruments are found to be
weak nor the models including the pair of instruments are overidentified. In
contrast, the effect of family size on employment for women aged 28 to 35 is
positive and precisely estimated (54 percent higher using Same Sex and 45
with Two Boys and Two Girls). Although the instruments are less precisely
estimated they are still statistically significant. However, the results of the
Sargant test suggest that the model using both Two Boys and Two Girls is
overidentified. Table (3.7) also shows the estimated effects of family size on
the number of hours worked per week, suggesting that an additional child is
associated with 21 fewer hours worked per week for women age 18 to 28. On
the contrary, for the group of women aged 29 to 35 the effect of family size
is positive and precisely estimated for the variable of employment and the
number of hours worked per week, although the F-statistics suggest that it
is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are weak. Fur-
thermore, the effects of family size on informality are not precisely estimated
when the married women are grouped by age.
These results suggest that younger women tend to reduce their labor sup-
ply, both in the intensive and the extensive margins, with increases in family
size. Two non-mutually exclusive hypothesis could help explain these results.
128
On one hand, the age profile of the children of younger women might also be
younger, thus requiring more time from the mother to take care of the chil-
dren (typically, household production models assume that the time parame-
ter for the production of child services is fixed (Browning, 1992; Bryant and
Zick, 2005), but in practice younger children tend to require more time and
attention from their parents). On the other hand, younger mother might also
have less working experience (and, therefore, lower wages on average), due to
less potential time to participate in the labor force, and a lower opportunity
cost of allocating more hours in the production of household goods (including
child services). This hypothesis suggest that less experienced females would
take the rational decision to reduce their labor supply and increase the time
they allocate to the production of household goods when the family size in-
creases. To provide evidence on the first hypothesis, Table (3.8) shows the
effects of family size on the labor supply of women whose younger children
are above or below 4 years old. Unfortunately, the household surveys do
not provide information on labor market experience, so it is not possible to
empirically test if labor experience is responsible of the different responses of
younger (18 to 28) and older (29 to 35) married women to increases in family
size.
Table (3.8) shows the effect of family size on female labor supply for women
grouped based on the age of the youngest children in the household. Since
children in most Latin American countries can start attending preschool as
early as age 4, the study uses this age as a cut-off to test whether having
younger children in the household (who are more likely to require constant
care) affects female labor decisions differently than for women with older
children. The results in Table (3.8) suggest that having at least one child
under the age of 5 in the household does not affect labor outcomes such
as employment or informality. Surprisingly, the results of the IV estimation
suggest that family size has a positive impact on the number of hours worked
per week for married women who have at least one child younger than 5 years
old (35 additional hours using the Same Sex instrument). However, the effect
of family size nn women with older children is not precisely estimated, though
it is also positive and of a similar magnitude, 30 additional hours. Thus, even
though the age of the mother seems to influence the effect of family size on
labor supply, the age of the youngest child would not play a major role.
In addition, this paper also analyzes the estimates of using as instrument
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and indicator variable for having the first three children of the same gender
and how the presence of extended family members affects female labor supply
decision by controlling for the presence of grandparents in the household. In
columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table (3.9) this study shows the estimates for
the cases in which the first three children are of the same gender. The
results suggest that, in contrast to the results in Table (3.4) a larger family
size reduces the probability of being employed by 50 percent, although the
effect is precisely estimated at the 10 percent level (with an F-statistic above
the cut-off value of 10). In addition, although the negative effect of going
from three to more children on the probability of being an informal worker is
significant, the F-statistic suggests that this is a weak instrument. Moreover,
family size has no precisely estimated effect on the number of hours worked
per week. Note that one of the main shortcomings of this approach is that
the number of observations falls rapidly as the probability of having the first
three kids of the same gender is very low.
Finally, in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table (3.9) this paper studies how the
structure of the family affects female labor market outcomes by estimating
the impact of the presence of grandparents in the household has on the labor
decisions of the mother. The results suggest that controlling for the presence
of grandparents in the household does not affect the main estimates of the
impact of family size on informal work or on the number of hours worked
per week. However, note that given data limitations (the survey does not
identify additional members of the family such as grandparents), I dropped
4 countries from the original sample.28
3.6 Conclusions
This paper aims to assess the relationship between childbearing and the fe-
male labor supply in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. In
particular, the paper relies on an instrumental variable (IV) strategy origi-
nally proposed by Angrist and Evans (1998) for the U.S., based on the gender
mix of siblings in families with two or more children. This paper contributes
to answer if the estimates reported by Angrist and Evans (1998) for the U.S.
can be generalized to the population of a region that, compared to U.S.,
28Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Panama.
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presents higher fertility, lower education levels, and fewer facilities for child-
care. Moreover, this paper discusses potential drivers or determinants of
the observed effects of family size on female labor supply by analyzing how
different groups of married women respond to shocks in family size.
These results suggest that even though family size would not affect female
labor supply in the extensive margin (labor force participation), it seems
to have a positive impact in the intensive margin (more hours worked per
week) and in the quality of the employment (less informality), although only
among married women. This findings are consistent with the literature on
bargaining models inside the households such as Bryant and Zick (2005)
and Browning et al. (2014) which suggest that married women would have
more flexibility to enter or leave the labor force. The results from the IV
estimations also suggest that a larger family size reduces the probability of
working in a informal job among married females, although this effect is
not very precisely estimated (only significant at the 10 percent level). In
addition, the instrumental variable estimation suggests that the relationship
between family size and hours worked per week is positive among married
women, increasing the time worked per week between 24 and 19. One possible
interpretation of these results echoes the findings by Priebe (2010) which
suggest that women in Indonesia work to help finance basic expenditure for
their children.
In addition, this paper finds that the estimates are not homogeneous across
all groups of women. The negative estimates on informality seem to be
driven by females with at least partial secondary education (among females
only with primary education a larger family size increases informality in 18
percent); while the positive effect of family size in the number of hours worked
per week is common across married women of all education levels.
Moreover, this paper also analyzes the effects of the family structure in
the female labor decisions of married women separating the sample into two
groups: women from 18 to 28 years, and from 29 to 35 years old. The results
suggest that while younger women (18 to 28 years old) tend to reduce their
labor supply in both the extensive and intensive margins, family size has
positive impacts on the older group. Two non-mutually exclusive hypothesis
could help explain these results. On one hand, the age profile of the children
of younger women might also be younger, thus requiring more time from the
mother to take care of the children. On the other hand, younger mother might
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also have less working experience and lower wages, thus a lower opportunity
cost of allocating more hours in the production of household goods (including
child services). This hypothesis suggest that less experienced females would
be taking the rational decision to reduce their labor supply and increase the
time they allocate to the production of household goods when the family size
increases.
To provide evidence on the first hypothesis, the paper shows the effects of
family size on the labor supply of women whose younger children are above
or below 4 years old. In spite that the age of the mother influences the effect
of family size on labor supply, the age of the youngest child does not affect
female labor supply. Similarly, controlling for the presence of grandparents
in the household does not affects the main results on the impact of family
size on informal work or in the number of hours worked per week. Taken
together, these results suggest that neither the age of the youngest children
in the household nor the presence of grandparents (who potentially could
provide help to raise the children) are driving the observed results.
Finally, the household surveys do not provide information on labor market
experience, so it is not possible to empirically test if labor experience is
responsible of the different responses of younger (18 to 28) and older (29 to
35) married women to increases in family size.
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3.7 List of National Household Surveys
The 17 surveys (countries, year) included in the analysis are:
• Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua - EPH . (Argentina, 2010).
• Encuesta Continua de Hogares - MECOVI . (Bolivia, 2011).
• Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios - PNAD . (Brazil, 2011).
• Encuesta de Caracterizacin Socioeconmica Nacional . (Chile, 2011).
• Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares - GEIH . (Colombia, 2010).
• Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - ENAHO . (Costa Rica, 2010).
• Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo - ENFT . (Dominican Repub-
lic, 2010).
• Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo - ENEMDU . (Ecuador,
2010).
• Encuesta de Hogares de Propsitos Mltiples - EHPM . (El Salvador,
2010).
• Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida - ENCOVI . (Guatemala,
2011).
• Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propsitos Mltiples - EPHPM .
(Honduras, 2010).
• Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares - ENIGH .
(Mexico, 2010).
• Encuesta de Hogares (Panama, 2010); Encuesta Permanente de Hoga-
res - EPH . (Paraguay, 2010).
• Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - ENAHO . (Peru, 2010).
• Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medicin de Nivel de Vida - EMNV .
(Nicaragua, 2009).
• Encuesta Continua de Hogares . (Uruguay, 2010).
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Note that for the case of Argentina and Uruguay, their surveys are only
representative at the urban level. The year of default for the selection of the
surveys is 2010; although, due to data availability issues, information from
household surveys of 2011 was used for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala.
In the case of Nicaragua, the household survey correspond to 2009.
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3.8 Figures and Tables





Children in household 1.48 1.16
Age (women) 28.65 4.50
Age at first birth (women) 21.49 3.97
Households with 2 or more children 0.58 0.49
Living with parents/in-laws 0.02 0.15
Employed [=1 if employed] 0.57 0.49
Informal [=1 if informal job] 0.44 0.50
Hours worked per week 28.53 22.37
Observations 82344
Women aged 36-50
Children in household 1.56 1.22
Age (women) 41.67 4.21
Age at first birth (women) 27.63 5.20
Households with 2 or more children 0.64 0.48
Living with parents/in-laws 0.02 0.15
Employed [=1 if employed] 0.66 0.47
Informal [=1 if informal job] 0.47 0.50
Hours worked per week 31.00 22.01
Observations 61967
Women aged 18-35 with 2 or more children
Children in household 2.52 0.82
Age (women) 30.21 3.75
Age at first birth (women) 20.38 3.21
Households with 2 or more children 1.00 0.00
Living with parents/in-laws 0.03 0.17
Employed [=1 if employed] 0.51 0.50
Informal [=1 if informal job] 0.54 0.50
Hours worked per week 26.33 23.01
Observations 37923
Married women aged 36-50 with 2 or more children
Children in household 2.56 0.84
Age (women) 30.10 3.79
Age at first birth (women) 20.60 3.26
Households with 2 or more children 1.00 0.00
Living with parents/in-laws 0.05 0.22
Employed [=1 if employed] 0.46 0.50
Informal [=1 if informal job] 0.56 0.50
Hours worked per week 32.04 22.79
Observations 25264
Notes: Descriptive statistics for women classified by birth cohort (age)
and number of children. Column (1) shows the mean average for each
variable and column (2) its standard deviation.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics, Women ages 18-35 with Two or More
Children
All women Married Unmarried
(1) (2) (3)
Children in household 2.558 2.561 2.551
(0.837) (0.835) (0.840)
More than 2 childre [=1 if true] 0.395 0.398 0.387
(0.489) (0.490) (0.487)
First child boy [=1 if true] 0.520 0.522 0.515
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Second child boy [=1 if true] 0.511 0.513 0.507
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Two boys [=1 if first 2 children boys] 0.266 0.266 0.265
(0.442) (0.442) (0.441)
Two girls [=1 if first 2 children girls] 0.235 0.231 0.243
(0.424) (0.421) (0.429)
Same sex [=1 if first 2 children of same sex] 0.500 0.496 0.508
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Age (women) 30.07 30.10 30.02
(3.810) (3.789) (3.856)
Age at first birth (women) 20.30 20.60 19.67
(3.172) (3.262) (2.868)
Employed [=1 if employed] 0.497 0.460 0.575
(0.500) (0.498) (0.494)
Informal [=1 if informal job] 0.561 0.560 0.563
(0.496) (0.496) (0.496)
Hours worked per week 28.06 32.04 23.24
(23.23) (22.79) (22.84)
Observations 34216 25264 8952
Notes: Standard deviation in parenthesis. The table shows the main descriptive statistics for the full sample of
“Women aged 18-35 with 2 or more children” in column (1), and for the sub-samples of only married women in
column (2) and only unmarried women in column (3).
136
Table 3.3: Fraction of Families that had Another Child by Parity and Sex of
Children
Full Sample: LAC-15
Gender of first child in families Fraction of Fraction that Fraction of Fraction that
with one or more children sample had another kid sample had another kid
(1) one girl 0.480 0.700 0.479 0.772
(0.0048) (0.0060)
(2) one boy 0.520 0.717 0.521 0.774
(0.0046) (0.0058)
difference (2) - (1) 0.017 0.002
(0.0067) (0.0083)
Gender of first two children in Fraction of Fraction that Fraction of Fraction that
families with two or more children sample had another kid sample had another kid
One boy, one girl 0.497 0.458 0.502 0.490
(0.0061) (0.0081)
Two girls 0.233 0.492 0.235 0.548
(0.0088) (0.0116)
Two boys 0.269 0.491 0.263 0.557
(0.0085) (0.0113)
(1) One boy, one girl 0.497 0.458 0.502 0.490
(0.0061) (0.0081)
(2) Both same sex 0.503 0.492 0.498 0.553
(0.0061) (0.0081)
difference (2) - (1) 0.034 0.062
(0.0086) (0.0114)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The sample includes females aged 18 to 35 from urban households in 15 LAC countries.
The top section of the table include women with one or more children under age 18. The bottom section includes females with
two or more children under age 18.
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Table 3.4: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply Models for Women with Two or More
Children in Latin America
All women Only married women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second Stage
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Dependent variables
Employed -0.086∗∗∗ -0.058 -0.040 -0.079∗∗∗ 0.056 0.049
(0.0059) (0.1556) (0.1554) (0.0069) (0.1580) (0.1575)
Informal 0.100∗∗∗ -0.142 -0.116 0.089∗∗∗ -0.572∗ -0.339
(0.0083) (0.2121) (0.2106) (0.0101) (0.3257) (0.2830)
Hours -3.654∗∗∗ 9.250 5.778 -2.712∗∗∗ 24.022∗∗ 19.635∗∗
(0.3051) (8.9091) (8.6891) (0.3848) (9.7496) (9.1468)
First Stage Statistics
Employed
Observations 34213 34213 34213 25262 25262 25262
F-statistic 48.399 24.290 48.652 24.429
Sargan Test 0.058 0.520
Informal
Observations 16952 16952 16952 11639 11639 11639
F-statistic 27.402 13.760 15.355 8.599
Sargan Test 0.068 0.018
Hours
Observations 22259 22259 22259 14221 14221 14221
F-statistic 28.192 14.312 29.660 15.566
Sargan Test 0.001 0.031
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with two or more children younger than 18 years old from
urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included
are age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (3) and
(6). The top section of the table reports estimates of the coefficient on the “More than 2 children” variable in equations (3.1) and
(3.3) for the three labor markets outcomes: participation in the labor market Employed), labor formality (Informal) and hours
worked per week (Hours). The bottom section of the table presents statistics associated with the first stage of the IV estimations
including the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10
suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the
set of instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.5: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply Models for Women with Two or Three
Children in Latin America
All women Only married women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second Stage
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Dependent variable
Employed -0.078∗∗∗ 0.058 0.087 -0.078∗∗∗ 0.249 0.137
(0.0064) (0.2083) (0.2055) (0.0074) (0.2311) (0.2138)
Informal 0.080∗∗∗ -0.190 -0.146 0.065∗∗∗ -0.884∗ -0.536
(0.0091) (0.2532) (0.2484) (0.0110) (0.5202) (0.4167)
Hours -2.927∗∗∗ 20.143 9.284 -2.302∗∗∗ 52.152∗∗∗ 35.285∗∗
(0.3330) (12.5156) (11.1536) (0.4165) (18.9997) (14.9414)
First Stage Statistics
Employed
Observations 30087 30087 30087 22223 22223 22223
F-statistic 28.381 14.683 24.921 13.889
Sargan Test 0.457 0.120
Informal
Observations 15113 15113 15113 10376 10376 10376
F-statistic 20.685 10.567 7.986 4.676
Sargan Test 0.228 0.044
Hours
Observations 19618 19618 19618 12531 12531 12531
F-statistic 17.270 9.338 14.220 8.028
Sargan Test 0.001 0.002
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with only two or three children younger than 18 years old from
urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included
are age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (3) and
(6). The top section of the table reports estimates of the coefficient on the “More than 2 children” variable in equations (3.1) and
(3.3) for the three labor markets outcomes: participation in the labor market Employed), labor formality (Informal) and hours
worked per week (Hours). The bottom section of the table presents statistics associated with the first stage of the IV estimations
including the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10
suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the
set of instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.6: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply Models for Married Women with Two or More Children
in Latin America by Mother’s Education
Married women with Married women with Married women with
primary education or less Partial secondary education Complete secondary or more
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Second Stage
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls Two girls
Dependent variable
Employed -0.076∗∗∗ 0.047 0.080 -0.061∗∗∗ -0.489 -0.409 -0.032∗ 2.655∗ -0.046
(0.0118) (0.1662) (0.1649) (0.0095) (0.3057) (0.2938) (0.0188) (1.4667) (0.4019)
Informal 0.117∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.014 -6.788 -3.932 0.043∗∗ -0.817 -0.892∗∗
(0.0170) (0.2516) (0.1487) (0.0141) (13.7525) (5.8611) (0.0200) (0.5447) (0.3534)
Hours -4.247∗∗∗ 17.956∗ 16.580∗∗ -1.990∗∗∗ 29.039 45.144 -0.873 36.441∗∗ 41.129∗∗∗
(0.7247) (9.5203) (7.4300) (0.5495) (36.4746) (35.8849) (0.8358) (18.1721) (15.7052)
First Stage Statistics
Employed
Observations 7602 7602 7602 13194 13194 13194 4455 4455 4455
F-statistic 38.977 19.970 7.533 4.071 4.865
Sargan Test 0.200 0.134 0.000
Informal
Observations 2953 2953 2953 5857 5857 5857 2824 2824 2824
F-statistic 18.514 20.436 0.243 6.261 7.974
Sargan Test 0.039 0.616 0.864
Hours
Observations 3873 3873 3873 7213 7213 7213 3129 3129 3129
F-statistic 27.820 22.300 1.702 10.762 7.956
Sargan Test 0.811 0.503 0.666
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only
women aged 18 to 35 with two or more children younger than 18 years old from urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of
survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (3), (6) and (9). The
top section of the table reports estimates of the coefficient on the “More than 2 children” variable in equations (3.1) and (3.3) for the three labor markets outcomes: participa-
tion in the labor market Employed), labor formality (Informal) and hours worked per week (Hours). The bottom section of the table presents statistics associated with the first
stage of the IV estimations including the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak
instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.7: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply Models for Married Women with Two
or More Children in Latin America by Mother’s Age
Married women aged 18-28 Married women aged 29-35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second Stage
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Dependent variable
Employed -0.094∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.446∗
(0.0126) (0.1978) (0.1961) (0.0082) (0.2709) (0.2525)
Informal 0.142∗∗∗ 0.329 0.204 0.075∗∗∗ -2.265 -1.635
(0.0221) (0.2037) (0.1903) (0.0114) (1.8342) (1.4052)
Hours -4.737∗∗∗ -21.758∗∗ -21.102∗∗ -2.151∗∗∗ 66.812∗∗ 53.384∗∗
(0.7977) (9.1724) (9.0832) (0.4401) (26.1900) (21.9333)
First Stage Statistics
Employed
Observations 7845 7845 7845 17417 17417 17417
F-statistic 36.426 18.515 21.110 11.353
Sargan Test 0.941 0.197
Informal
Observations 2779 2779 2779 8860 8860 8860
F-statistic 33.501 18.794 1.964 1.029
Sargan Test 0.060 0.039
Hours
Observations 3694 3694 3694 10527 10527 10527
F-statistic 31.327 15.841 9.891 5.318
Sargan Test 0.498 0.026
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger than 18 years old from urban households
in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first
birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (3) and (6). The top section of
the table reports estimates of the coefficient on the “More than 2 children” variable in equations (3.1) and (3.3) for the three labor
markets outcomes: participation in the labor market Employed), labor formality (Informal) and hours worked per week (Hours).
The bottom section of the table presents statistics associated with the first stage of the IV estimations including the number of
observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak instru-
ment), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is
valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.8: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply Models for Married Women with Two
or More Children in Latin America by Youngest Child Age
Married women youngest Married women youngest
child under 5 years child over 4 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second Stage
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Dependent variable
Employed -0.093∗∗∗ 0.336 0.157 -0.050∗∗∗ -0.126 -0.168
(0.0092) (0.3119) (0.2915) (0.0118) (0.2344) (0.2342)
Informal 0.122∗∗∗ -0.117 -0.006 0.064∗∗∗ -1.873 0.254
(0.0141) (0.4689) (0.4109) (0.0162) (1.2874) (0.3769)
Hours -2.551∗∗∗ 33.397∗∗ 40.355∗∗ -2.639∗∗∗ 30.672 20.628
(0.5316) (16.7640) (16.1943) (0.6223) (20.9387) (13.2014)
First Stage Statistics
Employed
Observations 16468 16468 16468 8794 8794 8794
F-statistic 16.125 8.517 22.199 11.203
Sargan Test 0.010 0.063
Informal
Observations 7033 7033 7033 4606 4606 4606
F-statistic 6.570 4.157 2.981 4.361
Sargan Test 0.598 0.000
Hours
Observations 8787 8787 8787 5434 5434 5434
F-statistic 13.404 8.228 7.296 7.551
Sargan Test 0.368 0.462
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger than 18 years old from urban house-
holds in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age
at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (3) and (6). The top
section of the table reports estimates of the coefficient on the “More than 2 children” variable in equations (3.1) and (3.3) for the
three labor markets outcomes: participation in the labor market Employed), labor formality (Informal) and hours worked per
week (Hours). The bottom section of the table presents statistics associated with the first stage of the IV estimations including
the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest
a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of
instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.9: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply Models for Married Women in Latin
America by Composition of the Household
Only households with 3 Controlling for grandparents
or more children present in household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second Stage
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for ”More than 2” - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys,
and ”More than 3” children Two girls Two girls
Dependent variable
Employed -0.005 -0.489∗ -0.393 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.100 -0.112
(0.0111) (0.2678) (0.2525) (0.0079) (0.1491) (0.1488)
Informal 0.080∗∗∗ -1.418∗∗ -1.511∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ -0.569∗ -0.264
(0.0160) (0.6908) (0.7113) (0.0118) (0.3148) (0.2451)
Hours -1.311∗∗ 23.504 22.066 -2.831∗∗∗ 23.943∗∗ 17.545∗∗
(0.6322) (15.1206) (14.2226) (0.4354) (9.3999) (8.3211)
First Stage Statistics
Employed
Observations 9869 9869 9869 18972 18972 18972
F-statistic 20.277 10.743 53.248 26.764
Sargan Test 0.086 0.261
Informal
Observations 4312 4312 4312 8484 8484 8484
F-statistic 6.987 3.577 16.425 10.946
Sargan Test 0.358 0.031
Hours
Observations 5453 5453 5453 11067 11067 11067
F-statistic 12.170 6.711 31.857 18.152
Sargan Test 0.821 0.040
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors
in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger than 18 years old from urban households in 15
countries in the LAC region in columns (1) to (3), and from 11 countries with information on grandparents presence in the household in
columns (4) to (6). All models include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indicators
for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (3) and (6). The top section of the table reports estimates of
the coefficient on the “More than 2 children” variable in equations (3.1) and (3.3) for the three labor markets outcomes: participation in
the labor market Employed), labor formality (Informal) and hours worked per week (Hours). The bottom section of the table presents
statistics associated with the first stage of the IV estimations including the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint
significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification
(a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is valid and the model is not misspecified).
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Table 3.10: Effects of conflict on trust in government institutions and the media
District Province National Regional National Jury Office Electoral Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 6 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Conflict exposure ages 7 to 18 -0.005** -0.006*** -0.003* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005* -0.006** -0.004* -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210915 206757 196327 195799 185444 188520 200729 210373
Mean level of trust 0.225 0.214 0.117 0.164 0.243 0.281 0.22 0.339
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level.
The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey
(pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend.
In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy
for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Peruvian
government system is organized in four levels, going from local to national: districts, provinces, regions and national government. In addition, the National Congress is the legislative
body of the government. Even though the Congress is a national level institution, the Congressmen are elected at the region level, with most regions having more than one represen-
tative in the Congress. The Peruvian National Jury of Elections is the agency responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral processes, proclaiming the official electoral results
and awarding recognition or credentials to the elected authorities. The National Office of Electoral Processes is the agency responsible for organizing the elections for the different
levels of political authorities in Peru. The Written Press includes local and nationwide public and private newspapers and magazines. Similarly, Radio & Television includes public
and privately owned radio and television stations. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution,
and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.11: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions,
multiple age periods
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 6 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.000
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Conflict exposure ages 7 to 18 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173602 204588 212178 211267
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes
only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at
the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models
include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and
a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size
and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language
(proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to
violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Catholic Church repre-
sents the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely Catholic country), the Political Parties
refer to political organizations (both local and national), the Ombudsman Office is the office of the pub-
lic defender responsible for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and the
community (created in 1993), and the National Police represents the police forces. The levels of trust
for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the
institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.12: Effects of conflict on trust in government institutions and the media, multiple age periods identifying the
source of violence
District Province National Regional National Jury Office Electoral Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 6 -0.008 -0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 6 0.004 0.007 -0.005 0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
Government violence exposure ages 7 to 18 -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.010*** -0.009** -0.006 -0.006** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Rebels violence violence exposure ages 7 to 18 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.008* 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.009*** -0.006* -0.000 -0.005 -0.009** -0.006 -0.009*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 30 0.010** 0.008* -0.003 0.011* 0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Government violence exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.002 -0.005** -0.002 -0.005** -0.003 -0.002 -0.005** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.005 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210915 206757 196327 195799 185444 188520 200729 210373
Mean level of trust 0.225 0.214 0.117 0.164 0.243 0.281 0.22 0.339
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample
includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004
to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for
gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages
‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Peruvian government system is organized in four levels, going from local
to national: districts, provinces, regions and national government. In addition, the National Congress is the legislative body of the government. Even though the Congress is a national level insti-
tution, the Congressmen are elected at the region level, with most regions having more than one representative in the Congress. The Peruvian National Jury of Elections is the agency responsible
for overseeing the legality of electoral processes, proclaiming the official electoral results and awarding recognition or credentials to the elected authorities. The National Office of Electoral Pro-
cesses is the agency responsible for organizing the elections for the different levels of political authorities in Peru. The Written Press includes local and nationwide public and private newspapers
and magazines. Similarly, Radio & Television includes public and privately owned radio and television stations. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported
having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.13: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions,
multiple age periods identifying the source of violence
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 6 -0.010 -0.000 0.009 -0.004
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 6 0.018 -0.003 -0.007 0.007
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Government violence exposure ages 7 to 18 -0.007* -0.000 -0.008** -0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Rebels violence violence exposure ages 7 to 18 0.013** 0.002 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.010** -0.002 -0.012*** -0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 30 0.010 0.003 0.014*** 0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Government violence exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.008*** -0.000 -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Rebels violence exposure ages 31 to 60 0.013*** -0.000 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173602 204588 212178 211267
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than
age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the house-
hold survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth
and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for
gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence
and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of ex-
posure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Catholic Church represents
the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely Catholic country), the Political Parties refer to political
organizations (both local and national), the Ombudsman Office is the office of the public defender responsible for
protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and the community (created in 1993), and the Na-
tional Police represents the police forces. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual
reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.14: Effects of conflict on participation in organizations that provide public services, multiple age
periods
Mothers School’s Parents Glass of Milk Soup-Kitchen Neighbors Worker’s
Club Associations Program Program Associations Union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 6 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.010** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Conflict exposure ages 7 to 18 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.002 0.001 -0.004** -0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.003** -0.002** -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.003** -0.001** 0.003 -0.002* 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78349 166545 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.017 0.038 0.200 0.033 0.121 0.088
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or
older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth,
cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status,
family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population).
Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Moth-
ers’ Club is a social organization typically formed by mothers (although, not exclusively) with the mission to serve as a link between the population and
the Government, in order to manage and organize the provision of some key social programs. The School Parents Association is a committee of parents
that is part of the schools council formed also by teachers and students under the direction of the principal. The Glass of Milk program is the largest
social assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes, cereals and other commodities among households with children, pregnant women
and elderly population. The Soup-kitchen are social dining halls based on locally organized charities to feed low-income households for free or for a small
contribution. The Neighbors Associations are social organizations for the provision of local public good or services. The Workers Union represents labor
union organizations. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3.15: Effects of conflict on participation in social organizations, multiple
age periods
Social Cultural Political Self-Defense
Club Association Organization Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 6 -0.005 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 7 to 18 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 31 to 60 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.051 0.011 0.025 0.067
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respec-
tively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals
younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the inter-
view for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district
of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In ad-
dition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household,
province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure
ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant
age range. Social Clubs are social groups that include the practice of sports and hobbies. The Political Or-
ganizations are associations related with both local and national level political parties. Cultural Associations
include theater, dance and other artistic organizations. The Self-Defense Groups are local civil groups orga-
nized to provide security. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports participating
in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3.16: Effects of conflict on participation in organizations that provide public services, multiple
age periods identifying the source of violence
Mothers School’s Parents Glass of Milk Soup-Kitchen Neighbors Worker’s
Club Associations Program Program Associations Union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 6 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 0.007** -0.008 -0.014**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 6 -0.006 0.004 0.006 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Government violence exposure ages 7 to 18 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.002 -0.007** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Rebels violence violence exposure ages 7 to 18 -0.005 -0.008** -0.013 -0.002 0.003 -0.007*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.002 -0.001 0.014** -0.000 -0.003 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.002 -0.004 -0.021** -0.005 0.004 -0.018***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Government violence exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.002 -0.001 0.015*** 0.000 0.002 0.013**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
Rebels violence exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.003 -0.002 -0.017*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.019***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78349 166545 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.017 0.038 0.200 0.033 0.121 0.088
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the
interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national
household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of house-
hold, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to
violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Mothers’ Club is a social organization typically formed by mothers (although, not ex-
clusively) with the mission to serve as a link between the population and the Government, in order to manage and organize the provision of some key social programs.
The School Parents Association is a committee of parents that is part of the schools council formed also by teachers and students under the direction of the principal.
The Glass of Milk program is the largest social assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes, cereals and other commodities among households with
children, pregnant women and elderly population. The Soup-kitchen are social dining halls based on locally organized charities to feed low-income households for
free or for a small contribution. The Neighbors Associations are social organizations for the provision of local public good or services. The Workers Union represents
labor union organizations. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3.17: Effects of conflict on participation in social organizations, multiple
age periods identifying the source of violence
Social Cultural Political Self-Defense
Club Association Organization Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 6 -0.011 0.008 0.009* 0.000
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 6 0.008 -0.002 -0.011** 0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Government violence exposure ages 7 to 18 -0.016*** -0.006* 0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Rebels violence violence exposure ages 7 to 18 0.019*** 0.007** -0.005** 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 30 -0.013*** -0.010*** 0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 30 0.017*** 0.009*** -0.006*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Government violence exposure ages 31 to 60 -0.005* -0.004 0.005** -0.003**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Rebels violence exposure ages 31 to 60 0.008*** 0.004 -0.006*** 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.051 0.011 0.025 0.067
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only indi-
viduals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of
the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects
for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific lin-
ear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for
head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous popula-
tion). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed
conflict during the relevant age range. Social Clubs are social groups that include the practice of sports and
hobbies. The Political Organizations are associations related with both local and national level political par-
ties. Cultural Associations include theater, dance and other artistic organizations. The Self-Defense Groups
are local civil groups organized to provide security. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the indi-
vidual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3.18: Effects of conflict on trust in government institutions and the media, falsification test
District Province National Regional National Jury National Office of Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Electoral Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Placebo conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Placebo conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.007* 0.006 0.007** 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No No No No No
Observations 210915 206757 196327 195799 185444 188520 200729 210373
Mean level of trust 0.225 0.214 0.117 0.164 0.243 0.281 0.220 0.339
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The
sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys
from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a district specific linear trend. Placebo conflict exposure
ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range, assuming exposure occurred 30 years before actual date. The Peruvian
government system is organized in four levels, going from more local to national: districts, provinces, regions and the national government. In addition, the legislative body of the government
is the National Congress. Even though the Congress is a national level institution, the Congressmen are elected at the department or region level, with most regions having more than one
representative in the Congress. The Peruvian National Jury of Elections is the agency responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral processes, proclaiming the official electoral results and
awarding recognition or credentials to the elected authorities. The National Office of Electoral Processes is the agency responsible for organizing the elections for the different levels of political
authorities in Peru. The Written Press includes local and nationwide public and private newspapers and magazines. Similarly, Radio & Television includes public and privately owned radio
and television stations. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.19: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions,
falsification test
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Placebo conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 0.005 -0.003 0.012 0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No
Observations 173602 204588 212178 211267
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only
individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the mo-
ment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed
effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a district specific
linear trend. Placebo conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the
Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range, assuming exposure occurred 30 years before actual
date. The Catholic Church represents the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely Catholic
country), the Political Parties refer to political organizations (both local and national), the Ombudsman
Office is the office of the public defender responsible for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms
of the individual and the community (created in 1993), and the National Police represents the police forces.
The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of
trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.20: Effects of conflict on trust in government institutions and the media, alternative specification with
limited control variables
District Province National Regional National Jury National Office of Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Electoral Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.005** -0.006*** -0.003* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.004* -0.004** -0.003 -0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No No No No No
Observations 210963 206804 196379 195848 185490 188566 200779 210424
Mean level of trust 0.225 0.214 0.117 0.164 0.243 0.281 0.220 0.339
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level.
The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled
surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. Conflict
exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Peruvian government system is organized in four
levels, going from more local to national: districts, provinces, regions and the national government. In addition, the legislative body of the government is the National Congress. Even
though the Congress is a national level institution, the Congressmen are elected at the department or region level, with most regions having more than one representative in the Congress.
The Peruvian National Jury of Elections is the agency responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral processes, proclaiming the official electoral results and awarding recognition or
credentials to the elected authorities. The National Office of Electoral Processes is the agency responsible for organizing the elections for the different levels of political authorities in Peru.
The Written Press includes local and nationwide public and private newspapers and magazines. Similarly, Radio & Television includes public and privately owned radio and television
stations. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.21: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions,
alternative specification with limited control variables
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No
Observations 173653 204641 212234 211327
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respec-
tively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals
younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the inter-
view for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of
birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. Conflict
exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the
relevant age range. The Catholic Church represents the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely
Catholic country), the Political Parties refer to political organizations (both local and national), the Ombuds-
man Office is the office of the public defender responsible for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms
of the individual and the community (created in 1993), and the National Police represents the police forces. The
levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in
the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.22: Effects of conflict on trust in government institutions and the media, alternative specification with limited
control variables identifying the source of violence
District Province National Regional National Jury Office Electoral Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.009*** -0.008** -0.005 -0.006* -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.005*** -0.006** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.006** -0.004 -0.007*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 0.006* 0.005 -0.002 0.009** 0.002 -0.003 0.007** 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No No No No No
Observations 210963 206804 196379 195848 185490 188566 200779 210424
Mean level of trust 0.225 0.214 0.117 0.164 0.243 0.281 0.22 0.339
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The
sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys
from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models
control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict
exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Peruvian government system is organized in four levels,
going from local to national: districts, provinces, regions and national government. In addition, the National Congress is the legislative body of the government. Even though the Congress is a
national level institution, the Congressmen are elected at the region level, with most regions having more than one representative in the Congress. The Peruvian National Jury of Elections is
the agency responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral processes, proclaiming the official electoral results and awarding recognition or credentials to the elected authorities. The National
Office of Electoral Processes is the agency responsible for organizing the elections for the different levels of political authorities in Peru. The Written Press includes local and nationwide public
and private newspapers and magazines. Similarly, Radio & Television includes public and privately owned radio and television stations. The levels of trust for the variables were coded as “1”
when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.23: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions, alternative
specification with limited control variables identifying the source of violence
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.007* -0.000 -0.008** -0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.013** 0.002 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.009*** -0.001 -0.011*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 0.009** 0.003 0.013*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No
Observations 173653 204641 212234 211327
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at
the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled
surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national
household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size
and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous
population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict
during the relevant age range. The Catholic Church represents the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely
Catholic country), the Political Parties refer to political organizations (both local and national), the Ombudsman Office is
the office of the public defender responsible for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and the
community (created in 1993), and the National Police represents the police forces. The levels of trust for the variables were
coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution, and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.24: Effects of conflict on participation in organizations that provide public services, alternative
specification with limited control variables
Mothers School’s Parents Glass of Milk Soup-Kitchen Neighbors Worker’s
Club Associations Program Program Associations Syndicate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.005 0.000 -0.004* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No No No
Observations 78393 166635 166635 166635 166635 166635
Mean participation 0.017 0.038 0.200 0.033 0.121 0.088
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clus-
tered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older
at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort
of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure
to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Mothers’ Club is a social organization typically formed by mothers (al-
though, not exclusively) with the mission to serve as a link between the population and the Government, in order to manage and organize the provision of
some key social programs. The School Parents Association is a committee of parents that is part of the schools council formed also by teachers and stu-
dents under the direction of the principal. The Glass of Milk program is the largest social assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes,
cereals and other commodities among households with children, pregnant women and elderly population. The Soup-kitchen are social dining halls based
on locally organized charities to feed low-income households for free or for a small contribution. The Neighbors Associations are social organizations for
the provision of local public good or services. The Workers Union represents labor union organizations. All the variables are binary equal to “1” when
the individual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
158
Table 3.25: Effects of conflict on participation in social organizations, alternative
specification with limited control variables
Social Cultural Political Self-Defense
Club Associations Organization Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.051 0.011 0.025 0.067
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age
60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household sur-
vey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of
the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years
of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. Social Clubs are social groups
that include the practice of sports and hobbies. The Political Organizations are associations related with both local and
national level political parties. Cultural Associations include theater, dance and other artistic organizations. The Self-
Defense Groups are local civil groups organized to provide security. All the variables are binary equal to “1” when the
individual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3.26: Effects of conflict on participation in organizations that provide public services, alternative specification
with limited control variables identifying the source of violence
Mothers School’s Parents Glass of Milk Soup-Kitchen Neighbors Worker’s
Club Associations Program Program Associations Union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.002 -0.001 0.008 0.003* -0.007* -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.005 -0.007** -0.020** -0.004 0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.003 -0.001 0.016*** -0.000 0.001 0.014*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.003 -0.005** -0.028*** -0.005* 0.002 -0.020***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No No No
Observations 78393 166545 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.017 0.038 0.200 0.033 0.121 0.088
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment
of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of
the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables
for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents
the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Mothers’ Club is a social organization typically formed
by mothers (although, not exclusively) with the mission to serve as a link between the population and the Government, in order to manage and organize the
provision of some key social programs. The School Parents Association is a committee of parents that is part of the schools council formed also by teachers and
students under the direction of the principal. The Glass of Milk program is the largest social assistance program in Peru, distributing milk, milk substitutes,
cereals and other commodities among households with children, pregnant women and elderly population. The Soup-kitchen are social dining halls based on locally
organized charities to feed low-income households for free or for a small contribution. The Neighbors Associations are social organizations for the provision of
local public good or services. The Workers Union represents labor union organizations. All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports
participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3.27: Effects of conflict on participation in social organizations, alternative
specification with limited control variables identifying the source of violence
Social Cultural Political Self-Defense
Club Association Organization Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government violence exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Rebels violence exposure ages 0 to 18 0.020*** -0.005** 0.005 0.006**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Government violence exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.009*** 0.003* -0.007* -0.004**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Rebels violence exposure ages 19 to 60 0.016*** -0.005*** 0.007* 0.006**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No
Observations 166545 166545 166545 166545
Mean participation 0.051 0.011 0.025 0.067
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at
the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled
surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national
household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition, the models control for gender, marital status, family size
and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous
population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict
during the relevant age range. Social Clubs are social groups that include the practice of sports and hobbies. The Political
Organizations are associations related with both local and national level political parties. Cultural Associations include
theater, dance and other artistic organizations. The Self-Defense Groups are local civil groups organized to provide security.
All the variables are binaries equal to “1” when the individual reports participating in the organization, and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3.28: Effects of conflict exposure on trust in government institutions and the media, continuous trust scale
District Province National Regional National Jury National Office of Written Radio &
Government Government Congress Government of Elections Electoral Processes Press Television
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.008** -0.012** -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.005* -0.006 -0.007** -0.006 -0.008** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.011***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No No No No No
Observations 210915 206757 196327 195799 185444 188520 200729 210373
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.068 0.059 0.047 0.052 0.060 0.052
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level.
The sample includes only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled
surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and a province specific linear trend. In addition,
the models control for gender, marital status, family size and indicator variables for head of household, province migration, urban residence and native language (proxy for indigenous
population). Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to violence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Peruvian government system
is organized in four levels, going from more local to national: districts, provinces, regions and the national government. In addition, the legislative body of the government is the National
Congress. Even though the Congress is a national level institution, the Congressmen are elected at the department or region level, with most regions having more than one representative
in the Congress. The levels of trust for the variables are coded as “1” when individual has no trust, “2” if has little trust, “3” if has some trust and “4” if the individual reports having a
lot of trust in the institution.
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Table 3.29: Effects of conflict on trust in non-government institutions,
continuous trust scale
Catholic Political Ombudsman National
Church Parties Office Police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict exposure ages 0 to 18 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Conflict exposure ages 19 to 60 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.002
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Fixed effects (birth, district, survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend (province) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No No No No
Observations 173653 204641 212234 211327
Mean level of trust 0.566 0.066 0.421 0.196
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district of birth level. The sample includes
only individuals younger than age 60 at the beginning of the conflict (in 1980) and 18 years or older at
the moment of the interview for the household survey (pooled surveys from 2004 to 2014). All models
include fixed effects for district of birth, cohort of birth and wave of the national household survey, and
a province specific linear trend. Conflict exposure ages ‘x’ to ‘y’ represents the years of exposure to vi-
olence from the Peruvian armed conflict during the relevant age range. The Catholic Church represents
the most important religious institution in Peru (a largely Catholic country), the Political Parties refer
to political organizations (both local and national), the Ombudsman Office is the office of the public
defender responsible for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and the com-
munity (created in 1993), and the National Police represents the police forces. The levels of trust for the
variables were coded as “1” when the individual reported having some or a lot of trust in the institution,
and “0” if trust was little or none.
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Table 3.30: First Stage Estimates of Table 3.4: Labor Supply Models for
Women with Two or More Children in Latin America
All women Only married women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for Same sex Two boys, Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Panel A: Employed
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.034∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0056)
Two boys 0.031∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0078)
Two girls 0.037∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0080)
Observations 34213 34213 25262 25262
F-statistic 48.399 24.290 48.652 24.429
Sargan Test 0.058 0.520
Panel B: Informal
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.036∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0081)
Two boys 0.037∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0113)
Two girls 0.035∗∗∗ 0.022∗
(0.0099) (0.0117)
Observations 16952 16952 11639 11639
F-statistic 27.402 13.760 15.355 8.599
Sargan Test 0.068 0.018
Panel C: Hours
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.032∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0074)
Two boys 0.035∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0103)
Two girls 0.029∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.0086) (0.0106)
Observations 22259 22259 14221 14221
F-statistic 28.192 14.312 29.660 15.566
Sargan Test 0.001 0.031
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with chil-
dren younger than 18 years old from urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models
include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indi-
cators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (2) and (4). The
table includes the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the
instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of
overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is valid and the model
is not overspecified).
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Table 3.31: First Stage Estimates of Table 3.5: Labor Supply Models for
Women with Two or Three Children in Latin America
All women Only married women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for Same sex Two boys, Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Panel A: Employed
Same Sex 0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0059)
Two boys 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0082)
Two girls 0.033∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0084)
Observations 30087 30087 22223 22223
F-statistic 28.381 14.683 24.921 13.889
Sargan Test 0.457 0.120
Panel B: Informal
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.032∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0084)
Two boys 0.036∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0117)
Two girls 0.029∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.0102) (0.0121)
Observations 15113 15113 10376 10376
F-statistic 20.685 10.567 7.986 4.676
Sargan Test 0.228 0.044
Panel C: Hours
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.026∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0077)
Two boys 0.033∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0107)
Two girls 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗
(0.0090) (0.0111)
Observations 19618 19618 12531 12531
F-statistic 17.270 9.338 14.220 8.028
Sargan Test 0.001 0.002
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with chil-
dren younger than 18 years old from urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models
include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indi-
cators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (2) and (4). The
table includes the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the
instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of
overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is valid and the model
is not overspecified).
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Table 3.32: First Stage Estimates of Table 3.6: Labor Supply Models for Married Women with
Two or More Children in Latin America by Mother’s Education
Married women with Married women with Married women with
primary education or less Partial secondary education Complete secondary or more
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for Same sex Two boys, Same sex Two boys, Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls Two girls
Panel A: Employed
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.066∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0078) (0.0113)
Two boys 0.075∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ -0.005
(0.0148) (0.0108) (0.0158)
Two girls 0.056∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0112) (0.0162)
Observations 7602 7602 13194 13194 4455 4455
F-statistic 38.977 19.970 7.533 4.071 4.865
Sargan Test 0.200 0.134 0.000
Panel B: Informal
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.073∗∗∗ 0.006 0.035∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0115) (0.0142)
Two boys 0.148∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.010
(0.0232) (0.0161) (0.0199)
Two girls -0.002 0.011 0.080∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0165) (0.0203)
Observations 2953 2953 5857 5857 2824 2824
F-statistic 18.514 20.436 0.243 6.261 7.974
Sargan Test 0.039 0.616 0.864
Panel C: Hours
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.079∗∗∗ 0.016 0.044∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0135)
Two boys 0.135∗∗∗ 0.005 0.012
(0.0204) (0.0145) (0.0189)
Two girls 0.022 0.027∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0149) (0.0194)
Observations 3873 3873 7213 7213 3129 3129
F-statistic 27.820 22.300 1.702 10.762 7.956
Sargan Test 0.811 0.503 0.666
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. The
sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger than 18 years old from urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models
include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy
2nd is excluded from equations (2), (4) and (6). The table includes the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the
instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest
that the set of instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.33: First Stage Estimates of Table 3.7: Labor Supply Models for Married
Women with Two or More Children in Latin America by Mother’s Age
Married women aged 18-27 Married women aged 28-35
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for Same sex Two boys, Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Panel A: Employed
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.057∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0069)
Two boys 0.064∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0096)
Two girls 0.051∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0099)
Observations 7845 7845 17417 17417
F-statistic 36.426 18.515 21.110 11.353
Sargan Test 0.941 0.197
Panel B: Informal
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.089∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.0154) (0.0095)
Two boys 0.118∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.0214) (0.0133)
Two girls 0.060∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.0220) (0.0137)
Observations 2779 2779 8860 8860
F-statistic 33.501 18.794 1.964 1.029
Sargan Test 0.060 0.039
Panel C: Hours
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.075∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0088)
Two boys 0.082∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0122)
Two girls 0.069∗∗∗ 0.021∗
(0.0192) (0.0127)
Observations 3694 3694 10527 10527
F-statistic 31.327 15.841 9.891 5.318
Sargan Test 0.498 0.026
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger than 18 years
old from urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of survey F.E.
Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd
is excluded from equations (2) and (4). The table includes the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic
of the joint significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the
Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is valid and the model
is not overspecified).
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Table 3.34: First Stage Estimates Table 3.8: Labor Supply Models for Married
Women with Two or More Children in Latin America by Youngest Child Age
Married women youngest Married women youngest
child under 5 years old child over 4 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second Stage
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for Same sex Two boys, Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Panel A: Employed
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.026∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0095)
Two boys 0.019∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0131)
Two girls 0.032∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0138)
Observations 16468 16468 8794 8794
F-statistic 16.125 8.517 22.199 11.203
Sargan Test 0.010 0.063
Panel B: Informal
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.024∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.0095) (0.0131)
Two boys 0.011 0.053∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0180)
Two girls 0.037∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.0136) (0.0191)
Observations 7033 7033 4606 4606
F-statistic 6.570 4.157 2.981 4.361
Sargan Test 0.598 0.000
Panel C: Hours
Independent variables
Same Sex 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.0086) (0.0122)
Two boys 0.016 0.065∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0168)
Two girls 0.047∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.0122) (0.0177)
Observations 8787 8787 5434 5434
F-statistic 13.404 8.228 7.296 7.551
Sargan Test 0.368 0.462
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respec-
tively. Standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger
than 18 years old from urban households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and
year of survey F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd.
The variable Boy 2nd is excluded from equations (2) and (4). The table includes the number of observations,
the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak
instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that
the set of instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.35: First Stage Estimates Table 3.9: Labor Supply Models for Married
Women with Two or More Children in Latin America by Household
Composition
Only households with 3 Controlling for grandparents
or more children (LAC-15) present in household (LAC-11)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second Stage
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for Same sex Two boys, Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 — 3 children” Two girls Two girls
Panel A: Employed
Independent variables












Observations 9869 9869 18972 18972
F-statistic 20.277 10.743 53.248 26.764
Sargan Test 0.086 0.261
Panel B: Informal
Independent variables












Observations 4312 4312 8484 8484
F-statistic 6.987 3.577 16.425 10.946
Sargan Test 0.358 0.031
Panel C: Hours
Independent variables












Observations 5453 5453 11067 11067
F-statistic 12.170 6.711 31.857 18.152
Sargan Test 0.821 0.040
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger than 18 years old from urban
households in 15 countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of survey F.E. Other controls included are
age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st, Boy 2nd, Boy 3rd. The variable Boy 3rd is excluded from equations (2) and
(4). The table includes the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance of the instruments (a
value lower than 10 suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a p-value larger than
0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
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Table 3.36: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply Models for Married
Women with Three or More Children and with Grandparents or In-Laws present
in the Household
Only households with 4 Only households with
or more children (LAC-15) grandparents present (LAC-11)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second Stage
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument for - Same sex Two boys, - Same sex Two boys,
”More than 2 children” Two girls Two girls
Dependent variable
hhmore4 -0.139∗∗∗ -1.310 -2.058
(0.0199) (7.8581) (1.3407)
hhmore2 -0.122∗∗∗ -1.162 0.445
(0.0378) (1.1404) (0.5396)
Observations 3039 3039 3039 752 752 752
F-statistic
Sargan Test
hhmore4 0.074∗∗ -1.421 -1.229
(0.0303) (2.1435) (1.3455)
hhmore2 0.038 10.261 4.894
(0.0601) (24.5743) (4.9737)
Observations 1263 1263 1263 353 353 353
F-statistic
Sargan Test
hhmore4 -2.828∗∗ 20.253 29.334
(1.2116) (40.4044) (42.2832)
hhmore2 1.408 -69.046 -44.004
(2.1969) (81.8432) (37.2640)





Observations 3039 3039 3039 752 752 752
F-statistic 0.041 1.347 1.609 2.319
Sargan Test 0.935 0.030
Informal
Observations 1263 1263 1263 353 353 353
F-statistic 0.724 0.773 0.168 0.480
Sargan Test 0.981 0.620
Hours
Observations 1690 1690 1690 440 440 440
F-statistic 1.804 0.965 1.011 1.429
Sargan Test 0.675 0.619
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. The sample includes only women aged 18 to 35 with children younger than 18 years old from urban households
in 15 (columns 1, 2, and 3) and 15 (columns 4, 5, and 6) countries in the LAC region. All models include country and year of survey
F.E. Other controls included are age, age at first birth, plus indicators for Boy 1st and, Boy 2nd. The variable Boy 2nd is excluded
from equations (2) and (4). The table includes the number of observations, the value of the F-statistic of the joint significance
of the instruments (a value lower than 10 suggest a weak instrument), and the p-value of the Sargan Test of overidentification (a
p-value larger than 0.05 suggest that the set of instruments is valid and the model is not overspecified).
170
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2003). “The Economics Costs of Con-
flict: A Case Study of the Basque Country”. American Economic Review,
93(1):113–132.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., and Thaicharoen, Y. (2003). “Insti-
tutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth”.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(1):49–123.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012). “Why nations fail: The origins of
power, prosperity, and poverty”. Crown Business.
Adhvaryu, A. and Fenske, J. (2014). “Conflict and the Formation of Political
Beliefs in Africa”.
Aguero, J. M. and Marks, M. S. (2008). “Motherhood and Female Labor
Force Participation: Evidence from Infertility Shocks. American Economic
Review, 98(2):500–504.
Akresh, R., Bhalotra, S., Leone, M., and Okonkwo Osili, U. (2012a). “War
and Stature: Growing Up during the Nigerian Civil War”. American Eco-
nomic Review, 102(3):273–77.
Akresh, R., Caruso, G. D., and Thirumurthy, H. (2016). “Detailed Geo-
graphic Information, Conflict Exposure, and Health Impacts”.
Akresh, R. and de Walque, D. (2008). “Armed Conflict and Schooling: Evi-
dence from the 1994 Rwandan Genocide”. HiCN Working Paper 47.
Akresh, R., Lucchetti, L., and Thirumurthy, H. (2012b). “Wars and Child
Health: Evidence from the Eritrean-Ethiopian Conflict”. Journal of De-
velopment Economics, 99(2):330–340.
Akresh, R., Verwimp, P., and Bundervoet, T. (2011). “Civil War, Crop Fail-
ure, and Child Stunting in Rwanda”. Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 59(4):777–810.
Anderson, L. R., Mellor, J. M., and Milyo, J. (2004). “Social Capital and
Contributions in a Public-Goods Experiment”. American Economic Re-
view, 94(2):373–376.
Andersson, Gunnar and Hank, Karsten and Rnsen, Marit and Vikat, Andres
(2006). “Gendering Family Composition: Sex Preferences for Children and
Childbearing Behavior in the Nordic Countries”. Demography, 43(2):255–
267.
Angrist, J. D. (2004). “Treatment effect heterogeneity in theory and prac-
tice”. The Economic Journal, 114(494):C52–C83.
171
Angrist, J. D. and Evans, W. N. (1998). “Children and Their Parents’ La-
bor Supply: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Family Size”. The
American Economic Review, 88(3):450–477.
Azimi, E. (2015). “The effect of children on female labor force participation
in urban Iran”. IZA Journal of Labor and Development, 4(1):1–11.
Bank, W. (2011). “World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and
Development”. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Bauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilov, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., and Mitts, T.
(2016). “Can War Foster Cooperation?”. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 30(3):249–74.
Bauer, M., Cassar, A., Chytilov, J., and Henrich, J. (2014). “Wars Endur-
ing Effects on the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-Group
Biases”. Psychological Science, 25(1):47–57.
Becchetti, L., Conzo, P., and Romeo, A. (2013). “Violence, trust, and trust-
worthiness: evidence from a Nairobi slum”. Oxford Economic Papers.
Becker, G. S. (1991). “A Treatise on the Family”. Harvard University Press.
Becker, G. S. and Lewis, H. G. (1973). “On the Interaction between the
Quantity and Quality of Children”. Journal of political Economy, 81(2,
Part 2):S279–S288.
Bellows, J. and Miguel, E. (2006). “War and Institutions: New Evidence
from Sierra Leone”. The American Economic Review, 96(2):394–399.
Bellows, J. and Miguel, E. (2009). “War and local collective action in Sierra
Leone”. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1112):1144–1157.
Ben-Porath, Y. and Welch, F. (1976). “Do sex preferences really matter?”.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(2):285–307.
Bisbee, J., Dehejia, R., Pop-Eleches, C., and Cyrus, S. (2015). “Local In-
struments, Global Extrapolation: External Validity of the Labor Supply-
Fertility Local Average Treatment Effect”. NBER Working Paper No.
21663.
Blanco, L. and Ruiz, I. (2013). “The Impact of Crime and Insecurity on Trust
in Democracy and Institutions”. American Economic Review, 103(3):284–
88.
Blattman, C. (2009). “From Violence to Voting: War and Political Partici-
pation in Uganda”. American Political Science Review, 103(2):231–247.
Blattman, C. and Miguel, E. (2010). “Civil War”. Journal of Economic
Literature, 48(1):3–57.
Bozzoli, C., Brück, T., and Wald, N. (2013). “Self-employment and Conflict
in Colombia”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(1):117–142.
Browning, M. (1992). “Children and Household Economic Behavior“. Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 30(3):1434–1475.
Browning, M., Chiappori, P.-A., and Weiss, Y. (2014). “Economics of the
Family”. Cambridge University Press, 1st. edition edition.
Brück, T., Justino, P., and Verwimp, P. (2015). “New Developments in
Measuring the Welfare Effects of Conflict Exposure at the Micro-Level”.
172
Peace & Conflict, 16.
Brück, T., Justino, P., Verwimp, P., and Tedesco, A. (2013). “Measuring
Conflict Exposure in Micro-Level Surveys”. HiCN Working Paper 153.
Brück, T. and Wickstrom, B. (2004). “The Economic Consequences of Terror:
A Brief Survey”. HiCN Working Paper 03.
Bryant, W, K. and Zick, C. D. (2005). “The Economic Organization of the
Family”. Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition edition.
Bundervoet, T., Verwimp, P., and Akresh, R. (2009). “Health and Civil War
in Rural Burundi”. The Journal of Human Resources, 44(2):536–563.
Burt, Jo-Marie (2008). “Political violence and the authoritarian state in
Peru: silencing civil society”. Springer.
Busso, M. and Romero Fonseca, D. (2015). “Female Labor Force Partic-
ipation in Latin America: Patterns and Explanations”. Documento de
Trabajo Nro. 187.
Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (2010). “Microeconometrics using stata”,
volume 2. Stata press College Station, TX.
Cassar, A., Grosjean, P., and Whitt, S. (2013). “Legacies of violence: trust
and market development”. Journal of Economic Growth, 18(3):285–318.
Chioda, L. (2011). “Work and Family: Latin American and Caribbean
Women in Search of a New Balance”. Washington, DC. The World Bank,
1st. edition edition.
Collier, P., Elliott, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., and
Sambanis, N. (2003). “Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Devel-
opment Policy. A World Bank policy research report”. World Bank and
Oxford University Press.
Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion (2004a). “Informe final (Peru:
1980-2000). Tomo I: El proceso, los hechos, las victimas -Exposicion gen-
eral”. Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos y Pontificia Universidad
Catolica del Peru.
Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliacion (2004b). “Informe final (Peru:
1980-2000). Tomo III: Los factores que hicieron posible la violencia”. Uni-
versidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos y Pontificia Universidad Catolica
del Peru.
Crost, B., Duquennois, C., Felter, J., and I. Rees, D. (2015). “Climate
Change, Agricultural Production and Civil Conflict: Evidence from the
Philippines”. Discussion Paper No. 8965.
Crost, B., Felter, J., and Johnston, P. (2014). “Aid under Fire: Development
Projects and Civil Conflict”. American Economic Review, 104(6):1833–56.
Crost, B., Felter, J., Mansour, H., and I. Rees, D. (2013). “Election Fraud
and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines”. Discussion
Paper No. 7469.
Cruces, G. and Galiani, S. (2007). “Fertility and Female Labor Supply in
Latin America: New Causal Evidence”. Labor Economics, 14(3):565–573.
De Juan, A. and Pierskalla, J. H. (2016). “Civil war violence and political
173
trust: Microlevel evidence from Nepal”. Conflict Management and Peace
Science, 33(1):67–88.
De Luca, G. and Verpoorten, M. (2011). “From vice to virtue? Civil war
and social impact in Uganda”. Discussion Paper No. 298/2011.
Degregori, C. I. (2013). “Que dificil es ser Dios: El Partido Comunista del
Peru - Sendero Luminoso y el conflicto armado interno en el Peru: 1980-
1999”. IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, primera reimpresion edition.
Dehejia, R., Pop-Eleches, C., and Cyrus, S. (2015). “From Local to Global:
External Validity in a Fertility Natural Experiment”. NBER Working
Paper No. 21459.
Deng, L. B. (2010). “Social capital and civil war: The Dinka communities in
Sudans civil war”. African Affairs, 109(435):231–250.
Fukuyama, F. (2000). “Social Capital and Civil Society”. IMF Working
Paper.
Gafaro, M., Ibaez, A. M., and Justino, P. (2014). “Local Institutions and
Armed Group Presence in Colombia”. HiCN Working Paper 178.
Galdo, J. (2013). “Long-run labor market impacts of early life exposure to
civil war: Evidence from the shining path in Peru”. Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 61(4):789–823.
Gallegos, J. and Gutierrez, I. (2010). “The Effect of Civil Conflict on Do-
mestic Violence: the Case of Peru”. Working Paper.
Gangadharan, L. and Maitra, P. (2003). “Testing for Son Preference in South
Africa”. Journal of African Economies, 12(3):371–416.
Garcia-Ponce, O. and Pasquale, B. (2013). “How political violence shapes
trust in the state”. Unpublished working paper, Center for Global Devel-
opment.
Garcia-Ponce, O. and Pasquale, B. (2015). “How political violence shapes
trust in the state”. Unpublished working paper, Center for Global Devel-
opment.
Gilligan, M. J., Pasquale, B. J., and Samii, C. (2014). “Civil War and Social
Cohesion: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Nepal”. American Journal of
Political Science, 58(3):604–619.
Gorriti, G. (2014). “Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Peru”.
Planeta, primera reimpresion edition.
Grimard, F. and Laszlo, S. (2014). “Long-Term Effects of Civil Conflict on
Women’s Health Outcomes in Peru”. World Development, 54:139–155.
Grimard, F., Laszlo, S., and Lim, W. (2010). “Health, Aging and Child-
hood Socio-Economic Conditions in Mexico”. Journal of health economics,
29(5):630–640.
Hank, K. and Kohler, H.-P. (2000). “Gender Preferences for Children in Eu-
rope: Empirical Results from 17 FFS Countries”. Demographic Research,
2(1):–.
Hanushek, E. (1979). “Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Estima-
tion of Educational Production Functions”. Journal of Human Resources,
174
14(3):351–388.
Kalyvas, S. (2006). “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Killingsworth, M. R. and Heckman, J. J. (1986). “Chapter 2: Female labor
supply: A survey”. volume 1 of Handbook of Labor Economics, pages
103–204. Elsevier.
Kondylis, F. (2010). “Conflict displacement and labor market outcomes in
post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Journal of Development Economics,
93(2):235–248.
Kugler, A. and Kumar, S. (2013). “Prefernce for Boys, Family Size and
Educational Attainment in India”.
Laszlo, S. and Santor, E. (2009). “Migration, Social Networks, and Credit:
Empirical Evidence from Peru”. The Developing Economies, 47(4):383–
409.
Leon, G. (2012). “Civil Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation: The
Long-Term Effects of Political Violence in Peru”. Journal of Human Re-
sources, 47(4):991–1022.
McCormick, G. H. (1992). “From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Cam-
paign of the Shining Path”. Technical report, DTIC Document. No.
RAND/R-4150-USDP. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST
SANTA MONICA CA.
Morales, A. and Singh, P. (2014). “The Effect if Civil Conflict on Child
Abuse: Evidence from Peru”. Household in Conflict Network, HiCN Work-
ing Paper 191. November 2014.
Nannicini, T., Stella, A., Tabellini, G., and Troiano, U. (2013). “Social Capi-
tal and Political Accountability”. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 5(2):222–50.
Pollak, R. A. (2002). “Gary Becker’s Contribution to Family and Household
Economics”. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 9232.
1050 Massachusetts Avenue. Cambridge, MA 02138. October 2002.
Priebe, J. (2010). “Child Costs and the Causal Effect of Fertility on Fe-
male Labor Supply: An investigation for Indonesia 1993-2008”. Courant
Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 45,
Göttingen.
Putnam, R. D., Feldstein, L., and Cohen, D. (2003). “Better Together:
Restoring the American Community”. Simon & Schuster, New York.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Wolpin, K. I. (1980). “Life-Cycle Labor Supply and
Fertility: Causal Inferences from Household Models”. Journal of Political
Economy, 88(2):328–348.
Sanchez, A. (2010). “Transitory Shocks and Long-Term Human Capital Ac-
cumulation: The Impact of Conflict on Physical Health in Peru”. DT. No.
2010-020. Serie Documentos de Trabajo. Working Paper series. Diciembre
2010.
Schaub, M. (2014). “Solidarity with a sharp edge: Communal conflict and
175
local collective action in rural Nigeria”. HiCN Working Papers 183, House-
holds in Conflict Network.
Sears, D. O. and Valentino, N. A. (1997). “Politics matters: Political events
as catalysts for preadult socialization”. American Political Science Review,
91(1):45–65.
Shemyakina, O. (2011). “The Effect of Armed Conflict on Accumulation of
Schooling: Results from Tajikistan”. Journal of Development Economics,
95(4):186–200.
Stern, S. J. (1998). “Shining and other paths: war and society in Peru,
1980-1995”. Duke University Press.
Stock, J. and Watson, M. (2011). “Introduction to Econometrics (3rd edi-
tion)”. Addison Wesley Longman. Professor Stock receives royalties for
this text.
Tortarolo, D. (2014). “Female Labor Supply and Fertility. Causal Evidence
for Latin America”. Revista de Economia Politica de Buenos Aires, 13:27–
65.
Truth and Commission, R. (2014). “Hatun Willakuy: Abbreviated Version
of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”.
Voors, M. J. and Bulte, E. H. (2014). “Conflict and the evolution of institu-
tions at the local level in Burundi”. Journal of Peace Research, 51(4):455–
469.
Voors, M. J., Nillesen, E. E. M., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E. H., Lensink, R.,
and Van Soest, D. P. (2012). “Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field
Experiment in Burundi”. American Economic Review, 102(2):941–64.
Willis, R. J. (1987). “What Have We Learned from the Economics of the
Family?”. The American Economic Review, 77(2):68–81.
Wong, Ho-Po Crystal (2014). “Family Structure and Labor Supply of Moth-
ers in Societies with Son Preference: Evidence from Hong Kong”.
176
